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Abstract 
 
This thesis is composed of four essays that make empirical contributions to impact 
evaluations of health sector interventions in low- and middle-income countries, in 
light of the interventions introduced under Egypt’s Health Sector Reform Program 
(HSRP) between 2000 and 2014. We are mainly interested in the effects on family 
planning and maternal and child health. Different methods are used in this context: 
difference-in-differences (DD), DD propensity score matching (PSM), fixed effects 
(FE), random effects (RE) and pooled ordinary least-squares (POLS). 
 
In chapter 3, we estimate the effect of improving the quality of health care through 
facility accreditation on the family planning, maternal health and child health 
outcomes that we expect to reflect the effect of compliance with quality standards, 
policies and procedures. We found that accreditation had multiple positive effects, 
especially on delivery care and child morbidity prevalence. No significant effects 
were observed, however, with respect to most antenatal care (ANC) outcomes. 
 
In chapter 4, we estimate the medium-term effect of introducing user fees on the 
utilization of family planning, ANC and delivery care services, women’s access to 
health care, and child health status. With respect to ANC, we found that the positive 
effect of increased willingness to pay for an improved quality of service outweighed 
the negative effect of the price elasticity of demand. Introducing user fees was 
associated with a higher likelihood of receiving ANC by skilled health personnel, a 
higher likelihood of receiving at least four ANC visits and a higher likelihood of 
receiving iron supplements during pregnancy. However, the two effects offset each 
other with respect to the outcomes that reflect the utilization of family planning and 
delivery care services, women’s access to health care, and child health status. No net 
effect at all was observed on these outcomes. 
 
Chapter 5 complements the analysis of chapter 4 by allowing us to estimate the net 
effect of combining user fees and two quality improvement interventions: facility 
accreditation and performance-based financing (PBF). Again, we observe positive 
effects on both the utilization and the quality of ANC services. More notably, a 
positive effect on access to care was observed during our first study period that is 
more likely to reflect the effect of quality improvements. These effects, however, 
were reversed during the second study period that is more likely to reflect the effect 
of user fee introduction. The positive effects reported in chapters 4 and 5 were 
mainly with respect to ANC. No effects were reported on the outcomes that reflect 
the utilization of family planning and delivery care services, and child health status. 
 
In chapter 6, we estimate the effect of discontinuing provider incentives on health 
outcomes that reflect the health services targeted by the PBF scheme as well as the 
quality of these services. We found that discontinuing the incentives had a negative 
effect on four out of seven health outcomes: knowledge of contraceptive methods, 
receiving ANC by skilled health personnel, receiving iron supplements during 
pregnancy and, more importantly, under-five child mortality. 
 
 
 
ix 
 
Our findings, first, suggest that improving the quality of care through facility 
accreditation could be particularly effective in improving delivery care and child 
health. However, a high level of commitment from the central government is 
indispensable to sustain the positive effects of quality improvement interventions.  
Second, introducing user fees will not necessarily have negative effects on access to 
and utilization of family planning, maternal health and child health services. 
However, user fees are ineffective, in general, as a stand-alone policy. Third, 
negative effects of introducing user fees in low- and middle-income settings on the 
utilization of healthcare services can be mitigated by officially exempting the poor 
from any fees at the point of service. More importantly, this exemption should be 
known to the population. Fourth, combining quality improvement interventions with 
user fees will not necessarily add to the few positive effects obtained when user fees 
are introduced as a stand-alone policy. Finally, provider incentives should be 
introduced carefully in low- and middle-income countries as negative effects are 
observed when these incentives are discontinued. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 MOTIVATION 
Improving the health and well-being of mothers and children is an ultimate public 
health goal for all countries. There has been progress in maternal and child health 
indicators in many low- and middle-income countries. However, progress was not 
enough to achieve the health-related Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
adopted by the United Nations (UN) in 2000. Moreover, the progress achieved 
was uneven, with the poorer countries lagging behind the rest. 
Contraceptive use remains to be low in the least developed countries (40 percent) 
and is particularly low in Africa (33 percent) (United Nations, 2015). Antenatal care 
(ANC) coverage (at least four visits) was as low as 54 percent in Africa and 56 
percent in the Eastern Mediterranean in 2013. Only 54 percent and 59 percent of 
women in Africa and South-East Asia, respectively, benefited in 2013 from skilled 
care during childbirth. A total of 303,000 women died of complications during 
pregnancy or childbirth in 2015, with 64 percent of these deaths occurring in Africa 
only. In 2015, an estimated 5.9 million children worldwide died before reaching the 
age of five. The heaviest burden of under-five mortality was borne by Africa (2.8 
million) followed by South-East Asia (1.6 million) (World Health Organization, 
2016). 
The progress achieved with respect to maternal and child health was triggered by 
different health sector interventions across countries. In 1997, Egypt introduced the 
Health Sector Reform Program (HSRP) to address persistent needs in maternal and 
child health through an emphasis on primary health care (PHC). Different types of 
interventions were introduced simultaneously. Three supply-side interventions were 
introduced to strengthen health service delivery: renewal of PHC infrastructure and 
equipment, development of human resource and quality assurance. In parallel, two 
interventions were introduced to improve healthcare financing: performance-based 
financing (PBF) on the supply side and user fees on the demand side. 
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In this context, this thesis investigates the effects of different interventions under 
Egypt’s HSRP on family planning and maternal and child health between 2000 and 
2014. We provide reliable empirical evidence on these interventions for low- and 
middle-income countries in general and for Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) in particular. 
1.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
This thesis has the five main objectives. The first objective is to estimate the effect 
of improving the quality of health care through facility accreditation on family 
planning, maternal health and child health outcomes during the period 2000-2008. 
The second is to estimate the effect of introducing user fees on family planning, 
maternal health and child health outcomes during the period 2008-2014. Our third 
objective is to estimate the effect of introducing user fees together with quality 
improvement interventions on family planning, maternal health and child health 
outcomes during the period 2000-2008. The fourth objective is to estimate the effect 
of discontinuing provider incentives on family planning, maternal health and child 
health outcomes during the period 2005-2014. The final objective of this thesis is to 
investigate complementary methods and datasets in assessing the effectiveness of 
stand-alone as well as simultaneous interventions under Egypt’s HSRP. 
1.3 MAIN CONTRIBUTION 
This thesis makes four important contributions. First, it provides a comprehensive 
framework for investigating the effects of different health sector interventions based 
on differential reform phases. In this context, robust methods and multiple datasets 
are used complementarily to ensure the reliability of the results. 
Second, this thesis disaggregates the effects of different types of supply- and 
demand-side interventions that were introduced simultaneously. Such disaggregation 
allows us to compare the effectiveness of the different types of interventions. 
Moreover, we compare between the effects of interventions that were introduced 
simultaneously and the effects of stand-alone interventions. 
Third, the thesis investigates the effects of interventions on a complete set of health 
outcomes that cover not only the quantity, but also the quality, of the healthcare 
services provided under the HSRP. Whenever applicable, outcome measures of 
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quality of healthcare services are included in the analyses together with the 
conventional measures of the quantity of services received.  
Fourth, there is several key policy implications that could be drawn from the results 
of this thesis. For example, our findings suggest that facility accreditation alone may 
not be sufficient to sustain high quality of health care in low- and middle-income 
settings. Our findings also suggest that, in general, user fees are ineffective as a 
stand-alone policy. However, we found evidence that, even when accompanied by 
quality improvements, introducing user fees in low- and middle-income settings can 
have negative effects on access to and utilization of health care. Our findings as well 
suggest that PBF schemes need to be applied carefully in low- and middle-income 
countries. 
1.4 THESIS OUTLINE 
In this chapter, we discuss the motivation of the thesis, outline its main research 
objectives and highlight its key contribution to the current knowledge base. Chapter 
2 describes the context in which Egypt’s HSRP has been introduced and the data 
sources used to investigate the effects of the program. 
In chapter 3, we estimate the effects of quality improvement through a facility 
accreditation program between 2000 and 2008 on the health outcomes that we 
expect to reflect the effect of compliance with quality standards, policies and 
procedures, which are the focus of accreditation assessment. Chapter 4 provides 
evidence on the medium-term effect of introducing user fees in a middle-income 
setting on the utilization of family planning, ANC and delivery care services, 
women’s access to health care, and child health status during the period 2008-2014. 
Chapter 5 complements our analysis in chapter 4 by estimating the net effect of 
combining user fees and quality improvement interventions during the period 2000-
2008 instead of estimating the effect of introducing user fees as a stand-alone policy. 
In chapter 6, we estimate the effects of discontinuing provider incentives in Egypt, 
after being in operation for more than five years, on family planning, maternal 
health and child health outcomes that reflect the health services targeted by the PBF 
scheme as well as the quality of these services in contracted facilities. 
Chapter 7 summarizes the main conclusions of the thesis and recommends some 
directions for future research. 
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2. BACKGROUND AND DATA SOURCES 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, we describe the context in which Egypt’s Health Sector Reform 
Program (HSRP) was introduced and present the sources of the data used to 
investigate the effects of the program. 
First, we discuss the systemic problems in Egypt’s healthcare system, including poor 
health outcomes, inequity, inaccessibility, inefficiency, poor quality and long-run 
financial instability. These along with other problems helped trigger healthcare 
reform. We also describe the integrated package of service delivery and financing 
interventions introduced under the HSRP. We indicate the progress of the HSRP 
implementation as well. 
Second, we discuss different sources of data our study draws on, including facility-
level data, district-level data, demographic and health surveys (DHS) as well as 
other supplemental sources of information. 
With this in mind, the remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: section 2.2 
gives an overview of the HSRP; section 2.3 describes the sources of our data; and 
section 2.4 concludes. 
2.2 Egypt’s HSRP 
In this section, we discuss the challenges that triggered the HSRP, highlight its 
objective and guiding principles, and describe the two main components of the 
program and the interventions introduced under each component. 
The providers of primary health care (PHC) in Egypt are the Ministry of Health 
(MOH) (public), the Health Insurance Organization (HIO) (public) and the private 
sector. MOH operates a nationwide network of PHC facilities. These public PHC 
facilities serve as the “insurer of last resort” by offering free or substantially 
subsidized PHC services to uninsured individuals. 
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In the early 1990s, the main focus of Egypt’s national health strategy was to achieve 
universal health coverage. The Government of Egypt (GOE) pressured HIO -
Egypt’s largest health insurer1- to rapidly expand coverage to new groups, such as 
infants and school children. The pressing need to achieve rapid progress towards 
universal coverage did not take into account the appropriate health system financing 
required to ensure sustainability. The quality of healthcare services was disregarded 
as well. 
The HSRP was triggered by several challenges. Egypt’s health outcomes were 
unacceptably poor, and even worse than the lower middle-income average, 
especially maternal and child outcomes. The country’s maternal mortality rate stood 
at 84 deaths per 100,000 live births in 2000 (United Nations Children Fund, 2015). 
Under-five mortality was 69 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2000.2 About one in 14 
children died before reaching the age of five, one in 10 in rural Upper Egypt (El-
Zanaty & Way, 2001). 
Egypt’s healthcare system additionally manifested significant inaccessibility and 
inequities in the access to, the use of and the outcomes of health care. In terms of 
access, less than 40 percent of Egyptians were insured under HIO in 1997. In terms 
of equity, the geographic, income and gender healthcare disparities widened during 
the 1990s. The geographic maldistribution of beds and physicians further worsened 
geographic differences in outpatient visits and hospital admission rates. Disparities 
in infant and child mortality and maternal mortality were estimated at 3 to 1 and 5 to 
1, respectively, across governorates. Only 16 percent of public spending for health 
was allocated to the lowest income quintile group. Gender inequalities, especially in 
access to reproductive health care, were also pronounced (World Bank, 2004). 
The healthcare system was profoundly inefficient as well, combining financing and 
provision functions. Moreover, PHC facilities were underutilized and public 
hospitals had low occupancy rates despite the surplus of physicians (125,000 
licensed physicians in 1997) and hospital beds (2.1 per thousand population in 
1997)3. Over 60 percent of all PHC visits took place in private facilities in spite of 
the massive capacity, low cost and physical availability of public PHC facilities in 
                                                           
1 HIO is a financer and provider of care as well. 
2 Data refers to the 10-year period preceding the Egypt DHS 2000. 
3 Egypt has more beds per capita than other comparable low middle-income countries. 
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Egypt. The underutilization of PHC services was induced by the poor quality of 
healthcare provided, the unavailability of drugs and the inappropriate de facto 
opening times of most public PHC facilities that offered a morning shift only. 
Hospital occupancy rate was less than 50 percent in the 1990s. In parallel, private 
out-of-pocket expenditures were substantial (World Bank, 2004). 
The quality of public PHC facilities was alarmingly poor, especially in rural areas. 
The majority of facilities across the country were underfunded, inadequately 
maintained and equipped and lacked supplies and drugs. Health personnel were 
inadequately trained. 
In addition, allocative and technical inefficiencies posed a threat to the long-term 
financial stability of the health system, particularly in light of expanding insurance 
coverage and high population growth. 
The GOE launched a comprehensive HSRP in 1997 to address the fundamental 
challenges in the healthcare system. The main objective of the program is to provide 
coverage of a basic package of healthcare services for all Egyptians based on five 
guiding principles: universality, quality, equity, efficiency and sustainability. In this 
regard, the HSRP introduced an integrated package of service delivery and financing 
interventions to address the means by which PHC is financed, delivered, organized 
and managed. 
The HSRP came into operation in 2000. The simultaneous implementation of a 
comprehensive program across Egypt was deemed infeasible due to pre-existent 
constraints in the healthcare system and the complex nature of interventions to be 
introduced. Hence, the GOE decided to implement the HSRP over phases. The main 
targeting took place at the district level. The master plans of governorates relied on a 
social vulnerability index to target districts of the most vulnerable populations. Early 
entrants to the program included a group of PHC facilities in Alexandria, Menoufia 
and Sohag governorates, which represent urban governorates, Lower Egypt and 
Upper Egypt, respectively. The three pilot governorates represent the three major 
regions in Egypt. Other governorates followed subsequently. 
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2.2.1 Service Delivery Interventions 
The main objective of the service delivery component of the HSRP is to address 
persistent needs in maternal and child health through a family health approach to the 
provision of PHC. A family health model (FHM) for patient care was first adopted 
in Egypt. The new model allows for rapid integration of family health services 
where PHC services are provided under the same roof for the entire family. The 
service delivery component of the HSRP introduced three main supply-side 
interventions: renewal of PHC infrastructure and equipment, development of human 
resource and quality assurance. 
The HSRP requires each participating healthcare facility to possess a standard 
catalogue of physical equipment that enables it to provide the basic benefit package 
(BBP) of healthcare services introduced under the reform. However, a facility has to 
be accredited first to receive investments in infrastructure and equipment. Human 
resource development is centered on family practice training for physicians and 
nurses and subject-specific training for other non-medical specialists in the facilities. 
To raise the efficiency of often overstaffed facilities and improve the quality of 
health personnel, the HSRP sets guidelines regarding staff numbers and 
qualifications required at each public PHC facility. The guidelines also regulate the 
number of families that could be registered per physician (a maximum of 700 
families). The guidelines further regulate the working hours of facilities to ensure 
that 24-hour services are provided in both rural and urban PHC facilities. 
To ensure high quality of care, the HSRP introduced a facility accreditation system 
and, later, a performance-based financing (PBF) scheme of healthcare providers.4 
MOH established the Quality Improvement and Accreditation Program (QIP) in 
1998 to develop both a standardized process of accreditation as well as a system to 
ensure the continuous improvement and the effective monitoring of facilities’ 
performance. The Quality and Regulation Unit (QRU) in MOH assesses public PHC 
facilities based on a standardized survey and observation tools given by the QIP. 
The assessment covers eight dimensions: patient rights, patient care, safety, 
management of support services, management of information, quality improvement 
program, family practice and management of the facility. For each facility, the QRU 
                                                           
4 PBF is also known as pay-for-performance (P4P). 
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calculates a percent score of compliance to reflect adherence to pre-established 
accreditation standards. Facilities that achieve a score between 50 and 80 percent or 
above 80 percent are accredited for one year or two years, respectively. 
Accreditation qualifies health facilities to benefit from infrastructure, equipment and 
human resource interventions under the HSRP. The QRU regularly inspects 
accredited facilities. Contracted facilities that participate in the financing component 
of the HSRP are further subject to the autonomous supervision of the relevant 
regional Family Health Fund (FHF). FHFs supervise the administrative and financial 
arrangements of facilities. On the central level, the central FHF monitors and 
evaluates the adherence of regional FHFs to the HSRP strategies at the regional 
level. 
Unreformed facilities are only subject to supervision by the Health District and the 
Health Directorate. All public PHC facilities –accredited or not– are subject to direct 
administrative supervision at the governorate level by the Health District and the 
Health Directorate. Public PHC facilities are routinely visited, inspected and 
followed up on compliance with standards by supervisors from both entities.  
The facilities that are subject to service delivery interventions under the HSRP and 
are successful in receiving accreditation are referred to as “accredited” facilities. A 
proportion of the accredited facilities became subject to the financing interventions 
introduced under the HSRP. 
2.2.2 Financing Interventions 
The financing component of the HSRP includes two main interventions: 
rechanneling of funds from direct to performance-based financing (supply-side 
intervention) and instituting a non-linear price system for the uninsured at the point 
of delivery (demand-side intervention). In parallel, MOH developed a cost-effective 
BBP to maximize the health benefits per each Egyptian pound (EGP) spent. 
In 1999, FHFs were established at the governorate level to separate the financing 
from the provision of PHC services and to ensure the sustainability of finance of 
PHC services. FHFs act as intermediate contractors that purchase PHC services from 
healthcare providers5 on behalf of uninsured and insured beneficiaries. The FHF 
                                                           
5 Public, private and NGO. 
9 
 
establishes and supervises the rules and eligibility criteria for PHC providers, 
contracts with providers provided accreditation and adherence to the FHF’s 
guidelines, rechannels the funds allocated to PHC services by receiving finance from 
a mix of sources and pays salaries of staff. 
A PBF scheme was later integrated in the HSRP in 2001. According to this scheme, 
FHFs paid monthly incentives to contracted healthcare providers, who deliver the 
BBP, based on pre-defined performance criteria. To qualify for financial incentives, 
facilities were required to underscore pre-determined standards of 11 indicators that 
covered: number of visits per day per physician, number of drugs per visit, rate of 
patient referral to the district hospital, rate of completion of visit encounter forms, 
patient satisfaction rate, rate of completion of medical records data, years of 
protection provided by contraceptive methods, number of children fully vaccinated 
in the catchment area, patient waiting time, number of ANC visits per pregnant 
woman and adherence to medical protocols. The indicators were selected to reflect 
various aspects of service provision. A weight and a required standard were assigned 
to each indicator. 
The higher the performance of a facility with regard to the 11 indicators, the higher 
the bonuses that were paid by the FHF to this facility. The health personnel in 
awarded facilities received incentives of 50-275 percent of their base salary, based 
on job type, years of experience, academic qualifications and on-the-job 
performance. However, if a reformed facility performed averagely, the PBF 
incentives it received became more stringent than the non-PBF incentives an 
unreformed facility received, making the latter facilities more attractive for staff. To 
ensure the financial sustainability of FHFs, PBF was replaced by the conventional 
“fee-for-service” mechanism by the end of 2008. 
FHFs are financed through different sources, mainly revenues from the new price 
system (roster fees, visit fees and copayments) and contributions of MOH on behalf 
of the uninsured. Other main sources include HIO’s reimbursements on behalf of its 
insured individuals who choose to use reformed PHC facilities as well as official 
donations from internal and external agencies. FHFs use these financial resources to 
pay monthly incentives to contracted providers based on pre-defined performance 
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criteria, salaries for contracted personnel and other administrative and operating 
costs. 
The new non-linear price system requires the uninsured to pay a one-off copayment 
of EGP10 to register in the contracted facility and open a family folder, a copayment 
of EGP5 (EGP10 in Menoufia) for annual renewal of the family health folder, a 
copayment of EGP3 per examination and 35 percent of the medical treatment (drugs 
and other therapy). The poor are officially exempt from any copayments at the point 
of service in contracted facilities. Some population categories are also exempt such 
as under-18 orphans without a supporter, divorced women, widows and the 
unemployed. However, there are concerns over the functioning of exemptions. The 
main concern is that the majority of individuals have never heard of the payment 
exemption of the poor (World Bank, 2010). 
The new copayment regime became effective in contracted PHC facilities in all 
governorates and in all MOH PHC facilities in Menoufia. The insured in HIO could 
also use healthcare services provided by contracted health facilities that are later 
reimbursed for treatment. Unreformed PHC facilities charge just EGP1 per 
examination and nothing for registration, treatment/therapy or even drugs. However, 
the de facto examination fees charged by many facilities are above the official fee 
scale, especially in the rural areas. 
The PHC facilities that are subject to the financing interventions under the HSRP are 
referred to as “contracted” facilities as they enter into contractual agreements with 
the respective FHF. However, facilities do not necessarily transfer from the first 
phase (accreditation) to the second phase (contracting) of the HSRP. 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the pathway of Egypt’s HSRP. Out of 4,882 eligible PHC 
facilities across Egypt, a total of 2,549 facilities were successfully accredited by year 
2014, 763 out of which became contracted by 2014. A total of 1,786 PHC facilities 
remained accredited only by 2014. These facilities have not been subject to any of 
the financing interventions introduced under the HSRP (Figure 2.2). 
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Figure 2.1: The pathway of the HSRP 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Progress of the HSRP’s implementation 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Egypt’s MOH 
 
A Quasi-Natural Experiment. A quasi-natural experiment is associated with the 
implementation of Egypt’s HSRP. As discussed earlier, the HSRP targeting is 
not random but rather relies on a social vulnerability index to target districts of the 
most vulnerable populations. However, we highlight the fact that the main targeting 
takes place at the district level rather than village or facility level. Decentralized and 
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autonomous allocation of funds takes place within districts. The Health District and 
the Health Directorate are responsible for such allocation within each district. This 
allocation could be random or follows criteria we do not observe. We also highlight 
the fact that, even at the district level, the HSRP targeting does not strictly follow 
the social vulnerability index. Later in the empirical chapters, we would investigate 
whether the differences in the district characteristics between reformed and 
unreformed health facilities are consistent with the targeting criteria of the HSRP.  
2.3 DATA SOURCES 
In this section, we describe the facility-level data, the district-level data, the DHS 
and the other supplemental sources of information that this study draws on.  
2.3.1 Facility-Level Data 
Our main explanatory variables reflect the HSRP interventions at the facility level. 
These variables draw from facility-level data that is collected from Egypt’s MOH 
and associated agencies. The Department of PHC in MOH keeps records of all PHC 
facilities that are affiliated to the Ministry. The QRU regularly accredits and inspects 
health facilities. The Family Health Unit (FHU) tracks the contracting of facilities 
with relevant FHFs. We obtain a list of PHC facilities in all governorates across the 
country during the period 2000-2014 and merge this data with data on interventions 
for accreditation and contracting. Table 2.1 disaggregates Egypt’s health facilities by 
the phases of reform. Out of 4,882 facilities eligible to join the HSRP, a total of 
2,549 (52 percent) and 763 (16 percent) facilities are accredited and contracted, 
respectively, by year 2014 (Table 2.1). 
 
Table 2.1: Health facilities by status of reform 
Cumulative number of facilities Years 
2000 2005 2008 2014 
Total 3,527 3,976 4,839 5,300 
Eligible to join the HSRP 3,065 3,533 4,410 4,882 
Accredited 3 647 1,200 2,549 
Contracted 2 343 525 763 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Egypt’s MOH 
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We also obtain information on the geographic coordinates of all health facilities 
across Egypt from the National Information Center for Health and Population 
(NICHP) affiliated to MOH. We use the data on the Global Positioning System 
(GPS) locations of PHC facilities and the GPS locations of women in our facility-
level analyses to link each woman to her nearest mapped facility. 
Besides information on the interventions, we obtain detailed information on the 
characteristics of health facilities from MOH. We use this data to generate a set of 
facility-level controls. Whenever possible, these controls are included in our facility-
level analyses to account for possible differences between treated and control 
facilities prior to participation in different interventions under the HSRP. The data 
obtained addresses the labor force, the building condition and the population 
coverage of facilities. 
2.3.2 The DHS 
The main source of data used to construct our dependent variables is the Egypt 
cross-section DHS, conducted in years 2000, 2005, 2008 and 2014. The Egypt DHS 
provides detailed information on fertility, family planning, infant and child 
mortality, maternal and child health and nutrition. The Egypt DHS consists of two 
main questionnaires: the household (HH) questionnaire and the ever-married women 
(EMW) questionnaire. Table 2.2 summarizes the sample selection, the survey 
coverage and the response rate of each of the four waves of the Egypt DHS. 
The EMW questionnaire, from which we extract our data, provides information on a 
nationally representative sample of EMW (between the ages of 15-49) during each 
month of around a five-year period beginning five years prior to the date of the 
interview. The observations are the EMW and their children. We present the 
characteristics of the EMW sample for the Egypt DHS waves in Table 2.3. 
The four waves of the Egypt DHS allow us to match early and late entrants to the 
HSRP. Combining data from the four waves of the DHS provides information on 
family planning and maternal and child health for 73,336 women and 51,219 births 
during the period 1995-2014. 
 
14 
 
Table 2.2: Description of the Egypt DHS  
 The 2000 Egypt DHS The 2005 Egypt DHS The 2008 Egypt DHS The 2014 Egypt DHS 
Sample selection 
(1) Stage 1 
 
 
 
 
 
(2) Stage 2 
 
 
 
(3) Stage 3 
 
500 primary sampling units 
selected (228 shiakhas/towns 
and 272 villages) 
 
 
 
1,000 segments from the parts 
in each shiakha/town and 
village chosen 
 
Random sample of HHs 
drawn 
 
682 primary sampling units 
selected (298 shiakhas/towns 
and 384 villages) 
 
 
 
1,359 segments from the parts 
in each shiakha/town and 
village chosen 
 
Random sample of HHs 
drawn 
 
610 primary sampling units 
selected (275 shiakhas/towns 
and 335 villages) 
 
 
 
1,267 segments from the parts 
in each shiakha/town and 
village chosen 
 
Random sample of HHs 
drawn 
 
884 primary sampling units 
selected (481 shiakhas/towns 
and 445 villages before 
dropping North and South 
Sinai from the sample) 
 
1,838 segments from the parts 
in each shiakha/town and 
village chosen 
 
Random sample of HHs 
drawn 
Survey coverage 17,521 HHs 
15,649 women 
22,807 HHs 
19,565 women 
19,739 HHs 
16,571 women 
29,471 HHs 
21,903 women 
Response rate 99.5% 99.5% 99.7% 99.4% 
Source: The Egypt DHS, 2000, 2005, 2008 and 2014 
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Table 2.3: Characteristics of the EMW sample of the Egypt DHS 
Characteristic of the EMW sample 2000 2005 2008 2014 
Demographic and socio-economic characteristics (weighted %) 
Marital status Married 92.4 93.4 93.2 94.0 
Widowed 5.0 3.9 4.1 3.1 
Divorced/separated 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.9 
Age 15-19 4.0 4.1 3.8 3.5 
20-24 14.4 15.2 15.6 14.0 
25-29 18.3 19.4 20.4 21.8 
30-34 17.3 16.5 16.1 19.0 
35-39 17.2 16.4 15.6 16.1 
40-44 14.0 14.7 15.0 13.2 
45-49 14.8 13.7 13.5 12.4 
Urban-rural residence Urban 44.1 41.3 41.2 35.0 
Rural 55.9 58.7 58.8 65.0 
Place of residence Urban governorates 19.2 16.9 17.7 12.7 
Lower Egypt 43.8 43.2 46.1 49.0 
     Urban 12.5 11.3 11.7 10.7 
     Rural 31.3 31.9 34.4 38.3 
Upper Egypt 35.6 38.8 34.8 37.4 
     Urban  11.6 12.4 10.8 11.1 
     Rural 24.0 26.4 24.0 26.2 
Frontier governorates 1.3 1.1 1.4 0.9 
Education No education 43.2 34.6 32.1 24.0 
Some primary 13.2 11.3 8.4 6.1 
Primary complete/some secondary 13.0 14.0 14.6 17.4 
Secondary complete/higher 30.5 40.1 44.9 52.4 
Educational 
attainment 
Median years of schooling 3.1 6.3 7.6 10.1 
Literacy Percentage literate 50.2 59.1 64.7 73.2 
Wealth quintile Lowest NA 18.3 18.4 17.9 
Second NA 19.4 19.7 19.7 
Middle NA 20.2 20.5 22.2 
Fourth NA 21.2 21.2 20.9 
Highest NA 20.9 20.2 19.4 
Employment status (%)  
Employment status Employed in the 12 months preceding the survey  
     Currently employed 16.8 21.5 16.4 15.5 
     Not currently employed 0.9 0.7 0.3 0.6 
Not employed in the 12 months preceding 
the survey 
82.3 77.8 83.4 83.9 
Occupation Professional/technical/managerial 40.9 36.0 45.9 45.3 
Clerical 23.6 12.7 11.4 9.2 
Sales and services 11.5 17.3 18.6 21.4 
Skilled manual 5.5 5.0 4.0 6.8 
Unskilled manual NA 3.3 5.1 1.2 
Agriculture 17.3 25.5 14.5 16.1 
Type of employment Agricultural work 17.3 25.5 14.5 NA 
Non-agricultural work 81.5 74.3 85.1 NA 
Characteristics of the HH population  
Dependency ratio 69.2 62.1 61.5 NA 
Mean size 5.2 4.9 4.6 4.1 
HH headship (%) Male 88.0 87.7 86.6 87.1 
Female 12.0 12.3 13.4 12.9 
Housing characteristics  
Electricity (%) Yes 97.7 99.4 99.6 99.8 
No 2.3 0.6 0.4 0.2 
Source of drinking Piped into residence/plot 80.8 89.7 91.4 90.9 
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Characteristic of the EMW sample 2000 2005 2008 2014 
water (%) 
Sanitation facility (%) Modern flush toilet 33.4 43.0 42.2 56.1 
Traditional with tank flush 3.6 1.9 2.3 NA 
Traditional with bucket flush 57.5 52.9 54.7 NA 
Pit toilet/latrine 3.0 1.0 0.3 0.0 
No facility 2.6 1.1 0.4 0.1 
Mean rooms per HH 3.7 3.9 3.8 NA 
Mean persons per room 1.6 1.8 1.7 NA 
NA: Not available. 
Source: The Egypt DHS, 2000, 2005, 2008 and 2014 
 
However, it is important to note that the Egypt DHS does not allow us to track the 
same women and children over time. Therefore, we collapse data from each DHS 
wave at the facility level to construct facility-level indicators for each wave. These 
indicators constitute the dependent variables of this study. Thus, we investigate the 
effects of interventions under the HSRP at the facility level rather than the 
individual level. 
In most recent DHSs, the groupings of HHs that participate in the survey, known as 
clusters, are geo referenced. These survey cluster coordinates are collected in the 
field using GPS receivers, usually during the survey sample listing process. In 
general, the GPS readings for most clusters are accurate to approximately less than 
15-20 meters. We obtain the GPS data points of all interviewed women in the Egypt 
DHS and use this information in the subsequent empirical chapters to spatially link 
women to their nearest facilities, and then, construct facility-level health outcomes. 
2.3.3 The Population and Housing Census 
We use data from Egypt’s 2006 Population and Housing Census to generate a set of 
district-level social and economic indicators. Whenever possible, these indicators 
are included in our analyses to capture possible differences between treated and 
control facilities prior to the launch of the HSRP. The socio-economic indicators 
included are the illiteracy ratio, the unemployment ratio, the income dependency 
ratio, inaccessibility to electricity, inaccessibility to potable water, the average 
family size, the HH crowding factor and the population size. These eight indicators 
are used to construct the vulnerability index that is used for the HSRP targeting. 
Egypt’s Population and Housing Census is the primary source of information on the 
universe of Egyptian HHs. The census is the most comprehensive source of 
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demographic, economic and social statistics for the entire population. The Central 
Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS) of Egypt conducts this 
Population and Housing Census every 10 years. 
2.4 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, we provide the contextual setting of our analyses in the four 
empirical chapters to follow. First, we discuss the fundamental challenges faced by 
Egypt’s healthcare system with respect to health outcomes, access to care, equity, 
efficiency, quality and financial stability. These are the challenges that triggered the 
launch of the HSRP in 1997. Under the HSRP, different types of interventions were 
introduced to improve the service delivery and financing of healthcare services. The 
service delivery component of the HSRP introduced three supply-side interventions: 
renewal of PHC infrastructure and equipment, development of human resource and 
quality assurance. The financing component introduced two main interventions: PBF 
of healthcare providers on the supply side and user fees on the demand side. Second, 
we present the data sources of this study. We describe the facility-level data, the 
district-level data, the Egypt DHS and the other sources of information used to 
construct our explanatory and dependent variables in the subsequent empirical 
chapters. Moreover, we summarize the background characteristics of the EMW 
interviewed whose data is later used to calculate our health outcomes of interest. 
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3. THE EFFECT OF IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE 
THROUGH ACCREDITATION ON FAMILY PLANNING AND 
MATERNAL AND CHILD HEALTH 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In 1997, a comprehensive Health Sector Reform Program (HSRP) was launched in 
Egypt to address fundamental challenges in the healthcare system. As discussed in 
chapter 2, the HSRP introduced an integrated package of service delivery and 
financing interventions to address the means by which primary health care (PHC) is 
financed, delivered, organized and managed. One of the cornerstones of the HSRP is 
the facility accreditation program. The program is defined as a process for evaluating 
PHC facilities according to a set of standards that define activities and structures that 
directly contribute to improved patient outcomes. The main aim of the program is to 
provide the HSRP with a framework for continuous quality improvement. The results 
of accreditation are also used as the basis for performance-based contracting with the 
Family Health Fund (FHF). 
Accreditation of healthcare providers has been established in many high-income 
countries, and some low- and middle-income countries, as an approach to improve the 
quality of care that combines the two elements of quality assurance and quality 
improvement (Hort et al., 2013). There is consistent evidence that shows that 
accreditation programs improve the process of care provided by healthcare services 
(Alkhenizan & Shaw, 2011). However, there is little evidence on the effectiveness of 
accreditation in terms of patient-level outcomes in all settings (Hinchcliff et al., 2012; 
Flodgren et al., 2016; Brubakk et al., 2015). To date, no study in a low- or middle-
income country investigated the effect of quality improvement through accreditation 
on key patient outcomes such as family planning, maternal health and child health 
outcomes. Since accreditation usually entails a significant cost, investigating its 
effectiveness is crucial, especially in settings where resources are constrained. 
In this chapter, we attempt to fill the gap in the literature by investigating the effect of 
quality improvement through accreditation on patient outcomes in a middle-income 
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country. The chapter exploits the quasi-natural experiment associated with the 
introduction of Egypt’s facility accreditation program to estimate the effect of having 
access to an accredited facility on a set of family planning, maternal health and child 
health outcomes. To do this, difference-in-differences (DD) is combined with 
propensity score matching (PSM). Diversified datasets on the health of populations in 
catchment, the characteristics of health facilities and the socio-economic indicators of 
districts are used. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 provides background information for the 
analysis of this study; section 3.3 discusses the econometric methods used in the 
study; section 3.4 constructs our dependent and explanatory variables; section 3.5 
presents the descriptive statistics and the estimation results; section 3.6 discusses 
several tests of the underlying identification strategy used; and section 3.7 concludes. 
3.2 BACKGROUND 
In this section, we give an overview of the facility accreditation program, discuss the 
anticipated effect of the program and review evidence on the effect of quality 
improvement through accreditation interventions in low- and middle-income 
countries. 
3.2.1 The Facility Accreditation Program 
In 1997, the GOE launched the HSRP, a new PHC strategy to reform the health system 
in phases over a period of 15-20 years. One of the key marketing points of the newly 
introduced PHC model of service provision is that it would improve access to quality 
care. To this end, the facility accreditation program was introduced with the aim of 
improving the quality of PHC services. The program is defined by Egypt’s MOH as 
an organized process to monitor the quality of services and influence the behavior and 
functions of healthcare providers to ensure compliance with quality standards. The 
program also allows facilities to improve the quality of services by providing follow-
up visits where technical assistance is provided to develop an improvement plan. 
Any PHC facility in Egypt is eligible to participate in the facility accreditation 
program. As part of the HSRP, accreditation is obligatory to all facilities interested in 
joining the program and contracting with the Family Health Fund. In addition, 
accreditation is voluntary to any other facility interested in being accredited. For a 
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facility to become eligible, it must meet specific criteria. The facility must have a 
process to monitor, evaluate, and improve the quality of care to its patients. In parallel, 
the facility must have a patient record system. In addition, the facility must provide a 
defined package of services including reproductive health obstetrics and gynecology, 
neonatal care, pediatric and adult medical care, basic emergency care and preventive 
health services. The facility must also provide services that include ambulatory care 
with or without inpatient services. Finally, the facility must be in operation for at least 
six months, have appropriate license by MOH and relevant medical union and 
operates in compliance with all government laws and regulations. 
The survey is a key step in the accreditation program. The survey process consists of 
a site visit to the PHC facility. This visit is conducted by a team of experts trained in 
accreditation using pre-set accreditation survey instruments and tools. The purpose of 
the accreditation survey is to evaluate the extent to which a facility complies with the 
nationally established accreditation standards, and accordingly, determine whether a 
facility is awarded or denied accreditation. 
Eight categories were selected to be included in the assessment: patient rights, patient 
care, safety, management of support services, management of information, quality 
improvement program, family practice and management of the facility. Optimal 
standards in each category were developed focusing on key processes, activities, or 
outcomes that facilities should achieve. 
During the accreditation survey, trained surveyors use three approaches to collect data 
and measure compliance with the established standards. The three approaches are: 
record review of specific administrative and clinical records, observation of the 
performance of specified tasks in specified areas in addition to personal interviews. 
The data is later analyzed using a computerized accreditation program. If a facility 
scores from 80 percent to 100 percent of the total survey scores, it is granted full 
accreditation for a period of two years. If a facility scores between 50 percent and 79 
percent of the total survey score, it is granted provisional accreditation for one year, 
after which a reassessment survey of the facility is conducted to assess improvements 
made in the problem areas identified in the first accreditation report. If a facility scores 
less than 50 percent, accreditation is denied. 
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The scoring criteria that measures the accreditation standards ranges from zero to 
three. Scores of zero, one, two and three denote that an accreditation standard is not 
met, unacceptable (partially met), acceptable (partially met) and fully met, 
respectively. All the scores from each activity are added to get the aggregate for the 
accreditation standard. The average score for each standard is calculated by dividing 
the aggregate scores by the frequency of activities. The scores are then weighed at the 
sub-area score level (level one) and the overall facility score level (level two) as shown 
in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, respectively. 
The quality dimension “patient care” contributes the most to the total accreditation 
score. This dimension measures the extent to which patients receive appropriate care. 
This focuses on compliance with clinical practice guidelines as well as appropriate 
diagnosis, assessment, treatment, follow-up and patient counseling.  
The focus of the assessment of the sub-area “antenatal care (ANC)” of the quality 
dimension “patient care” is to get a general understanding of the quality of ANC at 
the facility. For example, the surveyor assesses if a comprehensive history and 
physical examination is performed for all patients. The general physical examination 
should include weight measurement, height measurement, blood pressure 
measurement as well as measurement of edema of lower limbs. The surveyor also 
assesses if the necessary diagnostic tests (laboratory and radiology) are performed on 
time to determine the diagnosis. These tests include but are not limited to blood 
analysis, complete urine analysis and ultrasound according to clinical guidelines. In 
addition, the surveyor assesses that all treatment plans are appropriate according to 
clinical guidelines. For example, supplementation of iron and folic acid in first 
trimester is checked. The surveyor as well assesses the number of ANC visits 
according to clinical guidelines. For these visits, there is another assessment if a 
comprehensive history and physical examination is performed for all patients. In 
addition, the surveyor assesses if some educational messages are discussed with 
patient. For example, the physician should assist pregnant women have better 
knowledge and understanding of their immunization status (tetanus toxoid), the 
importance and the number of visits that should be made prior to delivery, alarming 
signs such as bleeding and the delivery services in the facility. 
 
 22 
Table 3.1: Sub-area score 
Quality dimension Sub-area Sub-area weight 
Patient rights Patient rights 2 
 Dimension total 2 
Patient care General clinical areas 3 
 Hypertension 3 
 Diabetes 3 
 ANC* 3 
 Normal delivery, neonatal 3 
 Postnatal care 3 
 IMCI** 3 
 Immunization 3 
 Family planning 3 
 Dimension total 27 
Safety Infection control 3 
 Sterilization 3 
 Employee health safety 1 
 Environmental safety 2 
 Dimension total 9 
Support services Emergency 2 
 Laboratory 2 
 Radiology 2 
 Pharmacy 3 
 Housekeeping 1 
 Kitchen 1 
 Laundry 1 
 Dimension total 12 
Management of information Medical records 2 
 MIS***/reporting 1 
 Dimension total 3 
Quality improvement program Quality improvement program 2 
 Dimension total 2 
Family practice model Prevention and screening 3 
 Continuity of care 3 
 Referral 3 
 Dimension total 9 
Management of the facility Human resource development 1 
 Management 1 
 Budgeting 1 
 Continuous education 1 
 Provider satisfaction 1 
 Dimension total 5 
*ANC: Antenatal care. **IMCI: Integrated Management of Child Illnesses. ***MIS: Management 
Information System. 
Source: Egypt’s MOH 
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Table 3.2: Overall facility score 
Quality dimension Dimension weight % of total score 
Patient rights 1 6% 
Patient care 5 29% 
Safety 3 18% 
Support services 2 12% 
Management of information 1 6% 
Quality improvement program 1 6% 
Family practice model 3 18% 
Management of the facility 1 6% 
Total 17 100% 
Source: Egypt’s MOH 
 
The focus of the sub-area “Integrated Management of Child Illnesses (IMCI)” is the 
wellbeing of children under five years of age. The surveyor first assesses if a 
comprehensive history and physical examination is performed for all sick children 
according to age of child. For example, a child is checked for cough, diarrhea, sore 
throat, ear infection and fever. Second, this surveyor assesses if the health providers 
explain to mothers the classification and treatment and any follow-up steps using clear 
and simple language. Third, the surveyor assesses if cases requiring diagnostic tests 
are appropriately referred according to IMCI guidelines, when needed. Finally, the 
surveyor assesses if the facility provides appropriate prevention and treatment to all 
sick children according to IMCI guidelines. 
The assessment of the sub-area “family planning” mainly focuses on counseling 
sessions. The surveyor assesses if a comprehensive history and physical examination 
is performed for all new women. The surveyor also assesses if insertion and removal 
of method is appropriately performed according to guidelines. In addition, the 
surveyor assists if the facility has a good information/education/communication (IEC) 
system. For example, the surveyor checks if the health provider discusses the family 
planning methods and follow-up steps with the client. The surveyor checks if the 
client is informed about different methods, mode of action, side effect, how to use a 
method, cost of method, etc. Finally, the surveyor assesses if the client decided on the 
appropriate method(s). 
Equipment and staff in accredited facilities generally follow a plan that complies with 
international standards. If needed, accreditation is accompanied by a series of 
interventions to meet equipment quality standards and strengthen staff’s competence 
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in addressing family health needs. Existing delivery units are transformed to meet the 
criteria for either Family Health Units (FHU) that provide basic outpatient services or 
Family Health Centers (FHC) that provide limited specialist outpatient and inpatient 
services. In most cases, this transformation implies upgrading, renewing or adding 
modern equipment. Examples of equipment in FHUs include sterilization ovens, 
delivery chairs and dentist chairs. Examples in FHCs include ultrasounds, x-rays, and 
hematological and cytological labs. To strengthen staff’s competence, equipment 
interventions are accompanied by a comprehensive training package for facility staff. 
For physicians and nurses, the package focuses on family health practice. For other 
non-medical specialists in facilities, such as pharmacists, lab technicians and social 
workers, the package focuses on subject-specific training. In addition, training is a 
means to introduce substantial administrative changes in facilities, such as reaching 
out to and rostering families, and keeping medical records electronically and in family 
folders. 
3.2.2 Anticipated Effect of the Facility Accreditation Program 
One important characteristic of healthcare markets is the presence of asymmetric 
information, where healthcare providers have more information than patients with 
respect to diagnoses, potential treatments, outcomes of services provided and the 
payments for these services (Arrow, 1963). When health providers, for their own self-
interests, act as “imperfect” agents on behalf of patients, over and under provision of 
care, as well as variations in quality, become a health concern. Different interventions, 
including accreditation of providers, have evolved in response to these problems. By 
subjecting healthcare providers to a formal process that makes them meet pre-
determined standards, accreditation is expected to minimize variations in medical 
practice, eliminate medically inappropriate care, control costs and address the 
possibility that quality is underprovided (Viswanathan & Salmon, 2000; Akerlof, 
1970). 
In the context of this study, accreditation is expected to have a primary or direct effect 
on some maternal health, child health and family planning outcomes, and a secondary 
or indirect effect on other outcomes. Accreditation of health facilities reflects better 
compliance with standards defining activities and structures that directly contribute to 
improved patient outcomes. Thus, accreditation standards established to measure 
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compliance of facilities in the subareas ANC, IMCI and family planning of the quality 
dimension “patient care” are expected to have a primary effect on ANC coverage 
(number of ANC visits), quality of ANC (weight measurement, blood pressure 
measurement, urine sample collection, blood sample collection and iron 
supplementation), child morbidity prevalence (acute respiratory infection (ARI), fever 
and diarrhea) and informed choice of contraceptive methods (knowledge of side 
effects of contraceptive method used and knowledge of other methods of 
contraception that could be used). These outcomes reflect some of the standards 
assessed during the accreditation survey. We expect improvements in these outcomes 
in accredited compared to non-accredited facilities. 
In parallel, accreditation is expected to have a secondary effect on the utilization of 
antenatal and delivery care services. Quality improvement in accredited facilities 
introduces an incentive for individuals to increase their demand for healthcare services 
and seek care at accredited facilities. The effect of this incentive is expected to be 
more significant with respect to the sub-areas of care that are included in the 
assessment of the accreditation survey. Thus, we expect having access to an accredited 
facility to be associated with higher ANC coverage (at least four visits), higher 
institutional delivery and higher skilled assistance during delivery. This expectation 
holds given that accredited facilities were not functioning at full capacity prior to 
accreditation and can increase supply in the short term. 
3.2.3 Evidence on the Effect of Accreditation 
We searched Academic Search Complete, Business Source Complete, CINAHL, 
EconLit, E-Journals, Health Policy Reference Center, MEDLINE, PsycINFO and 
SocINDEX via EBSCO database on May 4, 2017. A combination of the keywords 
“accreditation” and “health” was used to search the abstracts of studies published in 
EBSCO’s databases. We initially limited the results by excluding non-English studies, 
studies published before 2000 and studies conducted in high-income settings. This 
search yielded 104 studies after removing exact duplicates from the results. We 
screened these studies based on title and abstract, and searched the reference lists of 
the relevant ones. A total of seven studies were finally selected to be reviewed (see 
Table 3.3).  
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Table 3.3: Evidence on the effectiveness of accreditation of healthcare providers 
Study Intervention Outcome measure Reported effect on 
outcome 
Al Tehewy et al. 
(2009) 
-Accreditation of non-governmental organizations’ 
health units 
-Patient satisfaction Positive 
-Provider satisfaction None 
-Compliance with standards Positive 
    
Bukonda et al. (2002) -A national hospital accreditation program -Compliance with standards Positive 
    
Cleveland et al. 
(2011) 
-Accreditation of basic package of health services -Availability of information Positive 
-Shared understanding of priorities and oversight Positive 
-PBF Positive 
    
El-Jardali et al. (2008) -A national hospital accreditation program -Perceived quality of care Positive 
    
Hong et al. (2011) -Accrediting public clinics a gold star against a 
checklist of 101 quality indicators 
-Communication campaign 
-Contraceptive supply Positive 
-Counselling services Positive 
-Examination services Positive 
-Management Positive 
-Compliance with standards Positive 
    
Quimbo et al. (2008) -Accreditation of public/private healthcare providers 
-Insurance claims review 
-Financial incentives to healthcare providers 
-Average “vignette” score* Positive 
    
Salmon et al. (2003) -A province public hospital accreditation program -Compliance with standards Positive 
-Nurse perceptions of quality Positive 
-Patient satisfaction None 
-Patient medication education None 
-Medical record retrieval and accuracy None 
-Medical record completeness None 
-Completeness of peri-operative notes None 
-Labeling of ward stock medications None 
-Hospital sanitation None 
*Vignettes are written case scenarios designed to measure the quality of clinical care by measuring a doctor’s ability to properly diagnose and treat patients. 
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The majority of studies reviewed report on the effect of accreditation on compliance 
with quality standards (Al Tehewy et al., 2009; Bukonda et al., 2002; Hong et al., 
2011; Salmon et al., 2003). All studies suggest that accreditation has a positive effect 
on compliance with standards in the majority of the assessment’s areas. A quasi-
experimental study in Egypt found that accredited non-governmental health units had 
better compliance with quality standards compared with non-accredited units (Al 
Tehewy et al., 2009). Another study in Egypt on the impact of accrediting public 
clinics a gold star against a checklist of quality indicators found that providers in Gold 
Star facilities were more likely to adhere to higher quality practices in counselling and 
examination than in non-Gold Star facilities (Hong et al., 2011). According to a 
descriptive study in Zambia, a national hospital accreditation program was associated 
with significant improvement in compliance of accredited hospitals with standards in 
overall scores and in seven out of 13 functional areas (Bukonda et al., 2002). In South 
Africa, Salmon et al. (2003) used a randomized control trial to investigate the effect 
of an accreditation program on public hospitals’ processes and outcomes. The study 
found that the average compliance of accredited hospitals to standards improved 
significantly, while no significant increase was observed in non-accredited hospitals. 
Besides compliance with standards, the majority of the studies reviewed report on the 
effect of accreditation on quality of care measures. These are, for the most part, not 
patient health outcomes, but downstream process indicators (Al Tehewy et al., 2009; 
El-Jardali et al., 2008; Hong et al., 2011; Quimbo et al., 2008; Salmon et al., 2003). 
Unlike compliance with standards, there is no conclusive evidence on the effect of 
accreditation on quality of care. While El-Jardali et al. (2008), Hong et al. (2011) and 
Quimbo et al. (2008) report positive effect of accreditation on different indicators of 
quality of care, the studies employing more robust study designs report mixed effects. 
These are Salmon et al. (2003) and Al Tehewy et al. (2009), which used a randomized 
controlled trial and a quasi-experimental design, respectively. In a study based on data 
from hospitals in South Africa, Salmon et al. (2003) found little or no effect of a 
randomized accreditation program on quality measures apart from increases in 
perception of quality among nurses. In Egypt, Al Tehewy et al. (2009) found a 
positive effect of accreditation of non-governmental health units on patient 
satisfaction with respect to all areas of health service (cleanliness, waiting area, 
waiting time and staff performance). As for provider satisfaction, the study found a 
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positive effect on the overall satisfaction score, but no significant difference in the 
mean satisfaction score between the accredited and non-accredited units with respect 
to the social environment, administrative environment and family health model. 
In conclusion, the available evidence on the effectiveness of quality improvement 
through accreditation of healthcare providers is limited and of questionable quality. 
The evidence investigated in this review suggests that accreditation could improve the 
process of care provided by different providers. However, evidence is limited on the 
effectiveness of accreditation on patient outcomes. The review did not identify any 
study that estimated the effect of accreditation on key patient outcomes, such as family 
planning, maternal health and child health outcomes. In order to ensure that 
accreditation brings effective quality improvement practices, there is a need to assess 
quality based on patient outcomes. 
3.3 ECONOMETRIC STRATEGY 
In this section, we discuss the two methods used to estimate the effect of Egypt’s 
facility accreditation program: DD and DD PSM. The Global Positioning System 
(GPS) coordinates for PHC facilities nationwide and populations in catchment allow 
us to link each woman to the nearest mapped PHC facility. Health outcomes are 
calculated at the facility level based on information about women in catchment areas 
of facilities. This data allows the comparison of health outcomes for accredited and 
non-accredited facilities in 2000 and 2005 and again in 2005 and 2008. 
3.3.1 DD 
The main methods of impact evaluation are regression (least-squares), PSM, DD, 
regression discontinuity, instrumental variables (IV) and randomization. These 
methods except regression address the problem of selection bias. Since the publication 
of the seminal article Ashenfelter & Card (1985), DD has been applied widely (e.g., 
Card, 1992; Card & Krueger, 1994; Blundell et al., 1998; Angrist & Krueger, 1999; 
Finkelstein, 2002).
In this study, we use DD to estimate the effect of accreditation under Egypt’s HSRP. 
The DD setup is appropriate for this study as we observe both baseline and post-
intervention health outcomes for both accredited and non-accredited health facilities. 
We compare the health outcomes of accredited facilities (treatment group) and non-
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accredited facilities (control group) before and after accreditation. Using this method, 
we seek to remove biases in post-treatment comparisons between accredited and non-
accredited facilities that could result from permanent differences between facilities. 
We also seek to remove biases that could arise from comparisons between baseline 
and follow-up years. These are the biases that result from trends. 
For each health facility 𝑖 at time 𝑡, we estimate the following DD specification: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾 𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛿 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝜁 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑖 + 𝜂 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡               (3.1) 
 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 denotes a health outcome of interest 𝑦 for facility 𝑖 at time 𝑡. 𝑡 = 0 for the 
baseline year (2000 or 2005) and 𝑡 = 1 for the follow-up year (2005 or 2008). 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑡 is 
a treatment dummy variable for an accredited facility 𝑖. 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑡 = 1 if facility 𝑖 is 
accredited and 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑡 = 0 if facility 𝑖 is non-accredited. The coefficient 𝛽 captures 
baseline differences between accredited and non-accredited facilities prior to 
accreditation. 𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 is a time-period dummy variable for the follow-up year. 𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 
0 for the baseline year and 𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 1 for the follow-up year. The coefficient 𝛾 captures 
any time trends in health outcomes and aggregates factors that could have induced 
changes in outcomes of interest 𝑦 even if the facility accreditation program was not 
introduced. The interaction term (𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡) measures treatment after the baseline 
year. The term is equal to zero for all facilities in the baseline year and for non-
accredited facilities in the follow-up year. Only for accredited facilities in the follow-
up year, the term is equal to one. 𝛿 is the coefficient of interest. It captures the effect 
of accreditation on each respective outcome at the facility level. 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑖 is a vector of 
facility-level controls that reflect different characteristics of facility 𝑖, such as the labor 
force, the building condition and the population coverage of facilities. To ensure that 
the differential effect between accredited and non-accredited facilities are attributable 
to accreditation, we must control for observable facility characteristics that could 
explain part of these effect. The coefficient 𝜁 captures the effect of these 
characteristics on health outcomes at the facility level. 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖 is a vector of district-
level controls that reflect the social, economic and demographic characteristics of the 
district in which facility 𝑖 is located. We include these indicators to reflect the 
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selection criteria of the targeting of the HSRP and ensure proper matching of treatment 
and control groups. Thus, the coefficient 𝜂 captures the effect of district-level social, 
economic and demographic indicators on health outcomes at the facility level. The 
error term 𝜀𝑖𝑡 denotes the unobserved component of facility 𝑖 at time 𝑡. The term 
summarizes variations in health outcomes not captured by the remainder of covariates.  
Our parameter of interest 𝛿 is calculated within a regression framework, where for 
each facility 𝑖 at time 𝑡, 𝛿 is given by: 
 
𝛿 = (𝑦𝑖𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑇 − 𝑦𝑖𝑝𝑟𝑒
𝑇 ) −  (𝑦𝑗𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝐶 − 𝑦𝑗𝑝𝑟𝑒
𝐶 )                                                             (3.2) 
 
where the term (𝑦𝑖𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑇 −  𝑦𝑖𝑝𝑟𝑒
𝑇 ) denotes the change in health outcomes of treated 
facilities after being subject to accreditation. The term (𝑦𝑗𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝐶 −  𝑦𝑗𝑝𝑟𝑒
𝐶 ) denotes the 
change in health outcomes of control facilities after being subject to accreditation. 
The identifying assumption of 𝛿 is that, conditional on the measured covariates, the 
differences in health outcomes between accredited and non-accredited facilities before 
and after accreditation would have been the same in the absence of treatment. To test 
the validity of this assumption, we run several robustness checks later in this chapter 
(see section 3.6). 
For each health outcome, we report the results of estimating three specifications of 
equation (3.1) for two study periods: 2000-2005 and 2005-2008. Each specification 
progressively adds controls to test the stability of the coefficients. The DD model’s 
specification (1) does not include any controls. Facility-level controls are added in the 
model’s specification (2). In specification (3), we control for all observable facility- 
and district-level characteristics that could be correlated with our health outcomes. 
The bootstrap method is used to estimate the standard errors in all regressions. 
We have two econometric concerns. First, differences in the observable characteristics 
between accredited and non-accredited facilities, which are correlated with our 
outcomes of interest, could explain the differences in health outcomes between 
facilities after the reform. The econometric specification we propose accounts for this 
possibility by controlling for the characteristics that could be correlated with our 
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health outcomes. We include a set of facility-level characteristics that provide detailed 
information on the labor force, the building condition and the population coverage of 
facilities. These are the characteristics that are potentially correlated with our 
outcomes of interest. 
Our second econometric concern is that the regional targeting of the HSRP across 
districts is not random. As discussed in section 2.2, the targeting follows a social 
vulnerability index. To eliminate any potential bias, we control for the observed 
differences at the district level that could explain differential effect. We use a set of 
district-level social and economic indicators that reflect the selection criteria of the 
targeting of the HSRP. These indicators are included as control variables in our 
econometric analyses to ensure proper matching of treatment and control groups. We 
realize that additional targeting could have taken place within districts, at the facility 
level. However, within-district targeting lies within the discretion of the district health 
management and does not follow a criterion. The best option to control for this 
targeting is to include a set of facility-level characteristics as controls in our analyses 
whenever applicable. 
3.3.2 DD PSM 
Endogeneity is the fundamental concern that arises when we estimate the effect of 
participating in the facility accreditation program on health outcomes. There are some 
potential sources of endogeneity in our context. Self-selection, for instance, is one 
potential source of endogeneity. Accredited and non-accredited facilities are likely to 
differ along observable characteristics, such as labor force, and along other 
characteristics that are usually unobserved, such as managerial competence of 
facilities. As noted earlier, the targeting of the reform interventions under the HSRP 
is not random, but rather follows an observable socio-economic vulnerability index. 
This non-random assignment to treatment could bias our estimates if the outcomes of 
the two groups of facilities are compared without accounting for selectivity. 
Another potential source of endogeneity is omitted-variable bias. This bias could arise 
when a facility in a district is self-selected into the HSRP based on unobservable 
characteristics. Targeting could also depend on non-observables. If this is the case, 
unobserved facility characteristics could simultaneously affect our dependent 
variables (i.e., health outcomes) and main explanatory variable (i.e., participation in 
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the facility accreditation program). If so, the treatment variable is said to be 
“endogenous” and its estimated coefficient is expected to be biased. 
To address these endogeneity issues, we combine DD with the PSM approach. In 
general, matching is used to identify a comparison group of non-participants with 
similar pre-intervention characteristics as the treatment group. PSM is a way of 
determining which characteristics should be used and what weight should be assigned 
to each characteristic. Instead of matching on a multitude of dimensions in a vector of 
observable characteristics Z, Rosenbaum & Rubin (1983) argues that it is only 
necessary to match on a single dimension P(Z), which is the propensity score. A 
propensity score is given by: 
 
P(Z) = Probability(Treatment=1 | Z)                                                                                     (3.3) 
 
where Z is a vector of pre-treatment characteristics that could as well include the pre-
treatment value of the health outcome. Treated units are matched to comparison or 
control units with similar values of P(Z). 
In this study, we extend the conventional DD estimate by defining health outcomes 
conditional on propensity scores and applying semi-parametric methods to construct 
the differences. First, we match treated and control health facilities based on pre-
treatment observable characteristics. The intuition behind this matching is to construct 
a comparison group of non-accredited facilities with similar pre-intervention 
characteristics as that of accredited facilities. There are many ways to undertake the 
matching. The simplest methods are the one-to-one matching and the nearest n-
neighbor matching. A non-parametric method that we use in our analyses is Kernel 
matching (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). We use Kernel functions to assign weight to 
the jth control facility matched to the ith treated facility using PSM as follows: 
 
𝜔(𝑖, 𝑗) = 
𝐾(
𝑃𝑗 −𝑃𝑖
𝑎𝑛
)
∑ 𝐾(
𝑃𝑘 −𝑃𝑖
𝑎𝑛
)′𝐾∈𝐶
                                                                                                        (3.4) 
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where a is the bandwidth parameter; K is the Kernel function and 𝑃𝑖 and 𝑃𝑗 are the 
propensity scores for treated and control facilities. 
In our context, the propensity score is the probability of being targeted by 
interventions under the HSRP given a set of social and economic indicators. These 
are the indicators that construct the socio-economic vulnerability index used by the 
GOE for the HSRP targeting. After matching treated and control facilities, we use a 
two-sample t-test to check if there are still significant differences in the means of 
observable characteristics for both groups (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). 
Second, we conduct DD estimations in which health outcomes are defined conditional 
on the propensity score generated earlier. The DD Kernel PSM estimate for each 
treated facility i is calculated as follows: 
 
𝛿𝑖 = (𝑦𝑖𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑇 −  𝑦𝑖𝑝𝑟𝑒
𝑇 ) −  ∑ 𝜔(𝑖, 𝑗)(𝑦𝑗𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝐶 −  𝑦𝑗𝑝𝑟𝑒
𝐶 )𝑗∈𝐶                                          (3.5) 
 
DD PSM was first proposed by Heckman et al. (1998). The intuition behind 
combining both methods is to preserve the strengths and minimize the weaknesses of 
each method. To identify treatment effect in a “selection on observables” context, 
PSM could be used to control for observed characteristics. To identify treatment effect 
in a “selection on non-observables” context, DD could be used to control for 
unobserved characteristics. Thus, the conventional PSM could not be used to account 
for non-observables that could explain why the GOE chooses to enroll a facility in a 
district in the facility accreditation program and that could also affect health outcomes. 
However, combining DD with matching could at least account for unobserved 
differences that are constant over time. In addition, it is worth noting that the DD PSM 
estimates are superior to the conventional DD estimates as no functional form 
restrictions are imposed when estimating the conditional expectation of the outcome 
variable using DD PSM. 
While we use district-level social and economic indicators to estimate the propensity 
score, facility-level characteristics are used as additional covariates later in the DD 
estimations. For each of our health outcomes, we report the results for two study 
periods: 2000-2005 and 2005-2008. 
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3.4 DATA 
In this section, we present the sources of our data and construct the dependent and 
explanatory variables included in our analyses. As discussed in chapter 2, we rely on 
three waves of the Egypt Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) to calculate facility-
level health outcomes. We draw on facility-level data from MOH to reflect 
accreditation under the HSRP and to match accredited and non-accredited facilities. 
Data from Egypt’s 2006 Population and Housing Census conducted by the Central 
Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS) is used to construct a set 
of district-level social and economic controls. 
3.4.1 Dependent Variables  
We make use of all the relevant data made available by the Egypt DHS on family 
planning and maternal and child health. This is the data that we expect to reflect the 
effect of compliance with quality standards, policies and procedures, which are the 
focus of accreditation assessment. Our dependent variables are outcomes of informed 
choice of contraceptive methods, ANC, delivery care and child morbidity prevalence. 
We collapse the Egypt DHS individual responses at the facility level and calculate 
facility-level outcomes. We, then, combine outcomes of the 2000, 2005 and 2008 
waves of the DHS in a panel. These outcomes constitute the dependent variables of 
our analyses. 
Data Spatial Join. For each wave of the Egypt DHS, we use the GPS coordinates of 
both women interviewed in the Egypt DHS and health facilities to link each woman 
to the nearest mapped facility. The idea is to identify women who live in the catchment 
area of accredited facilities (treatment group) and women who live in the catchment 
area of non-accredited facilities (control group). The distance matrix tool in Quantum 
GIS 2.8.2 is used to do the spatial join. We calculate the linear distance between each 
woman in a DHS cluster and all PHC facilities in Egypt. A woman (i.e., DHS cluster) 
is then linked to the facility with the smallest distance. So, for each woman, we have 
an attribute that identifies the nearest facility and the linear distance to this facility. 
All eligible PHC facilities across Egypt are used during the joining process. 
A limitation of this spatial join is that an error could arise if some women seek health 
care from alternative sources apart from their nearest PHC facility. Examples of these 
sources are private hospitals and clinics. However, the movement between public and 
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private facilities is unlikely given that prices are lower in public facilities. Some health 
services are even provided free-of-charge in public facilities. An error could also arise 
if despite additional time and financial costs, some women bypass their closest PHC 
facilities in favor of higher quality PHC facilities or even public hospitals (Akin & 
Hutchinson, 1999). Again, this bypassing is unlikely in the context of this study as for 
a woman to use a MOH public PHC facility, she is obliged by MOH to use only the 
facility in catchment. 
Variables Construction. We use Stata 12.0 to recode and calculate health outcomes at 
the facility level for each of the Egypt DHS waves and combine outcomes in a panel. 
Our outcomes cover informed choice of contraceptive methods, ANC, delivery care 
and child morbidity prevalence. 
Family Planning. As part of the “family planning” sub-area of the patient care 
dimension of quality assessed by the accreditation survey, the surveyor checks if the 
facility has a good IEC system. In this regard, the surveyor checks if the health 
provider explains to client about the family planning methods and follow-up steps 
using clear and simple language. Two of the topics that should be discussed with the 
client are observed in the DHS: side effect of the contraceptive method used and other 
methods of contraception that could be used. 
Thus, we include two family planning outcomes that capture the effect of accreditation 
on informed choice of contraceptive methods. We calculate the percentage of current 
users of selected contraceptive methods who were informed of the side effect or 
problems of the method used (contsid). Women who receive information on the 
efficacy and side effect of contraceptives used tend to have higher continuation rates 
than those who do not receive such information. We also calculate the percentage of 
current users of selected contraceptive methods who were informed of other methods 
of contraception that could be used (contoth). Informed choice emphasizes that 
women choose the method that best satisfies their personal and reproductive health 
needs based on a thorough understanding of other methods of contraception they 
could use. 
ANC. As part of the “ANC” sub-area of the patient care dimension of quality assessed 
by the accreditation survey, the surveyor checks if physical examination is performed 
for all patients. Two of these examinations are observed in the DHS: weight 
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measurement and blood pressure measurement. The surveyor also checks if the 
necessary diagnostic tests are performed on time to determine the diagnosis. Two of 
these tests are observed in the DHS: urine sample collection and blood sample 
collection. In parallel, the surveyor checks if all treatment plans are appropriate 
according to clinical guidelines. In this regard, the surveyor checks if iron is being 
supplemented in first trimester. 
Thus, we include five ANC outcomes that capture the effect of accreditation on the 
quality of ANC. We calculate the percentages of mothers who received the following 
components of ANC: weight measurement (ancwght), blood pressure measurement 
(ancbp), urine sample collection (ancus) and blood sample collection (ancbs). We 
also calculate the percentage of mothers who received iron supplements (anciron) 
during pregnancy. These components are also highlighted by the World Health 
Organization (WHO) guidelines that are specific on the content of ANC visits. An 
outcome of an ANC component, say ancwght, is the quotient of the number of women 
who received ANC for their last birth and who had their weight measured, divided by 
the number of women with a birth in the last five years who received ANC for their 
last birth, expressed as a percentage. 
As part of the accreditation survey, the surveyor checks as well if the number of ANC 
visits is according to clinical guidelines. The Egypt DHS data allows us to calculate 
an outcome of ANC coverage (at least four visits) (anc4). WHO defines anc4 as “the 
percentage of women aged 15-49 with a live birth in a given time period who received 
ANC four or more times.” anc4 is used as a global preferred outcome of access to and 
use of health care during pregnancy to track performance in maternal health programs. 
It is a MDG outcome indicator that tackles progress towards Target 5.B of MDG 5. 
WHO recommends that a woman receives at least four antenatal visits during a normal 
pregnancy to ensure that antenatal complications are detected and controlled at the 
earliest stage. A pregnant woman is expected to receive health interventions during 
antenatal visits that could be vital to her health and the health of her infant as well. 
According to the Guide to DHS Statistics, anc4 is the quotient of the numbers of 
women who received ANC for their last birth, according to grouped number of visits 
(four visits), divided by the number of women with a birth in the last five years, 
expressed as a percentage. As part of the Egypt DHS EMW questionnaire, each female 
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respondent is asked how many times she received ANC during each of the pregnancies 
of her children born in the last five years. 
Delivery Care. As part of the “ANC” sub-area of the patient care dimension of quality 
assessed by the accreditation survey, the surveyor assesses patient’s knowledge and 
understanding of delivery services provided in the facility. In an interview, the patient 
is asked if anyone explained to her these services. The Egypt DHS allows us to 
calculate two delivery care outcomes to capture the effect of compliance with the 
accreditation standards in this regard: institutional delivery (delplac) and skilled 
assistance during delivery (delassist). The two outcomes are widely advocated for 
reducing maternal, perinatal and neonatal mortality. delplac captures the effect of 
accreditation on expanding access to childbirth facilities (particularly public health 
facilities). delplac is also a proxy measure of maternal and neonatal morbidity and 
mortality. Women who give birth at a health facility are more likely to receive proper 
medical attention and care during delivery. Their infants as well are more likely to 
receive proper care after delivery. According to the Guide to DHS Statistics, delplac 
is the quotient of the numbers of live births whose deliveries took place in a health 
facility, divided by the number of live births in the last five years, expressed as a 
percentage. 
The second but most important measure of delivery care included in our analyses is 
delassist. WHO defines delassist as “the proportion of births attended by skilled health 
personnel.” It is a MDG outcome indicator that tackles progress towards Target 5.A 
of MDG 5, which is to “reduce by three quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal 
mortality ratio.” Empirical literature provides evidence that wider access to 
professional care during pregnancy and childbirth reduces maternal mortality. Women 
assisted by skilled health personnel during delivery are less likely to die from any 
cause related to or aggravated by childbirth (Graham et al., 2001). According to the 
Guide to DHS Statistics, delassist is the quotient of the number of live births assisted 
by medical provider (doctor or nurse/midwife) during delivery divided by the number 
of live births in the last five years, expressed as a percent. As part of the Egypt DHS 
EMW questionnaire, each female respondent is asked either a health professional 
(doctor or nurse/midwife) or other person (daya or other) or no one assisted with the 
delivery of each of her children. 
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Child Morbidity Prevalence. As part of the “IMCI” sub-area of the patient care 
dimension of quality assessed by the accreditation survey, the surveyor checks if child 
is checked for cough, diarrhea, sore throat, ear infection and fever. The prevalence of 
three out of these five illnesses could be calculated using the Egypt DHS data: ARI 
(childari), fever (childfev) and diarrhea (childdiarr). 
ARI is the leading infectious cause of death in children worldwide. Mortality due to 
ARI accounted for 16 percent of the total deaths among under-five children in 2015. 
Diarrheal diseases are the second leading cause of death in children under age five 
(World Health Organization, 2016). The risk of under-five mortality could be 
diminished substantially through reducing the prevalence of ARI and diarrheal 
diseases and encouraging women to seek treatment for their children at a health 
facility or from a healthcare provider. We are not able, however, to calculate indicators 
of child morbidity treatment as observations in our sample are not statistically 
sufficient. 
We calculate child morbidity prevalence as the quotient of the number of children ill 
with a cough accompanied by short and rapid breathing (for childari), or ill with a 
fever (for childfev) or ill with diarrhea (for childdiarr) at any time during the two 
weeks preceding the interview, divided by the number of children under five years of 
age, expressed as a percentage. As part of the Egypt DHS EMW questionnaire, each 
female respondent is asked if any of her children became ill with a fever at any time 
in the last two weeks, if he/she had an illness with a cough at any time in the last two 
weeks, if he/she breathed faster than usual with short and rapid breaths or had 
difficulty breathing when he/she had an illness with a cough and if any of her children 
had diarrhea in the last two weeks. 
3.4.2 Explanatory Variables 
The explanatory variables included in the analyses of this study are a treatment 
variable that reflects participation in the facility accreditation program, facility-level 
controls, district-level social and economic controls and regional dummies to control 
for regional discrepancies. 
Treatment. The gradual uptake of the facility accreditation program by health 
facilities provides a quasi-natural experiment with treated and control facilities. A 
facility is treated if it is accredited and non-treated otherwise. Health facilities that are 
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subject to additional interventions under the HSRP such as performance-based 
financing (PBF) and copayments are removed from the dataset.  
Controls. Whenever possible, we include a set of facility and district characteristics 
in our analyses to eliminate potential unobserved heterogeneity, that is, account for 
possible differences between accredited and non-accredited facilities prior to 
accreditation. At the facility level, we obtain information on the labor force, the 
building condition and the population coverage. With respect to labor force, we 
include the numbers of eight types of workers in a health facility: practitioners (pract), 
specialists (spec), pharmacists (pharm), nurses (nurs), lab technicians (labtech), x-ray 
technicians (xraytech), health observers (obs) and social workers (socwork). With 
respect to infrastructure, a dummy variable is included to describe the condition of a 
facility building (inf) as bad, average or good. With respect to population, we report 
the size of population in the catchment areas of facilities (cov). 
At the district level, we include eight social and economic indicators: the illiteracy 
ratio (illit), the unemployment ratio (unemp), the income dependency ratio (incdep), 
inaccessibility to electricity (elect), inaccessibility to potable water (wat), the average 
family size (famsiz), the household (HH) crowding factor (crowd) and the population 
size (pop). In addition, regional dummies are defined for fully urban governorates 
(urb), urban Lower Egypt (lowurb), rural Lower Egypt (lowrur), urban Upper Egypt 
(uppurb), rural Upper Egypt (upprur) and frontier governorates (front). These district-
level covariates control for both the selection criteria of the HSRP targeting and the 
demographic variation across districts. As discussed in chapter 2, the regional 
targeting of the HSRP follows a socio-economic vulnerability index that is 
constructed from the eight social and economic indicators outlined earlier. 
3.4.3 Summary of Variables 
The dependent variables included in our analyses are facility-level family planning, 
maternal health and child health outcomes. Our explanatory variables include a 
treatment indicator, facility-level controls, district-level controls and regional 
dummies. Table 3.4 summarizes the description and sources of all variables included 
in the analyses of this study. 
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Table 3.4: Description and sources of the variables used 
Variable Description Measure Unit Source Year(s) 
Dependent variables* 
Family planning 
contsid Proportion of current users of selected contraceptive methods 
informed of side effect of the method used 
Family planning Percent Author’s calculations based on 
Egypt DHS 
2000, 2005, 
2008 
contoth Proportion of current users of selected contraceptive methods 
informed of other methods of contraception that could be used 
Family planning Percent Author’s calculations based on 
Egypt DHS 
2000, 2005, 
2008 
Maternal health 
anc4 Proportion of women who received four or more ANC visits ANC Percent Author’s calculations based on 
Egypt DHS 
2000, 2005, 
2008 
ancwght Proportion of women whose weight was measured as an ANC 
component 
ANC Percent Author’s calculations based on 
Egypt DHS 
2000, 2005, 
2008 
ancbp Proportion of women whose blood pressure was measured as 
an ANC component 
ANC Percent Author’s calculations based on 
Egypt DHS 
2000, 2005, 
2008 
ancus Proportion of women whose urine sample was taken as an 
ANC component 
ANC Percent Author’s calculations based on 
Egypt DHS 
2000, 2005, 
2008 
ancbs Proportion of women whose blood sample was taken as an 
ANC component 
ANC Percent Author’s calculations based on 
Egypt DHS 
2000, 2005, 
2008 
anciron Proportion of women who received iron supplements as an 
ANC component 
ANC Percent Author’s calculations based on 
Egypt DHS 
2000, 2005, 
2008 
delplac Proportion of live births delivered in a health facility Delivery care Percent Author’s calculations based on 
Egypt DHS 
2000, 2005, 
2008 
delassist Proportion of live births whose delivery was assisted by skilled 
health personnel 
Delivery care Percent Author’s calculations based on 
Egypt DHS 
2000, 2005, 
2008 
Child health 
childari Proportion of under-five children with symptoms of ARI Child morbidity 
prevalence 
Percent Author’s calculations based on 
Egypt DHS 
2000, 2005, 
2008 
childfev Proportion of under-five children with fever Child morbidity 
prevalence 
Percent Author’s calculations based on 
Egypt DHS 
2000, 2005, 
2008 
childdiarr Proportion of under-five children with diarrhea Child morbidity 
prevalence 
Percent Author’s calculations based on 
Egypt DHS 
2000, 2005, 
2008 
(2) Explanatory variables 
Treatment 
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡  𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡= 1 if a facility is accredited, 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡= 0 if a facility is 
non-accredited 
 
Accreditation Dummy Author’s calculations based on 
data from Egypt’s MOH 
2000, 2008 
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Variable Description Measure Unit Source Year(s) 
Facility characteristics 
pract Practitioners Labor force Number MOH 2005 
spec Specialists  Labor force Number MOH 2005 
pharm Pharmacists  Labor force Number MOH 2005 
nurs Nurses  Labor force Number MOH 2005 
labtech Lab technicians  Labor force Number MOH 2005 
xraytech X-ray technicians  Labor force Number MOH 2005 
obs Health observers  Labor force Number MOH 2005 
socwork Social workers  Labor force Number MOH 2005 
inf Building condition of a facility defined as bad, average or 
good 
Infrastructure Dummy MOH 2005 
cov Size of the population in catchment served by a facility Coverage Number MOH 2005 
District socio-economic indicators** 
illit Percentage of population (aged 10 years and above) who are 
illiterate 
Illiteracy Ratio CAPMAS 2006 
unemp Percentage of population (aged 15 years and above) who are 
unemployed 
Unemployment Ratio CAPMAS 2006 
incdep Ratio of the dependent population (aged below 15 years and 
over 65 years) to the working population (aged 15-64 years) 
Income dependency Ratio Author’s calculations based on 
CAPMAS’s census 
2006 
elect  Share of the population with no access to electricity Accessibility to 
electricity 
Ratio Author’s calculations based on 
CAPMAS’s census 
2006 
wat  Share of the population with no access to potable water Accessibility to 
potable water 
Ratio Author’s calculations based on 
CAPMAS’s census 
2006 
famsiz  The number of individuals divided by the number of families Family size Ratio CAPMAS 2006 
crowd Average number of individuals per room HH overcrowding Ratio CAPMAS 2006 
pop Size of population resident in a particular district Population size Number CAPMAS 2006 
Regional dummies 
urb Urban Regional variation Dummy CAPMAS 2006 
lowurb Lower urban  Regional variation Dummy CAPMAS 2006 
lowrur Lower rural Regional variation Dummy CAPMAS 2006 
uppurb Upper urban Regional variation Dummy CAPMAS 2006 
upprur Upper rural Regional variation Dummy CAPMAS 2006 
front Frontier Regional variation Dummy CAPMAS 2006 
Year dummy 
𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡= 1 for follow-up year, 𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡=0 for baseline year Follow-up year Dummy - 2000, 2005, 
2008 
*Definitions of dependent variables are obtained from WHO. **Definitions of control variables are obtained from CAPMAS.
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3.5 RESULTS 
In this section, we first present the descriptive statistics of the sample used in our 
analyses. Second, we discuss the estimated effect of accreditation on family planning 
and maternal and child health. As noted earlier, we report the results of estimating 
three specifications for each health outcome. The DD model’s specification (1) 
includes no controls. Only facility-level controls are included in specification (2). The 
model’s specification (3) includes both facility- and district-level controls. In addition, 
we report the results of a DD PSM model specification denoted by specification (4). 
This is our preferred specification as it includes all the explanatory variables listed in 
Table 3.4 either as matchers or as additional covariates. The analysis of estimation 
effect is mainly based on the results of our model’s specification (4). 
3.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3.5 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the facility-level characteristics, the 
district-level characteristics and the health outcomes of all facilities observed in years 
2000, 2005 and 2008. The statistics of facility and district characteristics indicate 
relatively moderate variability across health facilities and districts for most variables. 
We do recognize the relatively large variation in some variables, such as the number 
of specialists (spec), the population coverage of facilities (cov) and the income 
dependency (incdep) across districts. However, this variation is justifiable given the 
nationwide nature of our analysis and is tolerable given the relatively moderate sample 
size we are using.
With respect to health outcomes, Table 3.5 shows that Egypt performs moderately 
with respect to the family planning indicators of informed choice. The mean 
proportion of current users of selected contraceptive methods, who were informed of 
side effects of the method used (contsid), is 47 percent. The mean proportion of those 
who were informed of other methods of contraception that could be used (contoth) is 
53 percent. Table 3.5 also shows that Egypt has a relatively moderate level of ANC 
coverage. On average, 54 percent of pregnant women in Egypt report at least four 
ANC visits (anc4). Egypt performs differently with respect to various components of 
ANC. Women are more likely to be weighted (ancwght) and get their blood pressure 
measured (ancbp) during ANC visits, but less likely to receive iron supplements 
during pregnancy (anciron). 
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Table 3.5: Descriptive statistics 
Variable N Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Facility characteristics      
Practitioners 5,007 3.458 4.693 0.000 57.000 
Specialists  5,013 0.568 1.675 0.000 22.000 
Pharmacists  5,013 4.058 5.589 0.000 44.000 
Nurses  5,013 11.683 12.855 0.000 191.000 
Lab technicians  5,013 1.317 1.658 0.000 16.000 
X-ray technicians  5,013 0.181 0.824 0.000 14.000 
Health observers  5,013 1.344 1.500 0.000 17.000 
Social workers  5,013 0.433 1.600 0.000 49.000 
Building condition 4,410 1.640 0.630 0.000 2.000 
Population coverage 4,737 3.245 10.670 0.061 269.310 
      
District characteristics      
Illiteracy 5,661 32.330 10.285 0.000 54.030 
Unemployment 5,661 9.646 4.410 0.000 23.550 
Income dependency 5,661 5.059 15.322 0.000 87.402 
Inaccessibility to electricity 5,661 1.260 3.385 0.000 69.092 
Inaccessibility to potable water 5,661 4.369 6.887 0.000 90.204 
Family size 5,661 4.330 0.375 2.580 6.170 
HH overcrowding 5,661 1.150 0.107 0.840 1.930 
Population size 5,661 31.912 16.358 0.005 117.380 
      
Health outcomes      
Family planning      
Knowledge of side effects 1,927 47.271 23.300 0.000 100.000 
Knowledge of contraceptives 1,952 52.796 23.312 0.000 100.000 
ANC      
4+ visits 2,098 53.936 26.919 0.000 100.000 
Weight measurement 1,977 79.020 22.553 0.000 100.000 
Blood pressure measurement 1,977 77.326 22.413 0.000 100.000 
Urine sample collection 1,977 62.962 25.839 0.000 100.000 
Blood sample collection 1,977 64.155 25.242 0.000 100.000 
Iron supplementation 2,100 39.318 23.552 0.000 100.000 
Delivery care      
Institutional delivery 2,095 61.515 29.349 0.000 100.000 
Skilled-assisted delivery 2,098 71.906 26.674 0.000 100.000 
Child morbidity prevalence      
ARI 2,354 7.373 9.116 0.000 71.429 
Fever 2,354 12.848 11.512 0.000 80.000 
Diarrhea 2,354 8.809 9.937 0.000 63.636 
N denotes the number of observations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 44 
In parallel, Egypt has a fairly high level of delivery care coverage through access to 
health facilities and skilled health personnel. On average, over 60 percent of women 
deliver their most recent birth in an institutional setting (delplac). Over 70 percent of 
births are assisted by skilled health personnel (delassist) (Table 3.5). 
Tables 3.6 and 3.7 highlight differences in the facility and district characteristics, 
respectively, between accredited and non-accredited facilities. We use the two-sample 
t-test to check whether the means of the two groups differ significantly. Table 3.6 
indicates that accredited facilities have a significantly lower number of nurses (nurs) 
during the period 2000-2005 compared to non-accredited facilities. We do not observe 
significant differences during this study period in the other nine facility-level 
characteristics. However, we observe that practitioners (pract), pharmacists (pharm), 
nurses (nurs) and social workers (socwork) are significantly less in non-accredited 
facilities compared to accredited facilities during the period 2005-2008 (Table 3.6). 
 
Table 3.6: Two-sample t-test of facility characteristics of accredited and non-
accredited facilities 
 2000-2005  2005-2008 
 Non-
accredited 
Accredited Difference  Non-
accredited 
Accredited Difference 
Practitioners 3.367 2.600 0.767  3.137 5.539 -2.402*** 
  (0.836)    (0.396) 
Specialists  0.530 0.833 -0.303  0.522 0.738 -0.216 
  (0.298)    (0.144) 
Pharmacists  3.931 3.567 0.364  3.723 6.050 -2.327*** 
  (0.994)    (0.470) 
Nurses  11.853 6.400 5.453**  11.937 13.922 -1.985* 
  (2.385)    (1.182) 
Lab technicians  1.290 0.967 0.323  1.336 1.177 0.159 
  (0.300)    (0.146) 
X-ray 
technicians  
0.177 0.233 -0.056  0.193 0.163 0.030 
  (0.153)    (0.077) 
Health 
observers  
1.309 1.167 0.142  1.330 1.348 -0.018 
  (0.266)    (0.133) 
Social workers  0.437 0.533 -0.097  0.413 0.901 -0.488*** 
  (0.300)    (0.150) 
Building 
condition 
1.630 1.680 -0.050  1.605 1.653 -0.048 
  (0.128)    (0.062) 
Population 
coverage 
3.305 1.628 1.677  3.269 4.013 -0.745 
  (2.068)    (1.007) 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3.7: Two-sample t-test of district characteristics of accredited and non-
accredited facilities 
 2000-2005  2005-2008 
 Non-
accredited 
Accredited Difference  Non-
accredited 
Accredited Difference 
Illiteracy 32.376 31.453 0.923  32.672 29.325 3.347*** 
  (1.875)    (0.884) 
Unemployment 9.703 8.883 0.820  9.635 9.688 -0.054 
  (0.806)    (0.385) 
Income 
dependency 
5.228 0.601 4.627*  5.602 3.386 2.216 
  (2.798)    (1.356) 
Inaccessibility 
to electricity 
1.285 0.750 0.535  1.357 0.819 0.538* 
  (0.624)    (0.308) 
Inaccessibility 
to potable water 
4.390 4.294 0.095  4.528 2.593 1.935*** 
  (1.264)    (0.611) 
Family size 4.330 4.405 -0.076  4.334 4.193 0.141*** 
  (0.068)    (0.032) 
HH 
overcrowding 
1.148 1.188 -0.040**  1.141 1.153 -0.013 
  (0.019)    (0.009) 
Population size 31.646 29.079 2.567  31.072 34.383 -3.311** 
  (2.913)    (1.349) 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
On average, districts to which accredited facilities belong are significantly better with 
respect to only one characteristic during the period 2000-2005: income dependency 
(incdep) (Table 3.7). However, districts to which accredited facilities belong are 
significantly better with respect to four characteristics during the period 2005-2008: 
illiteracy (illit), inaccessibility to electricity (elect), inaccessibility to potable water 
(wat) and the family size (famsiz). In addition, accredited facilities are located in 
districts that are more populated (pop) than districts in which non-accredited facilities 
are located (Table 3.7). Thus, Table 3.7 provides evidence that the actual targeting of 
the HSRP does not strictly follow the socio-vulnerability index. 
3.5.2 Estimated Effects of Accreditation 
Table 3.8 provides evidence that accreditation does not have a significant effect on 
family planning during the study period 2000-2005. However, having access to an 
accredited facility is associated with a higher likelihood of being informed of the side 
effects of contraceptives (contsid) during the period 2005-2008. Table 3.9 shows that 
the proportion of women with access to accredited facilities, who are informed of the 
side effects of contraceptives used (contsid), increased significantly by 10 percentage 
points (ppts) compared to women with access to non-accredited facilities.
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Table 3.8: Estimated effects of accreditation, 2000-2005 
 Outcome  DD  DD PSM 
   (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
Family planning Knowledge of 
side effects 
 14.480 12.560 13.110  7.293 
 (9.480) (11.530) (11.280)  (5.097) 
Knowledge of 
contraceptives 
 8.818 11.070 10.920  6.320 
 (7.132) (11.380) (11.830)  (4.719) 
ANC 4+ visits  -7.399 3.702 5.465  2.529 
 (12.041) (9.574) (8.561)  (3.692) 
Weight 
measurement 
 -9.870 -6.371 -4.565  -0.081 
 (8.998) (8.863) (9.253)  (4.051) 
Blood pressure 
measurement 
 -9.997 -5.910 -3.247  0.155 
 (9.221) (9.556) (9.506)  (3.440) 
Urine sample 
collection 
 -15.140 -13.320 -9.640  -5.170 
 (10.188) (11.820) (11.600)  (3.851) 
Blood sample 
collection 
 -15.094 -6.236 -2.618  2.831 
 (11.976) (12.960) (12.070)  (4.354) 
Iron 
supplementation 
 11.155 15.530** 16.120**  11.540*** 
 (7.926) (6.971) (7.501)  (3.171) 
Delivery care Institutional 
delivery 
 -0.628 10.290 13.740*  8.187** 
 (10.771) (7.320) (7.238)  (3.890) 
Skilled-assisted 
delivery 
 2.734 10.400 12.320  10.510** 
 (10.156) (8.850) (7.927)  (4.097) 
Child morbidity 
prevalence 
ARI  -4.696 -6.769* -6.744*  -9.211*** 
 (3.077) (3.503) (3.643)  (1.565) 
Fever  -2.907 -5.286 -5.232  -8.571*** 
 (3.767) (4.568) (4.884)  (1.949) 
Diarrhea  0.487 3.922 3.588  -0.302 
 (3.917) (4.893) (5.030)  (1.581) 
Each row represents a separate regression. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Bootstrapped 
standard errors are reported for specifications (1) to (3). *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
In addition, we find that accreditation has limited significant effect on ANC during 
both study periods. The estimates of 4+ visits (anc4), weight measurement (ancwght), 
blood pressure measurement (ancbp), urine sample collection (ancus) and blood 
sample collection (ancbs) are statistically insignificant during the period 2000-2005. 
However, having access to an accredited facility is associated with a higher likelihood 
of receiving iron supplements during pregnancy (anciron). Table 3.8 shows that the 
proportion of women with access to accredited facilities, who receive iron 
supplements during pregnancy (anciron), increased significantly by 12 ppts between 
2000 and 2005 compared to women with access to non-accredited facilities. 
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Table 3.9: Estimated effects of accreditation, 2005-2008 
 Outcome  DD  DD PSM 
   (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
Family planning Knowledge of 
side effects 
 16.583*** 12.790** 13.630***  10.330** 
 (4.030) (5.337) (4.554)  (4.237) 
Knowledge of 
contraceptives 
 9.843** 6.015 6.434  -0.703 
 (4.189) (4.862) (4.512)  (4.035) 
ANC 4+ visits  -2.639 -4.188 -3.663  -2.301 
 (4.235) (3.816) (3.949)  (3.549) 
Weight 
measurement 
 4.949** 3.630 4.548  5.328* 
 (2.489) (3.500) (3.601)  (2.729) 
Blood pressure 
measurement 
 4.278 1.288 1.805  3.870 
 (2.775) (3.563) (3.836)  (2.969) 
Urine sample 
collection 
 6.342 3.910 4.772  3.661 
 (4.913) (4.606) (4.873)  (3.762) 
Blood sample 
collection 
 -0.241 -4.318 -3.388  -5.532 
 (4.593) (5.036) (5.171)  (4.039) 
Iron 
supplementation 
 3.009 -0.523 0.611  1.622 
 (4.806) (4.259) (4.173)  (3.839) 
Delivery care Institutional 
delivery 
 -4.495 -3.766 -1.364  -0.272 
 (3.998) (5.636) (4.427)  (4.398) 
Skilled-assisted 
delivery 
 -1.626 -0.546 1.501  3.880 
 (4.057) (4.878) (3.756)  (4.082) 
Child morbidity 
prevalence 
ARI  1.449 2.639 3.087  2.710 
 (1.792) (2.332) (2.418)  (1.736) 
Fever  2.008 1.342 1.775  0.278 
 (1.947) (2.357) (2.445)  (2.003) 
Diarrhea  -0.589 0.783 1.121  -1.684 
 (1.862) (2.626) (2.537)  (1.972) 
Each row represents a separate regression. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Bootstrapped 
standard errors are reported for specifications (1) to (3). *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
We also find that having access to an accredited facility is associated with a higher 
likelihood of weight measurement during ANC visits (ancwght) during the period 
2005-2008. Table 3.9 shows that the proportion of women with access to accredited 
facilities, who have their weight measured during ANC visits (ancwght), increased 
significantly by 5 ppts between 2005 and 2008 compared to women with access to 
non-accredited facilities. However, the estimates of 4+ visits (anc4), blood pressure 
measurement (ancbp), urine sample collection (ancus), blood sample collection 
(ancbs) and iron supplementation (anciron) are statistically insignificant during this 
period. 
More importantly, we observe that accreditation has a significant positive effect on 
delivery care during the study period 2000-2005. Having access to an accredited 
facility is associated with a higher likelihood of both institutional delivery (delplac) 
and skilled assistance during delivery (delassist) during the period 2000-2005. Table 
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3.8 indicates that institutional delivery (delplac) and skilled assistance during delivery 
(delassist) increased by more than 8 ppts and 11 ppts, respectively, among women 
with access to accredited facilities. However, the estimates of institutional delivery 
(delplac) and skilled assistance during delivery (delassist) are statistically 
insignificant during the period 2005-2008. In parallel, we observe that accreditation 
has a significant positive effect on child morbidity prevalence during the study period 
2000-2005. Table 3.8 indicates that accreditation reduced the prevalence of both 
childhood ARI (childari) and childhood fever (childfev) among children with access 
to accredited facilities by more than 9 ppts and 8 ppts, respectively, compared to 
children with access to non-accredited facilities. However, we do not observe any 
significant effect on all child morbidity prevalence outcomes during the period 2005-
2008. 
A comparison between the estimates in Tables 3.8 and 3.9 indicates that the positive 
effect of the facility accreditation program is not intense during the study period 2005-
2008 compared to the period 2000-2005. Some of these effects are even reversed. The 
change in the effect is justified by the fact that interventions under the HSRP have 
been slowing down and weakening since 2005. This trend becomes more apparent 
when we check the extent to which facilities comply to reform rather than the rate by 
which facilities join the HSRP. A plausible indicator of compliance is the 
accreditation score. While more facilities get accredited, we observe that accreditation 
scores were increasing until 2004 but started to decrease since then. Accreditation 
compliance also varies across governorates (Grun & Ayala, 2006). A high level of 
commitment to and participation in the HSRP was evident in the preparation and early 
implementation phases. However, successive changes in the leadership of the 
healthcare sector in Egypt affect the ownership of and commitment to reform efforts. 
3.6 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
In this section, we run several tests to ensure the robustness of our main results of 
estimated effects obtained in the previous section. First, we run placebo tests to verify 
the functional form of our DD set-up. Second, the quality of matching facilities is 
assessed using two-sample t-tests. Finally, we inspect the sensitivity of our DD PSM 
estimates. 
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3.6.1 Placebo Test 
We run a placebo test by defining a “false” lagged accreditation intervention. If the 
functional form of the DD set-up is properly specified, pre-accreditation estimations 
would yield null results. That is, the facility accreditation program should not have 
any effect on the health outcomes of accredited facilities before being subject to 
accreditation. 
We use the data of the study period 2000-2005 to verify the results of the period 2005-
2008. For the period 2000-2005, facilities that are accredited after 2005 are defined 
as treated and facilities that are not accredited after 2005 are defined as control. 
Facilities that are subject to additional interventions under the HSRP are removed 
from the dataset.  
The results of our placebo test are reported in Table 3.10. The treatment estimates are 
not significantly different from zero for all health outcomes. That is, differences 
between accredited and non-accredited facilities reported in section 3.5 only emerged 
after the introduction of the facility accreditation program. I.e., accreditation causes 
the effects observed rather than the other way around. 
3.6.2 Quality of Matching 
To check the extent to which observable characteristics are balanced in the matched 
sample, we use the balancing two-sample t-test of the difference in means of 
covariates across matched samples of facilities. Our covariates of interest are the ones 
used earlier to match treated and control health facilities. The results of the t-test are 
reported in Table 3.11. As the table indicates, there are no systematic differences in 
general at the baseline in the means of observed characteristics between accredited 
and non-accredited facilities. That is, matching on the propensity score is successful. 
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Table 3.10: Estimated effects of placebo accreditation, 2000-2005 
 Outcome Difference 
(baseline) 
Difference 
(follow-up) 
DD PSM 
Family planning Knowledge of 
side effects 
-12.705* -2.819 9.886 
  (8.009) 
Knowledge of 
contraceptives 
-6.589 0.060 6.649 
  (8.082) 
ANC 4+ visits 4.180 -4.955 -9.134 
  (7.874) 
Weight 
measurement 
-0.050 2.016 2.066 
  (7.214) 
Blood pressure 
measurement 
2.863 0.186 -2.678 
  (7.193) 
Urine sample 
collection 
-2.420 1.809 4.229 
  (8.668) 
Blood sample 
collection 
4.270 -1.740 -6.011 
  (9.683) 
Iron 
supplementation 
3.817 8.212 4.394 
  (9.004) 
Delivery care Institutional 
delivery 
-4.584 -10.182 -5.598 
  (6.534) 
Skilled-assisted 
delivery 
-6.477 -15.995*** -9.518 
  (5.922) 
Child morbidity 
prevalence 
ARI 4.972 6.501* 1.530 
  (3.644) 
Fever 3.107 7.327 4.220 
  (5.522) 
Diarrhea -0.691 -2.898 -2.207 
  (3.987) 
Each row represents a separate regression. The covariates are the facility characteristics, district socio-
economic indicators and regional dummies from Table 3.4. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, 
** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
3.6.3 Sensitivity of Results 
We further inspect the sensitivity of our results to the type of the Kernel function, the 
bandwidth of the Kernel function and the estimation method of the propensity score. 
To do the Kernel matching, we first must specify the type of the Kernel function. We 
initially use the epanechnikov Kernel to obtain our main results. This is the default 
type. In Tables 3.12 and 3.13, we compare the main results of the estimated effects 
reported to the results obtained based on other types of functions (gaussian, biweight, 
uniform and tricube). In general, we find that our main estimation results are not 
sensitive to the type of the Kernel function. 
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Table 3.11: Balancing two-sample t-test, 2005-2008 
 Difference in mean covariates between accredited and non-accredited facilities 
Illiteracy Un-
employment 
Income 
dependency 
Inaccessibility 
to electricity 
Inaccessibility 
to potable 
water 
Family size HH 
overcrowding 
Population 
size 
Family planning 
Knowledge of side 
effects 
-1.014 -0.038 -0.510 -0.064 -0.343 -0.042 0.003 1.689 
Knowledge of 
contraceptives 
-1.014 -0.038 -0.510 -0.064 -0.343 -0.042 0.003 1.689 
ANC 
4+ visits 
 
-1.090 -0.029 -0.666 -0.095 -0.405 -0.051* -0.000 2.082 
Weight 
measurement 
-1.242 0.044 -0.705 -0.097 -0.424 -0.048 -0.002 2.334* 
Blood pressure 
measurement 
-1.242 0.044 -0.705 -0.097 -0.424 -0.048 -0.002 2.334* 
Urine sample 
collection 
-1.242 0.044 -0.705 -0.097 -0.424 -0.048 -0.002 2.334* 
Blood sample 
collection 
-1.242 0.044 -0.705 -0.097 -0.424 -0.048 -0.002 2.334* 
Iron 
supplementation 
-1.090 -0.029 -0.666 -0.095 -0.405 -0.051* -0.000 2.082 
Delivery care 
Institutional 
delivery 
-1.131 -0.028 -0.676 -0.091 -0.406 -0.052* -0.000 1.967 
Skilled-assisted 
delivery 
-1.098 -0.027 -0.656 -0.094 -0.400 -0.051* -0.000 2.100 
Child morbidity prevalence 
ARI 
 
-1.223 -0.017 -0.597 -0.079 -0.342 -0.051* 0.000 1.822 
Fever 
 
-1.223 -0.017 -0.597 -0.079 -0.342 -0.051* 0.000 1.822 
Diarrhea 
 
-1.223 -0.017 -0.597 -0.079 -0.342 -0.051* 0.000 1.822 
Means and t-test are estimated by linear regression. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.12: Sensitivity to the type of the Kernel function, 2000-2005 
 Outcome Main 
results 
Type of function 
Gaussian Biweight Uniform Tricube 
Family 
planning 
Knowledge of 
side effects 
7.293 7.662 6.820 7.973 7.859 
(5.097) (5.079) (5.085) (5.091) (5.105) 
Knowledge of 
contraceptives 
6.320 6.788 5.704 6.884 6.863 
(4.719) (4.729) (4.711) (4.715) (4.718) 
ANC 4+ visits 2.529 1.483 3.417 1.666 1.732 
(3.692) (3.764) (3.648) (3.737) (3.722) 
Weight 
measurement 
-0.081 -3.173 0.760 -1.254 -1.008 
(4.051) (4.250) (4.018) (4.103) (4.090) 
Blood pressure 
measurement 
0.155 -2.687 1.099 -1.911 -1.051 
(3.440) (3.595) (3.381) (3.573) (3.519) 
Urine sample 
collection 
-5.170 -9.939** -3.476 -7.927** -7.082* 
(3.851) (4.021) (3.827) (3.911) (3.888) 
Blood sample 
collection 
2.831 -1.749 4.794 -0.215 0.718 
(4.354) (4.554) (4.316) (4.440) (4.407) 
Iron 
supplementation 
11.540*** 11.010*** 11.304*** 11.634*** 11.684*** 
(3.171) (3.215) (3.140) (3.201) (3.192) 
Delivery 
care 
Institutional 
delivery 
8.187** 7.568* 8.840** 8.085** 7.665* 
(3.890) (3.957) (3.839) (3.958) (3.929) 
Skilled-assisted 
delivery 
10.510** 9.623** 11.083*** 9.984** 10.040** 
(4.097) (4.179) (4.023) (4.183) (4.152) 
Child 
morbidity 
prevalence 
ARI -9.211*** -9.232*** -9.186*** -9.282*** -9.242*** 
(1.565) (1.559) (1.568) (1.562) (1.563) 
Fever -8.571*** -8.526*** -8.613*** -8.546*** -8.529*** 
(1.949) (1.937) (1.955) (1.943) (1.945) 
Diarrhea -0.302 -0.304 -0.331 -0.250 -0.237 
(1.581) (1.578) (1.582) (1.582) (1.582) 
Each row represents a separate regression. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
To do the Kernel matching, we also must specify the bandwidth of the Kernel 
function. The choice of bandwidth implies a trade-off between bias and efficiency. 
On one hand, a small bandwidth decreases the bias of estimates as we use the most 
similar observations to construct the counterfactual. The characteristics of these 
facilities are, in general, very similar. However, a small bandwidth decreases the 
efficiency of estimates as we ignore a lot of information from the sample. The fact 
that many control facilities are not used for the estimation implies an increase in the 
imprecision of estimates caused by a higher variance. On the other hand, a large 
bandwidth increases both the bias and efficiency of estimates. The bandwidth choice 
is, therefore, a compromise between a small variance and an unbiased estimate of the 
true density function. This choice is more important in practice than the choice of the 
type of the Kernel function (e.g., Silverman, 1986; Pagan & Ullah, 1999). 
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Table 3.13: Sensitivity to the type of the Kernel function, 2005-2008 
 Outcome Main 
results 
Type of function 
Gaussian Biweight Uniform Tricube 
Family 
planning 
Knowledge of side 
effects 
10.330** 11.413*** 9.808** 11.543*** 10.879** 
(4.237) (4.310) (4.229) (4.245) (4.244) 
Knowledge of 
contraceptives 
-0.703 0.488 -1.206 0.277 -0.132 
(4.035) (4.152) (4.020) (4.057) (4.050) 
ANC 4+ visits -2.301 -1.924 -2.526 -1.981 -1.959 
(3.549) (3.666) (3.543) (3.555) (3.553) 
Weight 
measurement 
5.328* 4.899* 5.411** 5.127* 5.211* 
(2.729) (2.833) (2.717) (2.753) (2.747) 
Blood pressure 
measurement 
3.870 3.467 4.039 3.675 3.696 
(2.969) (3.060) (2.961) (2.984) (2.982) 
Urine sample 
collection 
3.661 4.359 3.649 3.911 3.779 
(3.762) (3.860) (3.755) (3.773) (3.773) 
Blood sample 
collection 
-5.532 -5.512 -5.715 -5.226 -5.232 
(4.039) (4.157) (4.030) (4.059) (4.054) 
Iron 
supplementation 
1.622 2.219 1.854 1.306 1.473 
(3.839) (3.954) (3.832) (3.844) (3.842) 
Delivery care Institutional 
delivery 
-0.272 0.865 -0.391 -0.196 -0.203 
(4.398) (4.574) (4.382) (4.432) (4.418) 
Skilled-assisted 
delivery 
3.880 4.531 3.930 3.546 3.743 
(4.082) (4.259) (4.064) (4.116) (4.104) 
Child 
morbidity 
prevalence 
ARI 2.710 2.831 2.679 2.732 2.735 
(1.736) (1.789) (1.737) (1.742) (1.736) 
Fever 0.278 0.368 0.248 0.477 0.330 
(2.003) (2.095) (2.005) (2.012) (2.003) 
Diarrhea -1.684 -0.731 -1.777 -1.424 -1.547 
(1.972) (2.023) (1.972) (1.983) (1.973) 
Each row represents a separate regression. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
The default bandwidth of the Kernel function initially used to obtain our main results 
is 0.06. Alternative bandwidths are tried (bandwidths = 0.05 and 0.1). Tables 3.14 and 
3.15 show our main results of the estimated effects using different bandwidths. We 
find that our main results are not sensitive in general to the bandwidth parameter. 
The estimation of propensity score depends on a parametric specification (commonly 
logit or probit). We specify probit estimation of the propensity score to obtain our 
main estimation results. This is the default used by Stata 12.0. The specification of the 
propensity score equation affects the quality of matching and, consequently, the 
results. Therefore, we specify logit estimation of the propensity score and re-run the 
DD PSM models to test the sensitivity of our results to the estimation method of the 
propensity score. The results of this exercise are reported in Table 3.16. We find that 
the estimates for both methods of estimation match for most outcomes. 
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Table 3.14: Sensitivity to the bandwidth of the Kernel function, 2000-2005 
 Outcome Main results Bandwidth 
0.05 0.1 
Family planning Knowledge of 
side effects 
7.293 6.736 7.631 
(5.097) (5.083) (5.083) 
Knowledge of 
contraceptives 
6.320 5.569 6.736 
(4.719) (4.707) (4.727) 
ANC 4+ visits 2.529 3.480 1.755 
(3.692) (3.633) (3.760) 
Weight 
measurement 
-0.081 0.769 -1.497 
(4.051) (4.022) (4.096) 
Blood pressure 
measurement 
0.155 1.218 -1.851 
(3.440) (3.377) (3.542) 
Urine sample 
collection 
-5.170 -3.456 -8.374** 
(3.851) (3.827) (3.901) 
Blood sample 
collection 
2.831 4.732 -0.673 
(4.354) (4.315) (4.435) 
Iron 
supplementation 
11.540*** 11.684*** 10.923*** 
(3.171) (3.132) (3.214) 
Delivery care Institutional 
delivery 
8.187** 8.960** 7.838** 
(3.890) (3.815) (3.959) 
Skilled-assisted 
delivery 
10.510** 11.284*** 9.778** 
(4.097) (4.002) (4.173) 
Child morbidity 
prevalence 
ARI -9.211*** -9.133*** -9.243*** 
(1.565) (1.566) (1.559) 
Fever -8.571*** -8.563*** -8.545*** 
(1.949) (1.953) (1.936) 
Diarrhea -0.302 -0.318 -0.320 
(1.581) (1.582) (1.578) 
Each row represents a separate regression. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
In conclusion, the previous robustness checks rule out an existing trend that could 
challenge the DD PSM identifying assumptions. Our robustness checks also provide 
evidence that the main estimation results reported in section 3.5 are not sensitive in 
general to alternative types of the Kernel function, bandwidths of the Kernel function 
and estimation methods of the propensity score. 
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Table 3.15: Sensitivity to the bandwidth of the Kernel function, 2005-2008 
 Outcome Main results Bandwidth 
0.05 0.1 
Family planning Knowledge of 
side effects 
10.330** 10.097** 11.158*** 
(4.237) (4.233) (4.267) 
Knowledge of 
contraceptives 
-0.703 -1.085 0.174 
(4.035) (4.023) (4.085) 
ANC 4+ visits -2.301 -2.584 -1.947 
(3.549) (3.549) (3.601) 
Weight 
measurement 
5.328* 5.457** 4.816* 
(2.729) (2.717) (2.810) 
Blood pressure 
measurement 
3.870 4.060 3.823 
(2.969) (2.962) (3.043) 
Urine sample 
collection 
3.661 3.669 4.892 
(3.762) (3.758) (3.846) 
Blood sample 
collection 
-5.532 -5.687 -4.769 
(4.039) (4.033) (4.132) 
Iron 
supplementation 
1.622 1.784 2.431 
(3.839) (3.839) (3.901) 
Delivery care Institutional 
delivery 
-0.272 -0.307 0.273 
(4.398) (4.383) (4.484) 
Skilled-assisted 
delivery 
3.880 4.011 4.104 
(4.082) (4.067) (4.180) 
Child morbidity 
prevalence 
ARI 2.710 2.693 2.699 
(1.736) (1.737) (1.764) 
Fever 0.278 0.225 0.138 
(2.003) (2.005) (2.069) 
Diarrhea -1.684 -1.799 -0.890 
(1.972) (1.973) (1.999) 
Each row represents a separate regression. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3.16: Sensitivity to the estimation method of the propensity score 
 Outcome  2000-2005  2005-2008 
 Probit Logit  Probit Logit 
Family 
planning 
Knowledge of 
side effects 
 7.293 7.524  10.330** 10.428** 
 (5.097) (5.014)  (4.237) (4.241) 
Knowledge of 
contraceptives 
 6.320 5.466  -0.703 -0.720 
 (4.719) (4.649)  (4.035) (4.022) 
ANC 4+ visits  2.529 4.699  -2.301 -2.162 
 (3.692) (3.500)  (3.549) (3.545) 
Weight 
measurement 
 -0.081 0.995  5.328* 5.350 
 (4.051) (3.965)  (2.729) (2.728) 
Blood pressure 
measurement 
 0.155 -0.287  3.870 4.047 
 (3.440) (3.335)   (2.969) (2.968) 
Urine sample 
collection 
 -5.170 -1.385  3.661 3.753 
 (3.851) (3.839)  (3.762) (3.756) 
Blood sample 
collection 
 2.831 7.864*  -5.532 -5.396 
 (4.354) (4.376)  (4.039) (4.035) 
Iron 
supplementation 
 11.540*** 6.279**  1.622 1.855 
 (3.171) (2.976)  (3.839) (3.835) 
Delivery care Institutional 
delivery 
 8.187** 7.725**  -0.272 -0.207 
 (3.890) (3.691)  (4.398) (4.389) 
Skilled-assisted 
delivery 
 10.510** 10.715***  3.880 3.808 
 (4.097) (3.815)  (4.082) (4.079) 
Child 
morbidity 
prevalence 
ARI  -9.211*** -9.123***  2.710 2.710 
 (1.565) (1.562)  (1.736) (1.735) 
Fever  -8.571*** -8.489***  0.278 0.235 
 (1.949) (1.953)  (2.003) (2.005) 
Diarrhea  -0.302 -0.168  -1.684 -1.812 
 (1.581) (1.583)  (1.972) (1.975) 
Each row represents a separate regression. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
3.7 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, we use data from the Egypt DHS waves of 2000, 2005 and 2008 to 
investigate the effect of quality improvement through Egypt’s facility accreditation 
program. We are concerned with the effect on family planning, ANC, delivery care 
and child morbidity prevalence. DD is combined with Kernel PSM to address the 
potential for endogeneity bias. 
We find evidence that accreditation has multiple positive effects on delivery care and 
child morbidity prevalence during the study period 2000-2005. Having access to an 
accredited facility is associated with a higher likelihood of both institutional delivery 
and skilled assistance during delivery. In parallel, accreditation is associated with 
lower prevalence of childhood ARI and childhood fever during this period among 
children with access to accredited facilities. However, we do not observe an effect of 
accreditation on family planning outcomes during the period 2000-2005. The effect 
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of accreditation on ANC outcomes as well is limited. The only positive effect captured 
is with respect to iron supplementation during pregnancy. 
We also observe that the positive effects of the facility accreditation program are not 
intense during the study period 2005-2008 compared to the period 2000-2005. Some 
of these effects are even reversed. The only positive effects captured during this period 
are with respect to knowledge of side effects of contraceptive method used and weight 
measurement during ANC visits. The results of the period 2005-2008 highlight the 
fact that a high level of commitment, which is a reflection of strong political will, is 
indispensable for the success of quality improvement interventions in low- or middle-
income countries. Decentralization in no way diminishes the necessity of a high level 
of commitment from the central government.  
The findings of this chapter suggest that accreditation as a means for improving the 
quality of care could be associated with significant improvements in delivery care and 
child morbidity prevalence in low- and middle-income countries. However, we found 
that accreditation alone was not sufficient to sustain high quality of care, especially 
with respect to family planning and ANC. A possible explanation is that the facility 
accreditation program was successful in improving the process of care provided but 
did not have the anticipated effect on patient outcomes in accredited facilities. There 
could also be factors other than accreditation that might have affected performance 
differentially in accredited and non-accredited facilities. One factor is the nature and 
effectiveness of outreach activities carried out by facilities. Our results encourage an 
enquiry in this direction. Moreover, future research on this topic should broaden its 
scope to investigate which interventions, if combined with accreditation, could be 
associated with improved patient outcomes. There is evidence that improvements 
could be achieved, for example, through combining accreditation with properly 
monitored and well-designed payment or incentive schemes (Quimbo et al., 2008).  
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4. THE EFFECT OF INTRODUCING USER FEES ON FAMILY PLANNING 
AND MATERNAL AND CHILD HEALTH 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In 1997, the Government of Egypt (GOE) launched the Health Sector Reform 
Program (HSRP). As discussed in chapter 2, the main aim of the program is to provide 
coverage of a basic benefit package (BBP) of health services for all Egyptians. The 
HSRP has a service delivery component and a financing component. The former 
focuses on quality improvement through facility accreditation. The latter introduced 
two interventions, one on the supply-side and one on the demand-side. Funds are re-
channeled, on the supply side, from direct to performance-based financing (PBF) of 
healthcare providers. On the demand side, user fees were introduced in 2003 in public 
primary healthcare (PHC) facilities participating in the financing component of the 
HSRP. Uninsured beneficiaries are required to pay registration and renewal fees as 
well as copayment fees that include visit fees, drug copayment and copayments for 
other interventions. 
The effect of introducing or increasing user fees in low- or middle-income countries 
is controversial. On one hand, user fees are advocated as an effective means of 
generating additional revenue and improving the quality of health services. On the 
other hand, user fees are found to be a financial barrier for the poor who wish to use 
health services. Several studies investigated the effect of introducing or increasing 
user fees, however, the effects observed were immediate and abrupt. While it takes 
several years for health financing interventions to reach full impact, studies did not 
investigate whether the effects were sustained over the longer term. (Ensor et al., 
2017). Moreover, the quality of evidence provided is low (Lagarde & Palmer, 2008). 
This chapter contributes to the literature on demand-side financing in health by 
providing high-quality evidence on the medium-term effect of introducing user fees 
in a middle-income setting. Using difference-in-differences (DD), we estimate the 
effect of introducing user fees on the utilization of family planning, antenatal care 
(ANC) and delivery care services, women’s access to health care, and child health 
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status during the period 2008-2014. Financial incentives to contracted facilities 
participating in both components of the HSRP were discontinued at the end of 2008. 
Thus, the main difference between “accredited only” facilities participating in the 
service delivery component only and contracted facilities is that the latter became 
authorized to collect user fees from beneficiaries. This allows us to estimate the effect 
of introducing user fees by comparing the outcomes of “accredited only” facilities and 
contracted facilities. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 provides background information for the 
analysis of this study, section 4.3 discusses the econometric method used; section 4.4 
constructs our dependent and explanatory variables; section 4.5 reviews the 
descriptive statistics and presents our main results; section 4.6 reports the results of 
our robustness checks; and section 4.7 concludes. 
4.2 BACKGROUND 
In this section, we give an overview of cost sharing under Egypt’s HSRP, discuss the 
anticipated effect of introducing user fees and review evidence on the effect of 
introducing or increasing user fees in a low or middle-income settings. 
4.2.1 Cost Sharing under the HSRP  
Ministerial decree 147 of the year 2003 was issued to increase the ability of the Family 
Health Funds (FHF) to generate revenues by authorizing FHUs and FHCs to collect 
user fees and drug copayments from beneficiaries. As determined by the decree, 
uninsured beneficiaries are required to pay 10 Egyptian pounds (EGP) as registration 
fees for each enrolled person, up to a maximum of EGP30 per family. Uninsured 
beneficiaries are also required to pay EGP5 for annual renewal of registration for each 
enrolled person, up to a maximum of EGP15 per family. Besides registration and 
renewal fees, uninsured beneficiaries are required to pay copayment fees that include 
visit fees, drug copayment and copayments for other interventions. The decree 
requires uninsured beneficiaries to pay a copayment of EGP3 per examination and 
one third of the price of medical treatment (drugs and other therapy). These 
registration, renewal and copayment fees are applicable in contracted PHC facilities 
in all governorates except Menoufia. According to Ministerial Decree 231/2006, 
uninsured beneficiaries in Menoufia are required to pay EGP20 and EGP10 as 
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registration and renewal fees, respectively, for each enrolled person, without 
maximum. 
The Ministry of Health (MOH) transfers to the FHF 100 percent of the registration 
fees, the renewal fees and copayments for the uninsured poor beneficiaries, and 25 
percent of those fees (including copayments) for the uninsured non-poor beneficiaries. 
The insured by the Health Insurance Organization (HIO) can also use health services 
provided by contracted facilities in all governorates. The facilities are subsequently 
reimbursed for treatment by the HIO.  
Although the fee structure covers only a small share of the actual cost of providing a 
basic benefit package (BBP) of services, enrolled uninsured beneficiaries identified 
as poor are officially exempt from any user fees at the point of service in contracted 
facilities in all governorates. Some population categories are also exempt such as 
under-18 orphans without a supporter, divorced women, widows, the unemployed, 
etc. However, there are concerns over the functioning of exemptions. The main 
concern is that the majority of individuals have never heard of the payment exemption 
of the poor (World Bank, 2010). 
As for unreformed PHC facilities, uninsured beneficiaries are charged just EGP1 per 
examination and nothing for registration or treatment including drugs. However, the 
de facto examination fees charged by many facilities are above the official fee scale, 
especially in the rural areas. Beneficiaries who are insured by the HIO pay in 
unreformed facilities according to the rules established for their coverage. Any fees 
that are collected go directly to MOH (for the uninsured) and the HIO (for the insured).  
4.2.2 Anticipated Effect of Introducing User Fees 
Economic theory suggests that introducing user fees are expected to drive demand for 
health services in two opposite directions. On one hand, the negative price-elasticity 
of demand suggests that demand is expected to decrease as the price incurred by the 
consumer increases. On the other hand, the increased willingness to pay for an 
improved quality of service is expected to increase demand. 
Utilization of Health services. The conventional theory of consumer demand 
suggests that an increase in the price of a good/service is expected to decrease the 
demand for this good/service. Similarly, introducing user fees is expected to decrease 
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the demand for health services by increasing the price incurred by the consumer at the 
time of consumption. The underlying theory of this expected negative effect is 
Grossman’s human capital model of the demand for health. The economic theory of 
the demand for health and health care primarily stems from the Grossman human 
capital approach to health (Grossman, 1972; Grossman, 2000). Grossman extended 
the neoclassical approach to the consumer demand theory to the commodity of health 
care and drew from the human capital theory [Becker (1964, 1967); Ben-Porath, 1967; 
Mincer, 1974]. He constructed and estimated a model of demand for the commodity 
“good health”, where the demand for health care is derived from the demand for “good 
health”. 
In Grossman’s model, the utilization of health care as well as the time consumed while 
seeking health care both construct the inputs to the household (HH) health production 
function, according to which, individuals produce gross investment in health. 
According to Grossman, an increase in the price of a unit of health input (non-time 
and time) tightens the budget constraint of an individual and make him/her use less 
health inputs and produce less health. Thus, introducing user fees for health services, 
especially to the poor, is likely to discourage them from using health services. 
Quality of Care. Introducing user fees can have a positive effect on the quality of 
health services for which thet are charged, which can be associated with higher 
demand for these services. For this expectation to hold, revenues generated from user 
fees should be used by the charging facility to finance quality improvements such as 
maintenance or renewal of the equipment or the facility, or in-service training for 
health workers. A share of the revenues generated can also be used to incentivize 
health workers through performance-based financing (PBF) schemes. However, user 
fees can also lead to overprovision of services, that is, moral hazard on the part of the 
healthcare provider. 
In parallel, introducing user fees can have an indirect positive effect on the quality of 
services. User fees can provide incentives for users to monitor their providers and to 
demand better care. As users pay for services, they have an incentive to demand high 
quality to ensure they get their money’s worth. However, it is not clear whether users 
can judge the quality of the services they receive. 
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In this context, it is important to note that even if introducing user fees can improve 
the quality of the services for which fees are charged, this quality improvement is not 
necessarily translated into higher utilization of these services or better health 
outcomes of the population. Introducing user fees for health services can cause users 
to cut their utilization of these services and to divert to alternative providers of low 
quality or even self-treatment. This change in utilization patterns is expected to have 
a negative effect on health outcomes. 
Even if the quality of services does not actually improve, introducing user fees can 
attach value to a service, thus increasing demand by increasing perception of quality 
of services. I.e., user fees may encourage utilization if they are interpreted as a signal 
of higher quality (Bagwell & Riordan, 1991; Riley, 2001). 
Thus, if accompanied by quality improvements, introducing user fees under the HSRP 
can introduce an incentive for users to increase their demand for health services and 
seek care at contracted facilities. However, it is unclear if this positive effect will 
offset the negative effect suggested by the theory of consumer demand. 
4.2.3 Evidence on the Effect of Introducing/Increasing User Fees 
On May 10, 2017, we used EBSCO to search several databases: Academic Search 
Complete, Business Source Complete, CINAHL, EconLit, E-Journals, Health Policy 
Reference Center, MEDLINE, PsycINFO and SocINDEX. We searched the abstracts 
of studies published in these databases using a combination of the following 
keywords: “user fee”, “user charge”, “copayment”, “cost sharing”, “cost recovery” or 
“fee for service”, along with “health”. We initially limited the results by excluding 
non-English studies, studies published before 2000 and studies conducted in high-
income countries. This search yielded 195 studies after removing exact duplicates 
from the results. The studies were screened based on title and abstract. Only studies 
on the effect of introducing or increasing user fees were included. Studies on the effect 
of removing or reducing user fees were excluded. Moreover, studies on the effects of 
user fees on variables other than patient outcomes or patient-perceived quality of care 
were excluded. The reference lists of the relevant studies were searched as well. A 
total of 13 studies were finally selected to be reviewed (see Table 4.1). The majority 
of studies reviewed report negative effects of introducing or increasing user fees. 
These negative effects are typically observed with respect to the utilization of services. 
63 
Table 4.1: Evidence on the effectiveness of introducing/increasing user fees 
Study Intervention Outcome measure Reported effect 
on outcome 
Audibert & 
Mathonnat (2000) 
-Introduction of user fees in all health facilities 
from basic local units to some national hospitals 
-Drug availability Mixed 
-Vaccinations for children less than a year old Positive 
-Vaccinations for pregnant women Positive 
-Curative consultations Positive 
-Contacts per inhabitant Positive 
    
Benjamin et al. 
(2001) 
-Introduction of user fees for obstetric services 
in urban clinics and a general hospital 
-Attendance to antenatal clinics on first visits (immediate) Negative 
-Attendance to antenatal clinics on first visits (12 months) Positive 
-Higher user fees for obstetric services in urban 
clinics and a general hospital 
-Institutional delivery None 
    
Bratt et al. (2002) -Higher user fees in private non-profit clinics -Gynecology visits Negative 
-IUD* insertion visits Negative 
-IUD revisits Negative 
-ANC visits Negative 
    
Chawla & Ellis 
(2000) 
-Introduction of direct user charges and indirect 
insurance payments in government healthcare 
facilities, accompanied by quality 
improvements 
-Reporting illness Mixed 
-Seeking treatment None 
-Seeking formal treatment Mixed 
    
Cohen & Dupas 
(2010) 
-Higher price at which antenatal clinics sell 
long-lasting antimalarial insecticide-treated bed 
nets (ITNs) to pregnant women 
-ITN sales None 
-Pregnant women acquiring an ITN Negative 
-Pregnant women not only acquiring the ITN but also reporting 
using it at follow-up 
Negative 
    
Issifou & 
Kremsner (2004) 
-Higher consultation fees in a private hospital -Pediatric outpatient visits Negative 
-Malaria cases among outpatients Positive 
    
Jacobs & Price 
(2004) 
-Introduction of user fees at a district referral 
hospital 
-Care seeking from private practitioners Positive 
-Patients admitted for malaria None 
-Patients admitted for diarrhea/dysentery None 
-Patients admitted for respiratory infections None 
-Patients admitted for dengue Negative 
64 
Study Intervention Outcome measure Reported effect 
on outcome 
-Patients admitted for deliveries None 
-Patients admitted for other conditions None 
-Total patients (non-TB**) None 
-Mortality rate per admitted patients Negative 
-Reporting inability to pay costs of hospitalization Negative 
-Patients admitted None 
-Pediatric patients admitted None 
-Higher user fees at a district referral hospital -Care seeking from private practitioners Positive 
-Patients admitted for malaria Negative 
-Patients admitted for diarrhea/dysentery None 
-Patients admitted for respiratory infections None 
-Patients admitted for dengue Negative 
-Patients admitted for deliveries None 
-Patients admitted for other conditions Positive 
-Total patients (non-TB) None 
-Mortality rate per admitted patients Negative 
-Reporting inability to pay costs of hospitalization None 
-Patients admitted None 
-Pediatric patients admitted None 
    
Kipp et al. (2001) -Introduction of user fees in 38 government 
health units 
-Utilization by outpatients Negative 
-Utilization by outpatients (urban/semi-urban) Negative 
-Utilization by outpatients (rural) Positive 
-Utilization by malaria patients (urban/semi-urban) Negative 
-Utilization by malaria patients (rural) Positive 
    
Kremer & Miguel 
(2007) 
-Introduction of user fees for preventive 
deworming drugs in primary schools 
-Utilization of deworming drugs Negative 
    
Matee & Simon 
(2000) 
-Introduction of user fees for dental health 
services provided by the government 
-Attendance of dental patients Negative 
-Dental treatment demands None 
-Dental treatment pattern None 
    
Mubyazi et al. 
(2006) 
-Introduction of user fees in public health 
facilities 
-Quality of care None 
-Malaria patient attendances None 
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Study Intervention Outcome measure Reported effect 
on outcome 
Richard et al. 
(2007) 
-Introduction of user fees for emergency 
obstetric care in an urban district hospital 
-Emergency referrals from health centers Positive 
-Major obstetric interventions (MOI) Positive 
-MOI for absolute maternal indications (AMI) Positive 
-C-section*** rates Positive 
-Stillbirths among babies born by C-section Positive 
-Very early neonatal death (<12 h) among babies born by C-section Positive 
-Perception of the quality of care Positive 
    
Ridde (2003) -Introduction of user fees in PHC facilities -New curative consultations Negative 
*IUD: Intrauterine device. **TB: Tuberculosis. ***C-section: Cesarean section.
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Introducing User Fees. We include ten studies reporting on the effects of introducing 
user fees, four out of which reporting mixed effects (Benjamin et al., 2001; Chawla 
& Ellis, 2000; Jacobs & Price, 2004; Matee & Simon, 2000), three reporting negative 
effects (Kipp et al., 2001; Kremer & Miguel, 2007; Ridde, 2003), two reporting 
positive effects (Audibert & Mathonnat, 2000; Richard et al., 2007) and one reporting 
no effects (Mubyazi et al., 2006). 
In Papua New Guinea, Benjamin et al. (2001) reported that introducing user fees for 
obstetric services in four urban clinics and a general hospital was associated with an 
immediate decrease in attendance to obstetric care, followed by an increase in and 
stabilization of the frequency of attendances 12 months after introducing user fees. 
Despite quality improvements, introducing direct user fees and indirect insurance 
payments in government health facilities in Niger was associated with mixed effects 
on reporting an illness, no effects on seeking treatment and mixed effects on seeking 
formal treatment (Chawla & Ellis, 2000). In Cambodia, introducing user fees at a 
district referral hospital was associated with a decrease in admissions for dengue but 
no change in admissions for malaria, diarrhea/dysentery, respiratory infections, 
deliveries and other conditions (Jacobs & Price, 2004). More importantly, the study 
found that user fees had negative effects on hospital mortality rates and ability to pay. 
However, both total admissions and pediatric admissions remained unaffected by user 
fees. Matee & Simon (2000) reported that introducing user fees for dental health 
services provided by the government in Tanzania was associated with a decrease in 
dental attendance but no effect on either the demand for treatment or treatment pattern. 
A decrease in utilization levels for outpatient services, deworming drugs and curative 
services was observed in Uganda, Kenya and Burkina Faso, respectively, after 
introducing user fees (Kipp et al., 2001; Kremer & Miguel, 2007; Ridde, 2003). No 
effects were reported for introducing user fees in public health facilities in Tanzania 
on quality of care and malaria health-seeking behavior measured by malaria patient 
attendances (Mubyazi et al., 2006). 
Only two studies reported positive effects of introducing user fees. In Mauritania, the 
results of Audibert & Mathonnat (2000) were largely positive with respect to the 
improvement of the quality of care and the overall level of utilization of basic health 
facilities. Similarly in Burkina Faso, introducing user fees for emergency obstetric 
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care in an urban district hospital was associated with higher quality of care as well as 
higher emergency referrals from health centers, major obstetric interventions (MOI), 
MOI for absolute maternal indications (AMI) and Cesarean section (C-section) rates. 
User fees were also associated with lower stillbirths and lower very early neonatal 
death among babies born by C-section (Richard et al., 2007). The findings of both 
studies suggest that users are willing to pay when the quality of health care improves. 
While Audibert & Mathonnat (2000) highlighted the importance of the supply of 
essential drugs and motivation of staff, Richard et al. (2007) highlighted the 
importance of the availability of equipment and the standardization of protocols. 
Increasing User Fees. Five studies reported on the effects of increasing user fees, 
three out of which reporting negative effects on the majority of outcomes investigated 
(Bratt et al., 2002; Cohen & Dupas, 2010; Issifou & Kremsner, 2004), one reporting 
mixed effects (Jacobs & Price, 2004) and one reporting no effects (Benjamin et al., 
2001). 
In Ecuador, higher user fees for obstetric services in urban clinics and a general 
hospital was associated with a decrease in the utilization of these services measured 
by gynecology visits, intrauterine device (IUD) insertion visits, IUD revisits and ANC 
visits. Effect on seeking formal treatment, however, was mixed (Bratt et al., 2002). A 
randomized malaria prevention experiment in Kenya also found that a higher price of 
antimalarial insecticide-treated bed nets (ITN) was associated with a decrease in 
demand (Cohen & Dupas, 2010). Similarly, Issifou & Kremsner (2004) found that an 
increase in consultation fees in a private hospital in Gabon had a negative effect on 
pediatric outpatient visits. 
Jacobs & Price (2004) report mixed effects of higher user fees at a district referral 
hospital in Cambodia. While negative effects were observed with respect to 
admissions for malaria and dengue, positive effects were observed with respect to 
admissions for other conditions. Admissions for diarrhea/dysentery, respiratory 
infections and deliveries remained unaffected. More importantly, the study found that 
an increase in user fees had a negative effect on hospital mortality rates. However, no 
effects were observed with respect to ability to pay as well as admissions. No effects 
were reported by Benjamin et al. (2001) of higher user fees for delivery and postnatal 
care services in Papua New Guinea on institutional delivery. 
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Conclusion. The effect of introducing or increasing user fees in low- or middle-
income countries is a controversial issue in the literature. The available evidence is 
limited and of low quality. The studies reviewed suggest, in general, that introducing 
or increasing user fees had a negative effect on the utilization of health services. 
Although some of the studies reviewed reported that this effect was mitigated by 
quality improvements, the effects of simultaneously introducing user fees and quality 
improvement interventions remain unclear due to the absence or quality of existing 
evidence. Moreover, evidence on the longer-term effects of introducing or increasing 
user fees is lacking. Further research is needed to provide evidence in this regard. 
4.3 ECONOMETRIC STRATEGY 
Using the 2008 and 2014 waves of the Egypt Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), 
we employ the DD method to estimate the effects of introducing user fees on our 
health outcomes of interest. The use of DD is appropriate in our context as pre- and 
post-treatment health outcomes are observed for both accredited and contracted health 
facilities. Also as discussed in chapter 3, we could rely on DD to address our 
econometric concerns, most importantly endogeneity problems that could arise when 
comparing between heterogeneous facilities. 
We replicate the estimation of equation (3.1) in chapter 3. In the replication, however, 
we adopt a new definition of treatment: introducing user fees. We also use two 
different waves of the Egypt DHS: 2008 and 2014. We include facilities that are 
“accredited only” in 2008 and continue to be so in 2014 in our control group. These 
are the facilities that, despite being accredited, did not contract with the FHF. The 
treatment group includes facilities that are accredited in 2008 and are both accredited 
and contracted in 2014. For each health facility 𝑖 at time 𝑡, the model specification is 
as follows: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾 𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛿 𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝜁 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑖 + 𝜂 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡  (4.1) 
 
The dependent variable 𝑦𝑖𝑡 denotes a health outcome of interest 𝑦 for facility 𝑖 at time 
𝑡. 𝑡 = 0 for the baseline year (2008) and 𝑡 = 1 for the follow-up year (2014). The 
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variable 𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1 if a facility is both accredited and contracted and 𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 0 if 
a facility is accredited only. The coefficient 𝛽 captures the differences between 
contracted and “accredited-only” facilities in 2008 prior to any contractual agreements 
with FHFs. The variable 𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 1 for year 2014 and 𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 0 for year 2008. The 
coefficient 𝛾 captures any time trends in health outcomes as well as other factors that 
could affect outcomes even if facilities did not contract with the FHF after being 
accredited. The parameter of interest is the DD estimator, 𝛿, which is the coefficient 
of the interaction term (𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡). The term equals one for contracted facilities 
in 2014 and zero otherwise. 𝛿 is the estimated change in the outcomes of contracted 
facilities relative to accredited facilities as a result of contracting with the FHF and, 
consequently, becoming entitled to collect user fees. The definitions of the facility-
level controls 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑖, the district-level controls 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖 and the error term 𝜀𝑖𝑡 are the same 
as discussed in model specification (3.1) in chapter 3. 
For each health outcome, we report the results of estimating three specifications of 
equation (4.1). While the model’s specification (1) includes no controls, specification 
(2) includes facility-level controls only and specification (3) includes both facility- 
and district-level controls. Reporting results from these three specifications enables 
us to check the extent to which the effects on outcomes are sensitive to variation in 
our control set. Standard errors obtained are robust across clusters defined by facility. 
4.4 DATA 
In this section, we discuss how we construct our dependent and explanatory variables. 
We use the 2008 and 2014 waves of the Egypt DHS to calculate our health outcomes 
of interest at the facility level. Information obtained from Egypt’s MOH is used to 
capture interventions at the facility level and calculate facility-level controls. Data 
obtained from the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS) 
is used to calculate a set of district-level social and economic controls. A number of 
regional dummies is included as well in our analyses whenever possible. 
4.4.1 Dependent Variables 
We make use of all the data made available by the Egypt DHS to construct indicators 
that reflect the utilization of family planning, ANC and delivery care services. 
Moreover, we construct an indicator of women’s access to health care. These are the 
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outcomes that are expected to be affected by introducing user fees. The DHS data does 
not allow us to construct indicators of utilization of child care services. Alternatively, 
we construct an indicator of child mortality as a comprehensive measure of the health 
status of children. 
To construct our health outcomes, we follow the same steps discussed in chapter 3. 
First, we spatially link women interviewed in each of the Egypt DHS waves to their 
nearest mapped facilities using Quantum GIS 2.8.2. Second, we recode and compute 
the health outcomes at the facility level using Stata 12.0. We, finally, combine all 
waves of the survey in a panel. Table 4.2 summarizes the description and sources of 
dependent variables included in the analyses of this study. 
 
Table 4.2: Description and sources of dependent variables 
 Outcome Description* Units Source Year(s) 
Family 
planning 
mcp Proportion of women 
currently using any modern 
contraceptive method 
Percent Author’s 
calculations based 
on Egypt DHS 
2008, 
2014 
ANC ancprov Proportion of women attended 
for ANC by skilled health 
personnel 
Percent Author’s 
calculations based 
on Egypt DHS 
2008, 
2014 
 anc4 Proportion of women who 
received four or more ANC 
visits 
Percent Author’s 
calculations based 
on Egypt DHS 
2008, 
2014 
 anciron Proportion of women who 
received iron supplements as 
an ANC component 
Percent Author’s 
calculations based 
on Egypt DHS 
2008, 
2014 
Delivery 
care 
delplac Proportion of live births 
delivered in a health facility 
Percent Author’s 
calculations based 
on Egypt DHS 
2008, 
2014 
 delassist Proportion of live births 
whose delivery was assisted 
by skilled health personnel 
Percent Author’s 
calculations based 
on Egypt DHS 
2008, 
2014 
 delcaes Proportion of live births 
delivered by C-section 
Percent Author’s 
calculations based 
on Egypt DHS 
2008, 
2014 
Access to 
care 
accmon Proportion of women with a 
“getting money for treatment” 
problem in accessing health 
care 
Percent Author’s 
calculations based 
on Egypt DHS 
2008, 
2014 
Child 
health 
status 
childmort Proportion of deaths at age 0–
5 years to live-born children 
Percent Author’s 
calculations based 
on Egypt DHS 
2008, 
2014 
*Definitions are obtained from the World Health Organization (WHO).
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Family Planning. We include an indicator that reflects current use of family planning 
methods: modern contraceptive prevalence (mcp). mcp is a Millenium Development 
Goal (MDG) outcome indicator that tackles progress towards Target 5.B of MDG 5. 
We include mcp in our analyses as a proxy measure of access to reproductive health 
services. In this sense, higher mcp accelerates progress towards MDGs concerned with 
child mortality, HIV/AIDS and gender equality. The World Health Organization 
(WHO) defines mcp as “the percentage of women aged 15-49 years, married or in-
union, who are currently using, or whose sexual partner is using, at least one method 
of modern contraception, regardless of the method used.” According to the Guide to 
DHS Statistics, mcp is the quotient of the number of currently married women 
between ages 15 and 49 years who say they use one of the modern contraceptive 
methods1 divided by the number of currently married women between ages 15 and 49 
years, expressed as a percentage. As part of the Egypt DHS ever-married women 
(EMW) questionnaire, each female respondent is asked if she is currently doing 
something or using any method to delay or avoid getting pregnant and which 
method(s) she is using. 
ANC. The first dimension of ANC considered is women’s choice of the type of 
provider of ANC. We attempt to assess whether introducing user fees encourages or 
discourages women to shift from traditional birth attendants to doctors or trained 
nurses/midwives. We calculate the percentage of women with a birth in the last five 
years who received ANC by skilled health personnel (ancprov). According to the 
Guide to DHS Statistics, ancprov is the quotient of number of women who were 
attended for ANC for their last birth and received care by skilled health personnel, 
divided by the number of women with a birth in the last five years, expressed as a 
percentage. The indicator reflects the use of skilled care.  
The most important ANC outcome we include in our analyses, however, is ANC 
coverage (at least four visits) (anc4). It is used as a global preferred indicator of access 
to and use of health care during pregnancy to track performance in maternal health 
programs. WHO defines anc4 as “the percentage of women aged 15-49 with a live 
birth in a given time period who received ANC four or more times.” According to the 
                                                           
1 Female sterilization, male sterilization, the contraceptive pill, intrauterine contraceptive device, 
injectables, implants, female condom, male condom, diaphragm, contraceptive foam and contraceptive 
jelly, lactational amenorrhea method, country-specific modern methods and respondent mentioned 
other modern contraceptive methods. 
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Guide to DHS Statistics, anc4 is the quotient of the numbers of women who received 
ANC for their last birth, according to grouped number of visits (four visits), divided 
by the number of women with a birth in the last five years, expressed as a percentage. 
As part of the Egypt DHS EMW questionnaire, each female respondent is asked how 
many times she received ANC during each of the pregnancies of her children born in 
the last five years. anc4 is a MDG outcome indicator that tackles progress towards 
Target 5.B of MDG 5. WHO recommends that a woman receives at least four 
antenatal visits during a normal pregnancy to ensure that antenatal complications are 
detected and controlled at the earliest stage. A pregnant woman is expected to receive 
health interventions during antenatal visits that could be vital to her health and the 
health of her infant as well. 
Despite the significance of anc4, the use of this sole indicator as a summary measure 
of access to and use of health care during pregnancy inappropriately emphasizes the 
number of visits at the expense of the content and process of care. Therefore, we 
include a third ANC outcome to reflect the utilization of nutrients during pregnancy: 
iron supplementation during pregnancy (anciron). We calculate the percentage of 
mothers who received iron supplements during pregnancy. According to the Guide to 
DHS Statistics, anciron is the quotient of the number of women who received ANC 
for their last birth and who received iron supplements during pregnancy, divided by 
the number of women with a birth in the last five years who received ANC for their 
last birth, expressed as a percentage. 
Delivery Care. Three indicators of utilization of delivery care services are included 
in our analyses: institutional delivery (delplac), skilled assistance during delivery 
(delassist) and C-section delivery rates (delcaes). The two former indicators are 
widely advocated for reducing maternal, perinatal and neonatal mortality. Through 
the indicator delplac, we attempt to investigate the effect of introducing user fees on 
access to childbirth facilities. delplac is also a proxy measure of maternal and neonatal 
morbidity and mortality. Women who give birth at a health facility are more likely to 
receive proper medical attention and care during delivery. Their infants as well are 
more likely to receive proper care after delivery. According to the Guide to DHS 
Statistics, delplac is the quotient of the numbers of live births whose deliveries took 
place in a health facility, divided by the number of live births in the last five years, 
expressed as a percentage. 
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The second but most important measure of delivery care we include in our analyses is 
delassist. WHO defines delassist as “the proportion of births attended by skilled health 
personnel.” delassist is a MDG outcome indicator that tackles progress towards Target 
5.A of MDG 5, which is to “reduce by three quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the 
maternal mortality ratio.” Empirical literature provides evidence that wider access to 
professional care during pregnancy and childbirth reduces maternal mortality. Women 
assisted by skilled health personnel during delivery are less likely to die from any 
cause related to or aggravated by childbirth (Graham et al., 2001). According to the 
Guide to DHS Statistics, delassist is the quotient of the number of live births assisted 
by medical provider (doctor or nurse/midwife) during delivery divided by the number 
of live births in the last five years, expressed as a percent. As part of the Egypt DHS 
EMW questionnaire, each female respondent is asked either a health professional 
(doctor or nurse/midwife) or other person (daya or other) or no one assisted with the 
delivery of each of her children. 
Another measure of the availability of delivery care included in our analyses is the 
percentage of live births delivered by C-section (delcaes). delcaes is a key indicator 
of access to and use of health care during childbirth. We should be cautious, however, 
when interpreting this indicator as we recognize that very high levels of C-sections 
are as dangerous as very low levels. According to the Guide to DHS Statistics, delcaes 
is the quotient of the number of live births delivered by C-section divided by the 
number of live births in the last five years, expressed as a percent. 
Access to Care. Besides antenatal and delivery care outcomes, we construct an 
indicator of women’s access to health care. We calculate the percentage of women 
with a “getting money for treatment” problem in accessing health care for themselves 
(accmon). This indicator investigates whether introducing user fees deepens the role 
of money as an impediment to women to access health care. accmon is calculated as 
the quotient of the numbers of women who reported getting money for treatment as a 
problem in accessing health care for themselves, divided by the number of interviewed 
women, expressed as a percentage. 
Child Health Status. We finally calculate an indicator of child mortality as a 
comprehensive measure of the health status of children: under-five mortality rate 
(childmort). childmort is a MDG impact indicator that tackles progress towards Target 
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4.A of MDG 4, which is to “reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-
five mortality rate.” We calculate childmort as the quotient of the number of deaths at 
age 0–5 years divided by the number of live-born children in the last five years, 
expressed as a percentage. 
4.4.2 Explanatory Variables 
The main explanatory variable in our model is 𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑖𝑡. The variable draws on 
information from Egypt’s MOH regarding whether and when a facility is unreformed, 
accredited or contracted. After 2008, the main difference between accredited and 
contracted facilities is that the latter are entitled to collect user fees from beneficiaries. 
To capture the effects of user fees in this context, we define treatment as having a 
contractual agreement with the relevant FHF by 2014 after being “accredited only” in 
2008. A facility is considered to be control if it is accredited in 2008 and continues to 
be so in 2014. Unreformed facilities as well as facilities that are originally contracted 
in 2008 are removed from our dataset. 
In all regression models, we include facility-level characteristics, district-level social 
and economic characteristics as well as regional dummies to control for any potential 
discrepancies at facility, district and regional levels, respectively. A detailed list of all 
the control variables included in our analyses is provided in chapter 3 (see Table 3.4). 
4.5 RESULTS 
In this section, we present the descriptive statistics of the subsample used to estimate 
the effect of introducing user fees and discuss the estimated effect of introducing user 
fees on family planning and maternal and child health. 
4.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics of the facility-level characteristics, the district-level 
characteristics and the health outcomes of our subsample are reported in Table 4.3. 
Some disparities are observed between health facilities with respect to characteristics 
and outcomes. In parallel, we observe that Egypt performs well with respect to key 
antenatal and delivery care outcomes. However, Egypt’s cesarean section (C-section) 
delivery rate is way above the ideal rate set by the international healthcare community 
to be between 10-15 percent (World Health Organization, 2015). 
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Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics 
Variable N Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Facility characteristics      
Practitioners 304 5.322 7.077 0.000 57.000 
Specialists  270 0.822 1.767 0.000 13.000 
Pharmacists  298 5.872 6.310 0.000 36.000 
Nurses  302 14.146 9.760 1.000 60.000 
Lab technicians  296 1.149 1.256 0.000 7.000 
X-ray technicians  268 0.216 0.604 0.000 3.000 
Health observers  298 1.336 1.042 0.000 5.000 
Social workers  270 1.030 1.478 0.000 7.000 
Building condition 268 1.575 0.686 0.000 2.000 
Population coverage 308 38.528 61.404 1.866 465.000 
      
District characteristics      
Illiteracy 328 29.059 10.916 4.980 51.210 
Unemployment 328 9.772 3.741 2.150 23.200 
Income dependency 328 3.806 12.302 0.290 55.982 
Inaccessibility to electricity 328 0.737 0.782 0.023 8.871 
Inaccessibility to potable water 328 2.595 4.602 0.012 27.134 
Family size 328 4.192 0.368 3.310 5.240 
Household (HH) overcrowding 328 1.150 0.099 0.860 1.510 
Population size 328 32.732 18.896 3.566 117.380 
      
Health outcomes      
Family Planning      
Modern contraceptive prevalence 166 53.902 16.291 0.000 91.667 
ANC      
ANC by skilled health personnel 136 84.691 17.832 20.000 100.000 
4+ visits 135 79.377 19.911 20.000 100.000 
Iron supplementation 136 60.069 23.754 0.000 100.000 
Delivery care      
Institutional delivery 136 85.340 19.180 12.500 100.000 
Skilled-assisted delivery 136 89.881 16.848 12.500 100.000 
C-section delivery 136 47.261 25.742 0.000 100.000 
Access to care      
Money barrier reported 166 21.438 24.465 0.000 92.857 
Chilh health status      
Under-5 mortality 146 2.513 4.937 0.000 30.000 
N denotes the number of observations. 
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Tables 4.4 presents differences in facility-level characteristics between contracted and 
“accredited only” health facilities. We use the two-sample t-test to check whether the 
means of the two groups differ significantly. On average, we find that accredited 
facilities are better than contracted facilities with respect to more than half of the labor 
force characteristics. However, the differences observed are not significant in seven 
out of eight labor force indicators. The only significant difference is observed with 
respect to the number of social workers (socwork) in facilities. In parallel, we do not 
observe significant differences in the building condition (inf) and population coverage 
(pop) between the two groups of facilities (Tables 4.4). 
 
Table 4.4: Two-sample t-test of facility characteristics of accredited and contracted 
facilities 
 Accredited Contracted Difference 
Practitioners 5.126 6.320 -1.194 
   (1.553) 
Specialists  0.843 0.700 0.143 
   (0.430) 
Pharmacists  6.064 4.875 1.189 
   (1.410) 
Nurses  13.921 15.333 -1.412 
   (2.180) 
Lab technicians  1.210 0.833 0.376 
   (0.280) 
X-ray technicians  0.246 0.050 0.196 
   (0.146) 
Health observers  1.355 1.240 0.115 
   (0.229) 
Social workers  1.148 0.350 0.798** 
   (0.353) 
Building condition 1.536 1.773 -0.237 
   (0.159) 
Population coverage 39.297 34.560 4.737 
   (13.479) 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Similarly, we use the two-sample t-test to check whether district-level characteristics 
of contracted and “accredited only” facilities differ significantly. The results of our 
tests are reported in Table 4.5. We observe that contracted facilities are located in 
districts with more favorable socio-economic profiles compared to districts where 
accredited facilities are located. 
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Table 4.5: Two-sample t-test of district characteristics of accredited and contracted 
facilities 
 Accredited Contracted Difference 
Illiteracy 29.081 28.944 0.136 
   (2.345) 
Unemployment 10.139 7.826 2.313*** 
   (0.783) 
Income dependency 4.418 0.556 3.863 
   (2.625) 
Inaccessibility to electricity 0.775 0.537 0.237 
   (0.167) 
Inaccessibility to potable water 2.682 2.132 0.550 
   (0.988) 
Family size 4.200 4.146 0.054 
   (0.079) 
HH overcrowding 1.157 1.110 0.047** 
   (0.021) 
Population size 31.818 37.579 -5.761 
   (4.033) 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
However, significant differences between contracted and accredited facilities are only 
observed with respect to unemployment (unemp) and HH overcrowding (crowd). 
4.5.2 Estimated Effects of Introducing User Fees 
Table 4.6 indicates that introducing user fees does not have a significant effect on 
modern contraceptive prevalence (mcp), a proxy measure of access to reproductive 
health services. A possible explanation is that even if a woman has access to a 
contracted facility, she would still have to pay a highly subsidized price to obtain a 
family planning method. This price is equal to the price incurred by a woman with 
access to an “accredited only” facility. In this regard, we note that Egypt’s MOH offers 
family planning services to all women at nominal fees in an effort to slow down the 
rapid population growth. 
In parallel, Table 4.6 indicates that having access to a contracted facility that 
introduced user fees is associated with a higher likelihood of receiving ANC by skilled 
health personnel (ancprov) as well as a higher likelihood of receiving at least four 
ANC visits (anc4). As discussed earlier, ancprov and anc4 reflect the access to and 
use of skilled care during pregnancy. We find that both ancprov and anc4 increased 
significantly by 18 ppts between 2008 and 2014 among women with access to 
contracted facilities compared to women with access to “accredited only” facilities. 
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Table 4.6: Estimated effects of introducing user fees 
 Outcome DD 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Family planning Modern contraceptive prevalence -3.809 -0.810 -2.943 
(5.418) (7.630) (7.129) 
ANC ANC by skilled health personnel 16.112** 15.153* 17.929** 
(6.890) (8.545) (8.795) 
4+ visits 16.935** 13.154 17.776* 
(7.564) (9.060) (10.008) 
Iron supplementation 24.118*** 22.408** 23.589** 
(7.959) (9.894) (8.978) 
Delivery care Institutional delivery -5.409 1.763 8.847 
(6.302) (8.583) (8.701) 
Skilled-assisted delivery -4.608 2.851 7.818 
(5.837) (7.348) (7.226) 
C-section delivery 6.101 14.296 16.104 
(8.140) (10.704) (11.902) 
Access to care Money barrier reported 9.534 6.966 8.947 
(10.074) (12.426) (12.687) 
Child health status Under-5 mortality 2.835** 2.890 1.602 
(1.374) (1.980) (1.946) 
Each row represents a separate regression. Robust standard errors across clusters are reported in 
parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Moreover, having access to a contracted facility is associated with a higher likelihood 
of receiving iron supplements during pregnancy (anciron). Table 4.6 shows that the 
proportion of women with access to contracted facilities, who receive iron 
supplements during pregnancy (anciron), increased significantly by 24 ppts between 
2008 and 2014 compared to women with access to “accredited only” facilities. Thus, 
while there is a general trend in Egypt towards increased use of ANC services, 
contracting can add to this trend. 
The results reported with respect ANC outcomes is inconsistent with the theory of 
consumer demand. The positive effects captured in contracted facilities despite 
introducing user fees could, however, be justified by the higher quality of services 
provided by these facilities compared to “accredited only” facilities. The FHF 
contracts with facilities to deliver a package of services to the population. As the 
contracting agency, the FHF sets and supervises the rules and eligibility criteria for 
these facilities. The FHF has the right to contract with a facility only if it applies a set 
of guidelines as discussed in chapter 2. For instance, only a facility that is prepared to 
adopt the Family Health Model (FHM) can contract with the FHF. Thus, the facility 
should fulfill the family medicine accreditation requirements to be eligible to contract. 
Additionally, the facility should possess a standard catalogue of equipment. This 
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catalogue was originally developed to ensure that facilities have the equipment 
necessary to deliver the BBP of services defined under the HSRP. Hence, contracted 
facilities are initially better than “accredited only” facilities. 
In this regard, it is also important that contracted facilities are subject to additional 
supervision by the FHF. FHFs have an autonomous supervision system that focuses 
on the administrative and financial arrangements of contracted facilities. While all 
health facilities are regularly visited by supervisors from the Health District, 
contracted facilities also receive tri-monthly visits from the FHF. 
Grun & Ayala (2006) supports our hypothesis that contracted facilities are expected 
to provide higher quality of services. The study provides evidence that contracting is 
associated with a positive effect on accreditation scores. According to Grun & Ayala 
(2006), the accreditation score of a facility increases by about 3 ppts right after it 
contracts with the relevant FHF. As discussed in chapter 3, a higher accreditation 
score reflects higher compliance with standards in eight categories, each includes 
several measures of key processes, activities and outcomes that facilities should 
achieve. In this sense, the findings of Grun & Ayala (2006) provide additional 
justification of the positive effects captured with respect to ANC outcomes in 
contracted facilities despite introducing user fees in these facilities. 
With respect to delivery care, Table 4.6 shows that introducing user fees is associated 
with positive but insignificant effects on institutional delivery (delplac) and skilled 
assistance during delivery (delassist). While delplac reflects access to childbirth 
facilities, delassist reflects access to and use of professional care during pregnancy 
and childbirth. A higher quality of care is expected to drive utilization up and 
introducing user fees is expected to drive utilization down. Our findings on delivery 
care suggest that the negative effects associated with introducing user fees weaken the 
positive effects associated with providing a higher quality of care. In parallel, Table 
4.6 reports on C-section delivery rates (delcaes) that is also a key indicator of access 
to and use of health care during childbirth.  We find that introducing user fees does 
not have a significant effect on delcaes. It is important to note that we initially 
expected that introducing user fees would be associated with a significant decrease in 
delcaes as Egypt’s C-section delivery rate is far higher than the ideal. Our initial 
expectation is supported by the fact that some countries attempt to reduce the demand 
80 
for elective C-section by introducing a copayment when C-section is not medically 
indicated (Chen et al., 2014). 
In addition, Table 4.6 shows that having access to a contracted facility that introduced 
user fees is not associated with a significant change in the likelihood of reporting 
money as an impediment to access health care (accmon). This finding suggests that 
introducing user fees would not restrict women’s access to care if accompanied by 
quality improvement and a pro-poor exemption policy. We expect that women have 
become more aware of the exemption policy in place since 2003. As noted earlier in 
chapter 3, Ministerial Decree 147/2003 that institutionalizes user fees includes an 
exemption clause for patients who cannot afford to pay. Another possible justification 
is that services provided by contracted facilities became relatively more appealing to 
the population on two grounds. First, we realize that private healthcare providers in 
Egypt had raised their fees significantly during the period 2008-2014. Consequently, 
user fees incurred at public contracted facilities have become relatively less costly 
compared to the fees set by private providers. Second, contracted facilities stand a 
better chance than “accredited only” facilities of competing with private providers as 
contracted facilities offer a higher quality of care. 
Finally, we find that introducing user fees does not have a significant effect on under-
five mortality (childmort) during the period 2008-2014 (Table 4.6). 
4.6 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
To support our main results reported in the previous section, we re-estimate equation 
(4.1) using two new definitions of treatment and drawing on two new subsamples. In 
addition, we test the validity of the parallel-trend assumption and run a number of 
placebo tests to ensure that our DD model is correctly specified. 
4.6.1 Supporting Estimations 
To support our results reported in Table 4.6, we re-estimate equation (4.1) using two 
new definitions of treatment and drawing on two new subsamples. Our aim is to 
capture the effect of introducing user fees by comparing between changes in the 
outcomes of unreformed facilities after accreditation versus changes in the outcomes 
of unreformed facilities after both accreditation and user fee introduction. We could 
interpret this effect as the incremental effect of introducing user fees in accredited 
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facilities. We only include observations of facilities that are observed in both years 
2008 and 2014. To capture the effect of “accreditation only”, we use a subsample that 
includes health facilities that are unreformed in both 2008 and 2014 (control group) 
and facilities that are unreformed in 2008 and are “accredited only” in 2014 (treatment 
group). To capture the effects of combining accreditation and contracting, we use a 
subsample that includes facilities that are unreformed in both 2008 and 2014 (control 
group) and facilities that are unreformed in 2008 and contracted in 2014 (treatment 
group). We include all controls in this analysis. 
Our re-estimation results provide evidence that although contracting implies 
introducing user fees, it could mitigate the negative effects associated with 
accreditation (Table 4.7). This supports the findings of our main results that 
introducing user fees could even be associated with positive effects. 
 
Table 4.7: Estimated effect of accreditation versus contracting 
 Outcome DD 
Accredited vs  
unreformed 
Contracted vs  
unreformed 
Family planning Modern contraceptive prevalence 4.581 8.620 
(3.595) (6.699) 
ANC ANC by skilled health personnel -7.846* 4.391 
(4.095) (8.809) 
4+ visits -9.572** 1.263 
(4.586) (9.236) 
Iron supplementation 3.606 -0.798 
(7.145) (12.414) 
Delivery care Institutional delivery -2.930 2.586 
(4.257) (10.678) 
Skilled-assisted delivery -3.508 -2.344 
(3.626) (6.175) 
C-section delivery -6.752 -3.552 
(4.825) (11.095) 
Access to care Money barrier reported -2.717 -3.243 
(4.063) (6.493) 
Child health status Under-5 mortality 1.570 -0.735 
(1.313) (2.088) 
Each row represents a separate regression. Robust standard errors across clusters are reported in 
parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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4.6.2 Parallel Trends 
The key assumption of DD is parallel trends. We must verify that differences in health 
outcomes between treated and control facilities would have remained the same in the 
absence of treatment. However, it is not feasible to test the validity of parallel trends 
for our main results reported in Table 4.6 due to data limitations. As previously noted, 
to obtain our main results, facilities that are “accredited only” in 2008 and are both 
accredited and contracted in 2014 are included in the treatment group. The control 
group includes facilities that are “accredited only” in both 2008 and 2014. While we 
observe facilities that could be defined as control in 2005, we do not observe any 
facility in 2005 that could be defined as treated. We have observations for facilities 
that are accredited in 2005, 2008 and 2014, but we do not observe facilities that are 
accredited in 2005 and 2008 and became contracted by year 2014. 
Alternatively, we test for parallel trends to verify the results reported in Table 4.7. 
These are the results used to support our main results reported in Table 4.6. Verifying 
the robustness of our supporting results is the second-best option given the limitation 
in our data. First, we test for the robustness of the estimates reported in the third 
column of Table 4.7. These are the estimates that capture the effect of accreditation. 
We use the data of the study period 2005-2008 to evaluate the validity of parallel 
trends during the period 2008-2014. We only keep observations of facilities that are 
unreformed in both 2005 and 2008 and that are later observed in 2014 as either 
unreformed or accredited. We only include observations of facilities that are observed 
in all three years. We drop observations of facilities that are either accredited or 
contracted in 2005. For the period 2005-2008, we define facilities that became 
accredited after 2008 as treated and facilities that remain unreformed after 2008 as 
control. 
We provide visual evidence on the absence of an existing trend that could invalidate 
the DD assumption made to estimate the effects of accreditation. The annual mean 
proportion of all our health outcomes are plotted in Figure 4.1. We find that the 
parallel-trend assumption is broadly satisfied for the majority of outcomes. 
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Figure 4.1: Parallel trends in outcomes 
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Figure 4.1: Parallel trends in outcomes (cont’d) 
 
 
For some outcomes, however, we should initially match treated and control facilities. 
The inclusion of facility controls leads to a stricter satisfaction of the parallel-trend 
assumption for mcp, anc4, delplac and childmort. The inclusion of both facility and 
district controls leads to a stricter satisfaction for delassist. 
Second, we test for the robustness of the estimates reported in the fourth column of 
Table 4.7. These are the estimates that capture the effect of contracting. We only 
include observations of facilities that are unreformed in both 2005 and 2008 and that 
either remain to be so or became contracted by year 2014. Observations of facilities 
that are accredited or contracted in 2005 are dropped. For the period 2005-2008, a 
facility is considered treated if it became contracted after 2008. Facilities that remain 
unreformed after 2008 belong to the control group. 
The annual mean proportion of health outcomes are plotted in Figure 4.2. We find that 
the parallel-trend assumption is broadly satisfied for our outcomes of interest. 
4.6.3 Placebo Test 
We follow the placebo test of Bertrand et al. (2004) to confirm the robustness of the 
results reported in Table 4.7. We define “false” lagged accreditation and contracting 
interventions to inspect our health outcomes before the interventions. The pre-
treatment estimations would yield null results if our DD model is correctly specified. 
We use the data of the period 2005-2008 to verify the results of our study period 2008-
2014. We use the same data and definitions of treatment used earlier to test for the 
parallel-trend assumption. All controls are included in both placebo tests. 
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Figure 4.2: Parallel trends in outcomes 
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Figure 4.2: Parallel trends in outcomes (cont’d) 
 
 
The results of the placebo test of accreditation are reported in the third column of 
Table 4.8. The estimates of all outcomes are not significantly different from zero. That 
is, differences between the outcomes of accredited and unreformed facilities reported 
in the third column of Table 4.7 only emerged after accreditation. This finding 
provides further evidence on parallel trends. Our treatment causes the effects, rather 
than the other way around.  
 
Table 4.8: Estimated effects of placebo accreditation and contracting 
 Outcome DD 
Accredited vs  
unreformed 
Contracted vs  
unreformed 
Family planning Modern contraceptive prevalence -1.260 4.477 
(4.492) (3.992) 
ANC ANC by skilled health personnel -5.477 2.119 
(7.745) (6.904) 
4+ visits -4.478 0.747 
(8.262) (6.393) 
Iron supplementation 1.487 1.982 
(8.860) (6.843) 
Delivery care Institutional delivery 4.057 2.876 
(6.971) (6.628) 
Skilled-assisted delivery 6.960 4.727 
(7.009) (6.158) 
C-section delivery -3.443 -1.052 
(8.983) (4.980) 
Access to care Money barrier reported 9.781 -3.689 
(8.003) (6.084) 
Child health status Under-5 mortality -0.404 1.093 
(2.791) (1.786) 
Each row represents a separate regression. Robust standard errors across clusters are reported in 
parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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The results of the placebo test of contracting are reported in the fourth column of 
Table 4.8. Similarly, the estimates of all outcomes are not significantly different from 
zero. 
4.7 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, we use data from two waves of the Egypt DHS (2008 and 2014) to 
investigate the medium-term effect of introducing user fees on the utilization of family 
planning, ANC and delivery care services, women’s access to health care, and child 
health status. 
Using DD, we find that introducing user fees has no effect on the utilization of family 
planning and delivery care services. We also find that user fees do not hinder women’s 
access to care. No effect is found on child health status as well. The lack of effect has 
been attributed to the fact that higher utilization of care, probably due to the expected 
quality improvement, did not offset the decrease in utilization due to introducing user 
fees. 
The only positive effects observed of introducing user fees are with respect to the 
utilization of ANC services. Having access to a contracted facility that introduced user 
fees is associated with a higher likelihood of receiving ANC by skilled health 
personnel, a higher likelihood of receiving at least four ANC visits as well as a higher 
likelihood of receiving iron supplements during pregnancy. These positive effects 
captured in contracted facilities could be justified by the higher quality of ANC 
services provided by these facilities compared to “accredited only” facilities. 
Our findings suggest that, in general, user fees are ineffective as a stand-alone policy. 
Introducing user fees should be part of a broader package of interventions that include 
addressing the quality of care in order to offset reduction in care utilization. 
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5. THE EFFECT OF INTRODUCING USER FEES TOGETHER WITH 
QUALITY IMPROVEMENT INTERVENTIONS ON FAMILY PLANNING 
AND MATERNAL AND CHILD HEALTH 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
A Health Sector Reform Program (HSRP) was launched in Egypt at the national level 
in 1997. The main aim of the program is to address persistent needs in primary health 
care (PHC) in general and in maternal and child health in particular. Contracted health 
facilities that reached the highest phase of reform are subject to a broader package of 
interventions compared to unreformed or even “accredited only” facilities. On the 
supply side, interventions target quality improvement through facility accreditation 
and performance-based financing (PBF) of healthcare providers. As discussed in 
chapter 3, a facility accreditation program was introduced as an organized process to 
monitor the quality of services and ensure compliance with quality standards. In 
parallel, a PBF scheme was introduced in contracted facilities, according to which, 
monthly incentives are paid to health providers, who deliver a basic benefit package 
(BBP) of health services, based on pre-defined performance criteria (see chapter 2). 
On the demand side, user fees were introduced in contracted facilities. Uninsured 
beneficiaries became required to pay registration and renewal fees in addition to 
copayment fees that include visit fees, drug copayment and copayments for other 
interventions (see chapter 4). 
A review of the available evidence on user fees suggests that user fee introduction can 
be associated with negative effects on the utilization of health services, although 
quality improvement may help maintain utilization in some cases (Lagarde & Palmer, 
2008). However, the effectiveness of simultaneously introducing user fees and quality 
improvement interventions in low- and middle-income settings remains unclear due 
to the absence or quality of existing evidence. In a study of demand effects in Niger, 
introducing user fees was associated with mixed effects on reporting an illness, no 
effects on seeking treatment and mixed effects on seeking formal treatment despite 
quality improvements (Chawla & Ellis, 2000). In contrast, the findings of two studies 
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in Mauritania and Burkina Faso suggest that users are willing to pay when the quality 
of health care improves (Audibert & Mathonnat, 2000; Richard et al., 2007). 
This chapter contributes to the available evidence and adds to the results obtained in 
chapter 4 by allowing us to estimate the net effect of the combination of user fees and 
quality improvement instead of estimating the effect of user fees as a stand-alone 
policy. Combining difference-in-differences (DD) with propensity score matching 
(PSM), we estimate the effect on the utilization of family planning, antenatal care 
(ANC) and delivery care services, women’s access to health care, and child health 
status during the period 2000-2008. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 5.2 provides background information for our 
study; section 5.3 discusses the econometric strategies used in this chapter; section 
5.4 constructs our dependent and explanatory variables; section 5.5 presents the 
descriptive statistics together with the main results of our estimations; section 5.6 
assesses the robustness of our estimation results; and section 5.7 concludes. 
5.2 BACKGROUND 
In this section, we describe the interventions in question, discuss the anticipated effect 
of combining these interventions and review evidence on their effectiveness in a low- 
or middle-income settings. 
Cost Sharing and Quality Improvements under the HSRP. As discussed in chapter 
4, user fees were introduced in 2003 to increase the ability of the FHF to generate 
revenues. As determined by Ministerial decree 147/2003, uninsured beneficiaries are 
required to pay registration fees, fees for renewal of registration as well as copayment 
fees that include visit fees, drug copayment and copayments for other interventions in 
contracted health facilities in all governorates.  
However, user fee introduction was preceded by two main interventions to improve 
the quality of health care. First, a facility accreditation program was introduced under 
the HSRP in 2000. The main aim of facility accreditation is to improve the quality of 
PHC services provided by facilities participating in the HSRP. For a facility to get 
accredited, it must comply with pre-determined nationally established accreditation 
standards. As noted in chapter 3, optimal standards in eight categories were developed 
to assess key processes, activities, or outcomes that facilities should achieve. These 
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categories are patient rights, patient care, safety, management of support services, 
management of information, quality improvement program, family practice and 
management of the facility. 
Second, a PBF scheme was integrated in the HSRP in 2001. According to this scheme, 
financial incentives were provided to contracted healthcare providers on a monthly 
basis based on pre-defined performance criteria. The percentage of incentives was 
determined based on the monthly performance of the providers, which is assessed 
through a set of 11 indicators: number of visits per day per physician, number of drugs 
per visit, rate of patient referral to the district hospital, rate of completion of visit 
encounter forms, patient satisfaction rate, rate of completion of medical records data, 
years of protection provided by contraceptive methods, number of children fully 
vaccinated in the catchment area, patient waiting time, number of ANC visits per 
pregnant woman and adherence to medical protocols. These indicators cover all 
aspects of service provision, whether curative or preventive, and maintains efficiency 
and quality. Each has a weight and standard.1 
Anticipated Effect of Introducing User Fees and Quality Improvements. The 
simultaneous introduction of user fees and quality improvements is expected to drive 
demand in two opposite directions. As discussed in chapter 4, introducing user fees 
as a stand-one policy is expected to drive health service utilization down as the price 
incurred by the consumer increases. However, quality improvements are expected to 
drive utilization up due to the increased willingness to pay for an improved quality of 
service. The net effect of combining both interventions depends mainly on whether 
the positive effect of quality improvement outweighs the negative effect of user fee 
introduction. The net effect can also be affected by whether the user fees collected are 
used by the collector facility to improve the quality of care, and if so, what proportion 
of fees is used. Moreover, the net effect can be affected by whether an exemption 
policy is in place, and if so, how effective this policy is. We highlight the importance 
of outreach activities as well in mitigating the negative effect on access to health care 
that associates user fee introduction. Higher utilization can be associated with 
innovative outreach activities of health facilities. 
                                                           
1  A detailed description of the PBF scheme is provided later in chapter 6. 
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Evidence on the Effect of Introducing User Fees and Quality Improvements. The 
available evidence on the net effect of introducing user fees accompanied by quality 
improvement interventions is limited. A review of the studies reviewed in chapter 4 
suggests that even the available evidence is not conclusive, where two studies 
reported positive effects (Audibert & Mathonnat, 2000; Richard et al., 2007), two 
studies reported mixed effects (Chawla & Ellis, 2000; Jacobs & Price, 2004) and one 
study reported no effects (Mubyazi et al., 2006). 
In Mauritania, the results reported by Audibert & Mathonnat (2000) of introducing 
user fees in all health facilities were largely positive with respect to improvement in 
the quality of health care and the overall level of utilization of basic health facilities. 
Quality improvements included higher supply of essential drugs and better-motivated 
staff. These results provide evidence that beneficiaries are willing to pay when the 
quality of health care improves. Similar positive effects were observed in Burkina 
Faso, where Richard et al. (2007) reported that introducing user fees for emergency 
obstetric care in an urban district hospital was associated with increased referrals from 
health centers and increased major obstetric interventions (MOI). These positive 
effects were probably driven by the improvement in quality of care due to the 
availability of all items required for the management of severe maternal conditions 
and to the standardization of the protocols. 
However, Chawla & Ellis (2000) found that introducing direct user fees and indirect 
insurance payments in government health facilities in Niger was associated with 
mixed effects on reporting an illness, no effects on seeking treatment and mixed 
effects on seeking formal treatment. This mixed evidence was reported despite quality 
improvement interventions that included improving drug availability, training health 
personnel to use standard diagnosis and treatment protocols, strengthening 
management capacity, as well as improving supervisory and managerial capacity. 
Similar mixed effects were observed by Jacobs & Price (2004) in Cambodia, where 
increasing user fees at a district referral hospital had negative effects on admissions 
for malaria and dengue, positive effects on admissions for other conditions, and no 
effects on admissions for diarrhea/dysentery, respiratory infections, deliveries and 
total admissions. Prior to increasing user fees, quality improvement interventions at 
the hospital included strengthening the managerial capacity of its staff, and their 
diagnosis and treatment competence. 
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The findings of Mubyazi et al. (2006) support the evidence that introducing user fees 
would not have positive effects, especially when fees are not associated with a 
simultaneous improvement in the quality of services. The study reported no effects of 
introducing user fees in public health facilities in Tanzania on quality of care and 
malaria health-seeking behavior measured by malaria patient attendances. 
In conclusion, evidence on the effect of introducing user fees accompanied by quality 
improvement interventions in low- or middle-income countries is limited, mixed and 
of low quality. There is some evidence that introducing user fees can increase service 
utilization if they are associated by substantial and sustained improvement in the 
quality of care. However, further investigation is required before a generalization can 
be made. 
5.3 ECONOMETRIC STRATEGY 
In this section, we discuss the two methods used to estimate the effects of introducing 
user fees and quality improvement under the HSRP. We start with considering DD. 
Complementarily, the DD approach is combined with PSM. To do so, we first match 
treated and control facilities based on pre-treatment characteristics. We then estimate 
the effects of treatment using DD. 
DD. To remove potential biases, we use DD to estimate the effect of introducing user 
fees and quality improvements. The DD setup is also appropriate in our context as 
health outcomes for both contracted and non-contracted health facilities are observed 
both at the baseline and post treatment. We re-estimate the DD specification used in 
chapter 3 but using a new definition of treatment: introducing of user fees 
accompanied by quality improvements. Three different waves of the Demographic 
and Health Survey (DHS) are used: 2000, 2005 and 2008. Health facilities that are 
non-contracted in 2000 and continue to be so are included in the control group. 
Facilities that contracted with the FHF by 2005 or 2008 are included in the treatment 
group. 
For each health facility 𝑖 at time 𝑡, the model specification is as follows: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾 𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛿 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝜁 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑖 + 𝜂 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡          (5.1) 
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where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 denotes health outcomes of interest; 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 is a treatment dummy variable 
that switches on if a facility is contracted; 𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 is a time-period dummy variable that 
switches on in the follow-up year (2005 or 2008); the interaction term 
(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡) captures treatment after the baseline year 2000; 𝛿 is our coefficient 
of interest that captures the effect of contracting on each respective outcome at the 
facility level; 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑖 is a vector of facility-level characteristics; 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖 is a vector of 
district-level characteristics and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term that captures the effect of any 
unobservables. 
Similar to chapter 3, the results of estimating three specifications of equation (5.1) are 
reported for two periods: 2000-2005 and 2005-2008. The first model’s specification 
includes no controls; the second includes facility-level controls only and the third 
included both facility and district-level controls. The bootstrap method is used to 
estimate the standard errors in all regressions. 
DD PSM. As noted in chapter 3, endogeneity is our main concern when estimating 
the effects of introducing user fees and quality improvements. Facilities are likely to 
differ along observable characteristics (e.g., socio-economic background) and non-
observable characteristics (e.g., managerial competence). These potential differences 
require proper treatment of self-selection into treatment. Treating other potential 
sources of endogeneity such as omitted-variable bias is also required. To do so, we 
follow the DD Kernel PSM method discussed in chapter 3. 
A facility is considered to be treated if it has a contractual agreement with the FHF in 
2005 or 2008. A facility is considered to be control if it continues to be non-contracted 
in 2005 or 2008. First, treated and control districts are matched based on pre-treatment 
observable characteristics, which are captured by the eight indicators of the socio-
economic vulnerability index used by the GOE for the HSRP targeting. Two-sample 
t-tests are then used to check if there are still significant differences in the means of 
observable characteristics for both groups (see section 5.6). Second, we conduct a DD 
estimation in which health outcomes are defined conditional on the propensity score. 
While we use district-level social and economic indicators to estimate the propensity 
score, facility-level characteristics are used as additional covariates later in the DD 
estimations. For each of the outcomes, the results are reported for two study periods: 
2000-2005 and 2005-2008. 
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5.4 DATA 
We draw on data from the Egypt DHS to calculate facility-level health outcomes, 
information from MOH to capture interventions under the HSRP and construct a set 
of facility-level controls, and data from Egypt’s Population and Housing Census to 
calculate a set of district-level social and economic controls. Whenever applicable, a 
number of regional dummies is included as well in our analyses. 
Dependent Variables. We calculate the same health outcomes used in chapter 4 to 
estimate the effect of introducing user fees. These are the outcomes that reflect the 
utilization of family planning, ANC and delivery care services, women’s access to 
health care, and the health status of children. As discussed in chapter 4, these are the 
outcomes that are expected to be affected by introducing user fees. 
To calculate these outcomes, we follow the same steps discussed in chapter 3. First, 
we spatially join each woman interviewed in each of the DHS waves 2000, 2005 and 
2008 to her nearest mapped health facility using Quantum GIS 2.8.2. Second, for each 
of the Egypt DHS waves, we use Stata 12.0 to recode and calculate health outcomes 
at the facility level. Third, we combine our outcomes of interest in a panel. A detailed 
description of the definitions and sources of the health outcomes included in our 
analyses is provided in chapter 4 (see Table 4.2). 
Explanatory Variables. The main explanatory variable included in our analyses is 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡. The variable draws on information from Egypt’s MOH regarding whether and 
when a facility is non-contracted or contracted. Shifting from non-contracted to 
contracted, a facility introduces user fees accompanied by two quality improvement 
interventions: facility accreditation and PBF of health providers. 
To eliminate any unobserved heterogeneity, we include a set of facility-level, district-
level, and regional covariates as controls in our models whenever possible. These are 
the same facility-level characteristics, district-level social and economic 
characteristics, and regional dummies discussed in chapter 3 (see Table 3.4). 
5.5 RESULTS 
In this section, we report the descriptive statistics for the sample used as well as the 
estimated effects of introducing user fees and quality improvements under the HSRP 
on family planning, maternal health and child health outcomes. As previously noted, 
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for each health outcome, we report the results of estimating three DD specifications 
and a DD PSM model specification denoted by specification (4). This is our preferred 
specification in which all control variables are included either as matchers or as 
additional covariates (see Table 3.4). Our analysis of the effect is mainly based on the 
results of this specification. 
5.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Differences in the facility and the district characteristics between contracted and non-
contracted health facilities are highlighted in Tables 5.1 and 5.2, respectively. Two-
sample t-tests are used to check whether the means of the two groups differ 
significantly. 
We observe significant differences between contracted and non-contracted facilities 
with respect to six out of 10 facility-level characteristics during the period 2000-2005. 
Contracted facilities employ more practitioners (pract), specialists (spec), pharmacists 
(pharm), lab technicians (labtech) and health observers (obs) compared to non-
contracted facilities. The building condition (inf) of contracted facilities is also 
significantly better. Similar differences are observed between contracted and non-
contracted facilities during the study period 2005-2008 (Table 5.1). 
In parallel, contracted facilities are located in districts that significantly have lower 
unemployment rates (unemp) and bigger population size (pop) during the study period 
2000-2005. During the period 2005-2008, we observe that contracted facilities are 
located in districts that significantly have lower income dependency (incdep), better 
accessibility to electricity (elect) and bigger population size (pop) (Table 5.2). 
Table 5.2 provides evidence that the actual targeting of the HSRP does not strictly 
follow the socio-vulnerability index. The differences in the district characteristics 
captured between contracted and non-contracted facilities are inconsistent with the 
targeting criteria of the HSRP. These differences could bias our estimation results. 
Thus, we must match facilities before estimating our DD models as previously 
discussed. 
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Table 5.1: Two-sample t-test of facility characteristics of contracted and non-
contracted facilities 
 2000-2005  2005-2008 
 Non-
contracted 
Contracted Difference  Non-
contracted 
Contracted Difference 
Practitioners 3.367 5.956 -2.589***  3.137 4.022 -0.885*** 
  (0.581)    (0.314) 
Specialists  0.530 1.324 -0.793***  0.522 0.731 -0.209* 
  (0.206)    (0.121) 
Pharmacists  3.931 7.221 -3.290***  3.723 4.762 -1.039*** 
  (0.692)    (0.396) 
Nurses  11.853 10.074 1.780  11.937 8.776 3.161*** 
  (1.600)    (0.946) 
Lab technicians  1.290 2.103 -0.813***  1.336 1.296 0.040 
  (0.205)    (0.122) 
X-ray 
technicians  
0.177 0.250 -0.073  0.193 0.126 0.067 
  (0.103)     (0.061) 
Health 
observers  
1.309 2.235 -0.926***  1.330 1.426 -0.096 
  (0.186)    (0.111) 
Social workers  0.437 0.309 0.128  0.413 0.256 0.158 
  (0.199)    (0.117) 
Building 
condition 
1.630 1.857 -0.228***  1.605 1.836 -0.231*** 
  (0.081)    (0.048) 
Population 
coverage 
3.305 2.554 0.751  3.269 2.592 0.677 
  (1.364)    (0.820) 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 5.2: Two-sample t-test of district characteristics of contracted and non-
contracted facilities 
 2000-2005  2005-2008 
 Non-
contracted 
Contracted Difference  Non-
contracted 
Contracted Difference 
Illiteracy 32.376 31.445 0.931  32.672 32.078 0.594 
  (1.268)    (0.719) 
Unemployment 9.703 8.514 1.189**  9.635 9.685 -0.051 
  (0.547)    (0.317) 
Income 
dependency 
5.228 3.185 2.043  5.602 2.524 3.078*** 
  (1.911)    (1.102) 
Inaccessibility 
to electricity 
1.285 0.842 0.443  1.357 0.916 0.441* 
  (0.422)    (0.249) 
Inaccessibility 
to potable water 
4.390 3.845 0.545  4.528 4.496 0.033 
  (0.856)    (0.499) 
Family size 4.330 4.309 0.021  4.334 4.397 -0.063** 
  (0.046)    (0.026) 
HH 
overcrowding 
1.148 1.178 -0.030**  1.141 1.207 -0.067*** 
  (0.013)    (0.007) 
Population size 31.646 39.952 -8.306***  31.072 35.823 -4.751*** 
  (2.022)    (1.135) 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Tables 5.3 and 5.4 provide the descriptive statistics of the health outcomes of facilities 
before and after contracting over two time periods: 2000-2005 and 2005-2008. These 
outcomes are calculated based on the answers of women interviewed in the Egypt 
DHS after identifying who are located in catchment areas of contracted facilities 
(treatment group) and who are located in catchment areas of non-contracted facilities 
(control group). We observe that treatment and control groups of facilities are matched 
during both study periods 2000-2005 and 2005-2008. We do not observe statistically 
significant differences at the baseline between contracted and non-contracted facilities 
during both periods. 
5.5.2 Estimated Effects of Introducing User Fees and Quality Improvements 
During the study period 2000-2005, introducing user fees and quality improvements 
had positive effects on ANC and women’s access to health care; but no effects on 
family planning, delivery care and child health status. No negative effects are 
observed with respect to any of our health outcomes of interest (Table 5.5). 
Having access to a contracted facility was associated with a higher likelihood of 
receiving ANC by skilled health personnel (ancprov), receiving four or more ANC 
visits (anc4) and receiving iron supplements during pregnancy (anciron) during the 
period 2000-2005. Table 5.5 shows that ancprov, anc4 and anciron increased by 12 
ppts, 7 ppts and 10 ppts, respectively, between 2000 and 2005, among women with 
access to contracted facilities compared to those with access to non-contracted 
facilities. A possible explanation of the multiple positive effects on ANC is that the 
ANC dimension was subject to substantial quality improvements under the facility 
accreditation program. 
In addition, we observe that introducing user fees and quality improvements had a 
significant positive effect on women’s access to health care. Having access to a 
contracted facility is associated with a lower likelihood of reporting money as an 
impediment to access care. Table 5.5 shows that the proportion of women with access 
to contracted facilities, who report getting money for treatment (accmon) as a problem 
in accessing health care decreased significantly by 7 ppts between 2000 and 2005. 
The positive effect captured with respect to accmon suggests that access to health care 
is enhanced, not impeded, when quality improvements accompany user fee 
introduction.
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Table 5.3: Descriptive statistics of health outcomes, 2000-2005 
   Baseline (2000)  Follow up (2005) 
   Non-
contracted 
Contracted Difference  Non-
contracted 
Contracted Difference 
Family planning Modern contraceptive prevalence  48.269 48.858 0.589  50.381 50.546 0.166 
 (0.805) (3.616) (3.557)  (0.655) (3.051) (3.037) 
ANC ANC by skilled health personnel  54.083 52.688 -1.395  68.370 77.422 9.052* 
 (1.104) (6.074) (6.466)  (0.813) (5.051) (5.152) 
4+ visits  38.024 38.323 0.299  57.441 60.932 3.491 
 (1.083) (7.262) (7.176)  (0.843) (3.534) (3.818) 
Iron supplementation  25.737 28.211 2.474  48.713 60.305 11.592*** 
 (0.761) (6.286) (6.260)  (0.893) (4.149) (4.254) 
Delivery care Institutional delivery  49.228 55.158 5.930  62.623 68.266 5.643 
 (1.277) (8.073) (8.139)  (1.180) (4.586) (4.806) 
Skilled-assisted delivery  61.768 62.474 0.706  73.456 79.546 6.090 
 (1.360) (7.162) (7.219)  (0.921) (4.004) (4.261) 
C-section delivery  10.706 13.170 2.464  19.348 24.233 4.885 
 (0.499) (3.097) (3.104)  (0.644) (3.653) (3.716) 
Access to care Money barrier reported  28.581 32.219 3.638  30.940 27.049 -3.891 
 (0.794) (3.404) (3.326)  (0.740) (3.103) (3.209) 
Child health status Under-5 mortality  4.260 4.504 0.244  3.422 2.918 -0.503 
 (0.255) (1.317) (1.348)  (0.180) (1.194) (1.216) 
Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5.4: Descriptive statistics of health outcomes, 2005-2008 
   Baseline (2005)  Follow up (2008) 
   Non-
contracted 
Contracted Difference  Non-
contracted 
Contracted Difference 
Family planning Modern contraceptive prevalence  49.989 48.180 -1.809  51.192 50.877 -0.315 
 (0.519) (1.859) (2.017)  (0.715) (1.970) (2.018) 
ANC ANC by skilled health personnel  68.185 66.509 -1.676  73.161 62.842 -10.319*** 
 (1.086) (2.530) (2.812)  (0.897) (3.071) (3.329) 
4+ visits  56.966 55.112 -1.854  64.282 56.422 -7.860** 
 (0.945) (2.403) (2.388)  (1.109) (3.257) (3.568) 
Iron supplementation  48.130 50.835 2.705  38.063 45.404 7.341*** 
 (0.961) (2.380) (2.596)  (0.978) (2.247) (2.307) 
Delivery care Institutional delivery  62.120 59.766 -2.355  70.111 68.683 -1.428 
 (1.258) (2.871) (3.052)  (0.928) (3.357) (3.551) 
Skilled-assisted delivery  72.893 74.769 1.876  78.311 77.246 -1.065 
 (0.987) (1.482) (1.895)  (1.048) (3.187) (3.363) 
C-section delivery  18.879 18.513 -0.366  27.790 25.430 -2.360 
 (0.835) (1.625) (1.733)  (0.689) (2.077) (2.273) 
Access to care Money barrier reported  30.298 30.327 0.029  47.056 51.153 4.096 
 (0.617) (1.352) (1.578)  (0.844) (3.163) (3.305) 
Child health status Under-5 mortality  3.518 3.614 0.096  2.241 2.794 0.553 
 (0.246) (0.548) (0.621)  (0.223) (0.542) (0.561) 
Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
100 
Table 5.5: Estimated effects of introducing user fees and quality improvements, 
2000-2005 
 Outcome DD  DD PSM 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) 
Family planning Modern contraceptive 
prevalence 
-0.423 -0.210 0.386  1.761 
(4.887) (4.165) (4.266)  (2.410) 
ANC ANC by skilled health 
personnel 
10.447 5.164 7.133  11.830*** 
(8.193) (5.631) (5.111)  (4.301) 
4+ visits 3.193 -0.618 0.977  7.086* 
(7.976) (6.784) (6.335)  (3.898) 
Iron supplementation 9.118 8.767 8.795  9.522** 
(7.927) (6.358) (6.246)  (3.833) 
Delivery care Institutional delivery -0.287 -4.013 -1.172  -1.930 
(8.587) (8.382) (7.413)  (4.672) 
Skilled-assisted delivery 5.384 -0.397 2.042  2.940 
(7.901) (8.715) (7.530)  (4.405) 
C-section delivery 2.421 0.973 1.287  2.595 
(4.810) (4.075) (4.769)  (2.670) 
Access to care Money barrier reported -7.529* -2.349 -2.524  -7.034** 
(4.491) (5.379) (4.935)  (2.932) 
Child health 
status 
Under-5 mortality -0.747 -0.527 -0.658  -1.142 
(1.905) (1.353) (1.388)  (0.940) 
Each row represents a separate regression. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Bootstrapped 
standard errors are reported for specifications (1) to (3). *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
We do not observe any significant effects during the period 2000-2005 on outcomes 
of family planning, delivery care and child health status (Table 5.5). 
However, Table 5.6 indicates that the positive effects observed during the study period 
2000-2005 were reversed during the period 2005-2008. This change in the effects is 
justified by the fact that the phased introduction of user fees started in the first quarter 
of 2004. Thus, our second study period is more likely to reflect the effects of user fees 
while the first period is more likely to reflect the effects of quality improvements 
through facility accreditation and PBF of health providers. The results of the period 
2005-2008 provide evidence that user fees drove down utilization in contracted 
facilities and probably shifted utilization towards non-contracted facilities. Although 
the poor are supposed to be officially exempt from any fees at the point of service, 
this exemption is not essentially known to the population (World Bank, 2010). 
According to a facility survey carried out by the World Bank as a census of all 362 
public PHC facilities in Alexandria and Menoufia and a HH survey of a total of 5,471 
HHs in their catchment area, 97 percent of the respondents have never heard of the 
payment exemption for the poor in contracted facilities. 
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Table 5.6: Estimated effects of introducing user fees and quality improvements, 
2005-2008 
 Outcome DD  DD PSM 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
Family 
planning 
Modern contraceptive 
prevalence 
1.493 0.349 -0.445  2.279 
(2.961) (2.323) (2.204)  (2.428) 
ANC ANC by skilled health 
personnel 
-8.643** -11.17*** -12.54***  -7.551* 
(4.068) (3.626) (3.898)  (4.128) 
4+ visits -6.006 -7.572 -9.004**  -4.031 
(4.112) (4.632) (4.411)  (4.151) 
Iron supplementation 4.636 3.408 3.474  4.641 
(3.385) (3.790) (3.801)  (3.941) 
Delivery care Institutional delivery 0.927 -2.237 -3.653  -2.178 
(4.888) (4.187) (4.045)  (4.190) 
Skilled-assisted delivery -2.941 -6.107* -7.161**  -0.073 
(3.919) (3.408) (3.348)  (3.961) 
C-section delivery -1.994 -2.871 -3.790  -3.068 
(2.821) (3.233) (3.218)  (2.963) 
Access to care Money barrier reported 4.067 3.483 3.983  9.353*** 
(2.923) (3.669) (3.651)  (3.022) 
Child health 
status 
Under-5 mortality 0.457 0.491 0.553  0.952 
(0.802) (1.017) (0.993)  (1.004) 
Each row represents a separate regression. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Bootstrapped 
standard errors are reported for specifications (1) to (3). *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
The change in the effects could also be justified by the significant reduction of 
incentive payments to health providers due to funding issues of the FHFs. World Bank 
(2010) reports that the average utilization rate per person per year decreased, from 25 
daily encounters per doctor in 2006 to 12 daily encounters in 2009, possibly because 
of decreased funding for incentives. This finding provides evidence on the effect of 
provider incentives on service utilization and patient satisfaction. 
5.6 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS  
In this section, we run several checks to verify the robustness of our main results 
reported in the previous section. First, a placebo test is carried out to verify the 
functional form of the DD set-up. Second, we assess the quality of matching facilities 
using two-sample t-tests. Third, we conduct a sensitivity analysis for our DD PSM 
estimates. 
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5.6.1 Placebo Test 
We follow the placebo test of Bertrand et al. (2004) as in chapter 3 to ensure that the 
functional form of the DD set-up is properly specified. If so, no effects on the health 
outcomes of contracted facilities should be observed before contracting as we define 
a “false” lagged contracting intervention. The data of the study period 2000-2005 is 
used to verify the results of the period 2005-2008, where facilities that are contracted 
after 2005 are defined as treated and facilities that are not contracted after 2005 are 
defined as control for the period 2000-2005. We could not run the placebo test using 
our preferred model’s specification (4) due to data limitation. Alternatively, we use 
the model’s specification (3). 
The results of our placebo test reported in Table 5.7 indicate that the treatment 
estimates are not significantly different from zero for all health outcomes. That is, 
differences between contracted and non-contracted facilities reported in our main 
results only emerged after contracting. 
 
Table 5.7: Estimated effects of placebo contracting, 2000-2005 
 Outcome Difference 
(baseline) 
Difference 
(follow-up) 
DD 
(3) 
Family planning Modern contraceptive 
prevalence 
-7.269* 3.210 10.479 
  (6.397) 
ANC ANC by skilled 
health personnel 
-19.073 -10.510 8.563 
  (53.932) 
4+ visits -13.851 -14.609 -0.758 
  (27.636) 
Iron supplementation -21.195 -13.857 7.338 
  (20.424) 
Delivery care Institutional delivery -16.768 -33.036 -16.268 
  (13.643) 
Skilled-assisted 
delivery 
-26.650 -31.684 -5.034 
  (42.505) 
C-section delivery -29.138 -26.366 2.772 
  (8.407) 
Access to care Money barrier 
reported 
0.482 8.686 8.204 
  (10.992) 
Child health status Under-5 mortality 2.334 3.113 0.778 
  (5.280) 
Each row represents a separate regression. The covariates are the facility characteristics, district socio-
economic indicators and regional dummies from Table 3.4. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, 
** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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5.6.2 Quality of Matching 
We use the balancing two-sample t-test of the difference in means of covariates across 
matched samples of facilities to check whether observable characteristics are balanced 
in the matched sample. 
The results of the t-test reported in Table 5.8 indicate that matching on the propensity 
score is successful as there are no systematic differences in general at the baseline in 
the means of observed characteristics between contracted and non-contracted health 
facilities. 
5.6.3 Sensitivity of Results 
We follow the same steps discussed in chapter 3 to inspect the sensitivity of our main 
estimation results reported in section 5.5 to the type of the Kernel function, the 
bandwidth of the Kernel function and the estimation method of the propensity score 
(see subsection 3.6.3). 
The results of our sensitivity checks reported in Tables 5.9 and 5.10 provide evidence 
that our main results are not sensitive in general to alternative types of the Kernel 
function. More importantly, our main results are not sensitive to alternative 
bandwidths of the Kernel function (Tables 5.11 and 5.12). Moreover, the results of 
our checks reported in Table 5.13 indicate that our main results are not sensitive to 
alternative estimation methods of the propensity score. 
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Table 5.8: Balancing two-sample t-test, 2005-2008 
 Difference in mean covariates between contracted and non-contracted facilities 
 Illiteracy Un-
employment 
Income 
dependency 
In-
accessibility 
to electricity 
In-
accessibility 
to potable 
water 
Family size HH 
overcrowding 
Population 
size 
Family planning         
Modern contraceptive 
prevalence 
0.508 0.134 -0.510 -0.020 0.063 0.011 -0.002 4.040*** 
ANC         
ANC by skilled 
health personnel 
-1.180 0.416 -1.209 -0.051 -0.356 -0.002 -0.013 4.908*** 
4+ visits 
 
-1.180 0.416 -1.209 -0.051 -0.356 -0.002 -0.013 4.908*** 
Iron supplementation 
 
-1.180 0.416 -1.209 -0.051 -0.356 -0.002 -0.013 4.908*** 
Delivery care         
Institutional delivery 
 
0.273 0.204 -1.399 -0.065 -0.191 -0.004 -0.009 5.761*** 
Skilled-assisted 
delivery 
-1.139 0.431 -1.284 -0.051 -0.350 -0.001 -0.013 4.958*** 
C-section delivery 
 
-1.175 0.415 -1.199 -0.051 -0.357 -0.001 -0.013 4.903*** 
Access to care         
Money barrier 
reported 
0.508 0.134 -0.510 -0.020 0.063 0.011 -0.002 4.040*** 
Child health status         
Under-5 mortality 
 
0.324 0.175 -1.137 -0.047 0.035 0.008 -0.008 5.201*** 
Means and t-test are estimated by linear regression. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
105 
Table 5.9: Sensitivity to the type of the Kernel function, 2000-2005 
 Outcome Main 
results 
Type of function 
Gaussian Biweight Uniform Tricube 
Family 
planning 
Modern contraceptive 
prevalence 
1.761 1.496 1.868 1.515 1.653 
(2.410) (2.452) (2.412) (2.408) (2.409) 
ANC ANC by skilled 
health personnel 
11.830*** 10.654** 11.999*** 11.550*** 11.572*** 
(4.301) (4.387) (4.304) (4.293) (4.294) 
4+ visits 7.086* 6.768* 7.232* 6.872* 6.870* 
(3.898) (3.979) (3.901) (3.892) (3.892) 
Iron supplementation 9.522** 9.130** 9.619** 9.281** 9.319** 
(3.833) (3.910) (3.840) (3.820) (3.822) 
Delivery 
care 
Institutional delivery -1.930 -2.362 -1.737 -2.089 -2.105 
(4.672) (4.803) (4.676) (4.664) (4.664) 
Skilled-assisted 
delivery 
2.940 2.230 3.031 2.951 2.900 
(4.405) (4.534) (4.406) (4.402) (4.401) 
C-section delivery 2.595 2.305 2.488 2.707 2.712 
(2.670) (2.744) (2.677) (2.664) (2.663) 
Access 
to care 
Money barrier 
reported 
-7.034** -5.869** -7.162** -6.889** -6.937** 
(2.932) (2.977) (2.937) (2.921) (2.932) 
Child 
health 
status 
Under-5 mortality -1.142 -0.963 -1.188 -1.111 -1.106 
(0.940) (0.956) (0.938) (0.941) (0.941) 
Each row represents a separate regression. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 5.10: Sensitivity to the type of the Kernel function, 2005-2008 
 Outcome Main 
results 
Type of function 
Gaussian Biweight Uniform Tricube 
Family 
planning 
Modern contraceptive 
prevalence 
2.279 2.167 1.886 2.965 2.827 
(2.428) (2.486) (2.410) (2.477) (2.459) 
ANC ANC by skilled health 
personnel 
-7.551* -7.593* -7.548* -7.851* -7.652* 
(4.128) (4.028) (4.136) (4.163) (4.132) 
4+ visits -4.031 -4.475 -3.964 -4.514 -4.171 
(4.151) (4.055) (4.160) (4.175) (4.153) 
Iron supplementation 4.641 3.816 4.630 4.684 4.613 
(3.941) (3.805) (3.962) (3.937) (3.924) 
Delivery 
care 
Institutional delivery -2.178 -1.727 -2.269 -2.133 -2.101 
(4.190) (4.335) (4.180) (4.190) (4.197) 
Skilled-assisted 
delivery 
-0.073 -2.129 -0.168 -0.303 0.004 
(3.961) (3.884) (3.971) (3.975) (3.957) 
C-section delivery -3.068 -4.141 -3.210 -2.197 -2.751 
(2.963) (2.944) (2.967) (2.993) (2.965) 
Access to 
care 
Money barrier reported 9.353*** 9.009*** 8.729*** 10.063*** 10.044*** 
(3.022) (3.088) (3.020) (3.033) (3.027) 
Child 
health 
status 
Under-5 mortality 0.952 0.621 1.012 0.811 0.862 
(1.004) (1.023) (1.004) (1.002) (1.004) 
Each row represents a separate regression. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5.11: Sensitivity to the bandwidth of the Kernel function, 2000-2005 
 Outcome Main 
results 
Bandwidth 
0.05 0.1 
Family planning Modern contraceptive prevalence 1.761 1.899 1.556 
(2.410) (2.409) (2.427) 
ANC ANC by skilled health personnel 11.830*** 11.974*** 11.531*** 
(4.301) (4.304) (4.311) 
4+ visits 7.086* 7.201* 6.944* 
(3.898) (3.900) (3.907) 
Iron supplementation 9.522** 9.629** 9.383** 
(3.833) (3.838) (3.837) 
Delivery care Institutional delivery -1.930 -1.815 -1.986 
(4.672) (4.675) (4.684) 
Skilled-assisted delivery 2.940 2.985 3.080 
(4.405) (4.405) (4.422) 
C-section delivery 2.595 2.529 2.633 
(2.670) (2.674) (2.677) 
Access to care Money barrier reported -7.034** -7.141** -5.912** 
(2.932) (2.935) (2.946) 
Child health 
status 
Under-5 mortality -1.142 -1.181 -1.089 
(0.940) (0.937) (0.942) 
Each row represents a separate regression. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 5.12: Sensitivity to the bandwidth of the Kernel function, 2005-2008 
 Outcome Main 
results 
Bandwidth 
0.05 0.1 
Family planning Modern contraceptive prevalence 2.279 1.917 2.562 
(2.428) (2.405) (2.469) 
ANC ANC by skilled health personnel -7.551* -7.473* -7.662* 
(4.128) (4.127) (4.047) 
4+ visits -4.031 -3.874 -4.487 
(4.151) (4.151) (4.073) 
Iron supplementation 4.641 4.663 4.229 
(3.941) (3.959) (3.821) 
Delivery care Institutional delivery -2.178 -2.275 -1.545 
(4.190) (4.179) (4.294) 
Skilled-assisted delivery -0.073 -0.102 -1.663 
(3.961) (3.965) (3.888) 
C-section delivery -3.068 -3.331 -3.305 
(2.963) (2.961) (2.942) 
Access to care Money barrier reported 9.353*** 8.810*** 9.191*** 
(3.022) (3.018) (3.048) 
Child health 
status 
Under-5 mortality 0.952 1.005 0.697 
(1.004) (1.004) (1.013) 
Each row represents a separate regression. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
107 
Table 5.13: Sensitivity to the estimation method of the propensity score 
 Outcome  2000-2005  2005-2008 
 Probit Logit  Probit Logit 
Family 
planning 
Modern contraceptive 
prevalence 
 1.761 1.757  2.279 1.066 
 (2.410) (2.414)  (2.428) (2.504) 
ANC ANC by skilled health 
personnel 
 11.830*** 11.781***  -7.551* -7.985* 
 (4.301) (4.301)  (4.128) (4.114) 
4+ visits  7.086* 7.041*  -4.031 -4.101 
 (3.898) (3.898)  (4.151) (4.143) 
Iron supplementation  9.522** 9.486**  4.641 4.120 
 (3.833) (3.831)  (3.941) (3.961) 
Delivery care Institutional delivery  -1.930 -1.986  -2.178 0.767 
 (4.672) (4.671)  (4.190) (4.357) 
Skilled-assisted delivery  2.940 2.942  -0.073 -0.262 
 (4.405) (4.405)  (3.961) (3.942) 
C-section delivery  2.595 2.598  -3.068 -2.939 
 (2.670) (2.669)  (2.963) (2.950) 
Access to 
care 
Money barrier reported  -7.034** -6.976**  9.353*** 9.616*** 
 (2.932) (2.938)  (3.022) (3.152) 
Child health 
status 
Under-5 mortality  -1.142 -1.127  0.952 0.701 
 (0.940) (0.941)  (1.004) (1.039) 
Each row represents a separate regression. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
5.7 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, we collapse data from the Egypt DHS waves of 2000, 2005 and 2008 
at the facility level to complement our results of introducing user fees obtained in 
chapter 4. Our aim is to investigate how combining user fee introduction and quality 
improvements affects the utilization of family planning, ANC and delivery care 
services, women’s access to health care, and child health status. DD and DD Kernel 
PSM are used in this context. 
If accompanied by quality improvements, introducing user fees is associated with 
positive effects on the utilization of ANC services and on women’s access to health 
care during the study period 2000-2005. Having access to a contracted facility was 
associated with a higher likelihood of receiving ANC by skilled health personnel, 
receiving four or more ANC visits and receiving iron supplements during pregnancy. 
These positive effects on ANC probably reflect substantial quality improvements in 
the ANC dimension under the facility accreditation program. Moreover, the phased 
introduction of user fees started in the first quarter of 2004. Thus, we do not expect 
this study period to fully capture the effects of user fee introduction. In parallel, we 
find that having access to a contracted facility is associated with a lower likelihood of 
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reporting money as an impediment to access care during the period 2000-2005. No 
effects are observed during this period with respect to family planning, delivery care 
and child health status. 
The positive effects observed during the study period 2000-2005 were reversed during 
the period 2005-2008. This change in effects was probably driven by the introduction 
of user fees in 2004 together with the low level of public awareness of the exemption 
policy of the poor. Moreover, the significant reduction of incentive payments to health 
providers due to funding issues of the FHFs could have affected the quality of care. 
The findings of this chapter provide evidence that, even when accompanied by quality 
improvements, introducing user fees in low- and middle-income settings can have 
negative effects on access to and utilization of health care. These negative effects are 
expected to be more significant in light of unpublicized exemptions and unsustainable 
quality improvements. 
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6. THE EFFECT OF DISCONTINUING PROVIDER INCENTIVES ON 
FAMILY PLANNING AND MATERNAL AND CHILD HEALTH 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In 2001, a performance-based financing (PBF) scheme -also known as pay-for-
performance (P4P)- was integrated in the Health Sector Reform Program (HSRP) of 
Egypt. According to this scheme, the Family Health Fund (FHF) is entitled to pay 
monthly incentives to healthcare providers in contracted facilities based on pre-
specified performance criteria. To qualify for financial incentives, health facilities are 
required to underscore pre-determined standards of 11 indicators that cover several 
aspects of service provision, whether curative or preventive, and maintains efficiency 
and quality. At the end of 2008, however, financial incentives to providers in 
contracted facilities were discontinued. The PBF scheme was replaced by the 
conventional “fee-for-service” mechanism to ensure the financial sustainability of 
FHFs. 
Provider incentives are increasingly advocated as effective means to change the 
behavior of providers, and, consequently, improve health outcomes. While there is 
considerable enthusiasm for the intervention, there is little rigorous evidence on its 
effectiveness in low- and middle-income settings, particularly when implemented at 
scale (Das et al., 2016; Witter et al., 2012; Eldridge & Palmer, 2009). The existing 
evidence is more limited on the effects of discontinuing rather than introducing 
incentives, even in high-income settings. Moreover, the available studies focus on 
process indicators, quality, etc., rather than patient outcomes. No evidence is found as 
well on the effects of discontinuing provider incentives in any low- or middle-income 
country. As many PBF schemes have been operating for several years, the need to 
improve policy design requires an insight into the effects of discontinuing these 
incentives either partly or totally. Such discontinuation may be stimulated by changes 
in policy priorities, by the ineffectiveness of some schemes, or by the unintended 
dysfunctional consequences of other schemes. 
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In this chapter, we fill the gap in the literature by investigating the effects of 
discontinuing provider incentives in Egypt after being in operation for more than five 
years. We estimate the effects of replacing PBF by “fee-for-service” on family 
planning, maternal health and child health outcomes that reflect the health services 
targeted by the PBF scheme as well as the quality of these services in contracted 
facilities. Generalized least squares (GLS) random-effects (RE) and fixed-effects (FE) 
are used in this context.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 6.2 provides background information for our 
analysis; section 6.3 discusses the econometric method used as well as considerations 
for model choice; section 6.4 constructs our dependent and explanatory variables; 
section 6.5 reviews the descriptive statistics and presents the main results of our 
estimations; section 6.6 reports the results of some robustness checks; and section 6.7 
concludes. 
6.2 BACKGROUND 
In this section, we give an overview of the design of the PBF scheme, discuss the 
anticipated effect of discontinuing provider incentives and review evidence on the 
effect of introducing or discontinuing provider incentives in low- and middle-income 
countries. 
6.2.1 PBF Scheme Design 
To increase the quality of, as well as access to and use of health services, a PBF 
scheme was integrated in the HSRP in 2001 to complement the facility accreditation 
program. According to this scheme, FHFs paid financial incentives on a monthly basis 
to healthcare providers in contracted health facilities, who deliver the BBP, based on 
pre-defined performance criteria. All workers in contracted facilities were eligible to 
receive incentives, including doctors, nurses, technicians, administrators, other health 
workers and support staff. These workers received a base salary, which was typically 
low, in addition to an incentive payment that could reach up to 275 percent of their 
base salary. 
To qualify for financial incentives, facilities were required to underscore pre-
determined standards of 11 indicators that were selected by MOH to reflect various 
aspects of service provision. Through these indicators, the PBF scheme sought to 
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address priority health concerns in Egypt, including maternal and child health, 
reproductive health/family planning, tuberculosis (TB), and immunization. A list of 
the 11 indicators is provided in Table 6.1 together with the required target assigned to 
each indicator. 
 
Table 6.1: Performance Indicators of the PBF Scheme 
 Indicator Target 
1 Number of visits per day per physician 10-24 
2 Number of drugs per visit Less than 2 
3 Rate of patient referral to the district hospital 1-8% 
4 Rate of completion of visit encounter forms More than 98% 
5 Patient satisfaction rate More than 90% 
6 Rate of completion of medical records data More than 90% 
7 Years of protection* More than 50% 
8 Number of children fully vaccinated in the catchment area 95% 
9 Patient waiting time Less than 20 minutes 
10 Number of ANC visits per pregnant woman More than half a visit per month 
11 Adherence to medical protocols More than 98% 
*Years of protection is the estimated protection provided by contraceptive methods during a one-year 
period, based upon the volume of all contraceptives sold or distributed free of charge to beneficiaries 
during that period. 
Source: Egypt’s MOH 
 
The higher the performance of a facility with respect to these indicators, the higher 
the incentives that were paid by the FHF to this facility. According to the PBF scheme, 
if facilities achieved more than 75 percent of the indicator targets, they would receive 
100 percent of the financial incentives; if facilities achieved 61-75 percent, they would 
receive 50 percent of the incentives. Facilities that achieved less than 61 percent would 
receive no incentives. 
When a facility met certain targets, the relevant FHF would make a cash payment to 
the facility manager, who then distributed the incentives to the staff involved in 
achieving the target. To determine which staff participated in achieving the target, 
each facility had its own pre-determined protocol that was based on a point system. 
This point system was, in turn, based on number of variables, such as qualifications, 
experience, number of days worked and efforts made to achieve the indicators in each 
area. The total cash payments made to a facility was divided by the sum of the points 
earned by the staff and multiplied by the number of points for each worker. This 
determined the amount of cash payment each worker received each month. 
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The PBF scheme was replaced by the conventional “fee-for-service” mechanism by 
the end of 2008 to ensure the financial sustainability of the FHF. 
6.2.2 Anticipated Effect of Discontinuing Provider Incentives 
Egypt’s MOH introduced a PBF scheme to ensure that the provision of the BBP is 
based upon competition between different healthcare providers. Under this scheme, 
performance-based supply-side financial incentives were disbursed to providers in 
contracted facilities to strengthen their accountability to performance targets and 
induce desirable health outcomes. Economic theory suggests that PBF could alter the 
supply of health services. The contract theory underlying PBF schemes is traced to 
the principal-agent literature. According to the conventional principal-agent model, 
the PBF scheme is an intervention to stimulate efficient provider behavior through 
financial incentives. The ultimate goal is to improve the quality and efficiency of 
health care. We start this subsection by reviewing a simple model of healthcare 
provision under an incentive payment scheme to understand how providers are 
expected to behave if paid based on their performance. Accordingly, we discuss the 
anticipated effect of discontinuing financial incentives to providers. 
A Model of Healthcare Provision under an Incentive Payment Scheme. Contract 
theory suggests that contracts could be incentivized to induce agents –providers in the 
context of this study– to perform and/or not perform actions. Incentive-based 
contracts are used to address information asymmetries in both provider-patient and 
payer-provider relationships. A perfect agent should perform actions that maximize 
the wellbeing of the patients. However, since a typical provider works to maximize 
his/her own utility, contracts should be designed to promote targeted health outcomes. 
We attempt to formalize this idea in a simplified principal-agent framework, where a 
healthcare provider (the agent) could use his/her “effort” to improve the quality of 
health services provided. However, since this “effort” is unobservable to the purchaser 
of services or the payer (the principal such as Egypt’s MOH), the payer should 
reimburse the provider according to contracted outcomes, not according to his/her 
choice of efforts. 
We consider a healthcare service contract problem in which a purchaser of services 
(Egypt’s MOH) offers a contract to a healthcare provider (PHC facility) to deliver 
outpatient services. We, first, assume that two health outcomes, 𝑦𝑐 and 𝑦𝑛𝑐, could be 
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generated by a provider. 𝑦𝑐 denotes a contractible outcome against which a provider 
is being compensated and 𝑦𝑛𝑐 denotes a non-contractible outcome. 
We further assume that a provider chooses two actions, exerting two types of efforts, 
𝑒1 and 𝑒2, at cost 𝑐(𝑒1, 𝑒2). Both efforts are costly to exert and both are unobservable 
except by the provider. A provider could produce each of the two health outcomes as 
follows: 
 
𝑦𝑐 = 𝑓(𝑒1, 𝑒2) +  𝜀                                                                                                 (6.1.a)   
𝑦𝑛𝑐 = 𝑔(𝑒1, 𝑒2) +  𝜂                                                                                             (6.1.b) 
 
We assume that the provider has a separable utility function 𝑢 that is increasing in 
compensation 𝑤 and decreasing in efforts 𝑒1 and 𝑒2. 
 
𝑢(𝑤, 𝑒1, 𝑒2) = 𝑤 − 𝑐(𝑒1, 𝑒2)                                                                                    (6.2) 
 
where 𝑢 is concave for a risk-averse provider, convex for a risk-seeking provider and 
linear for a risk-neutral provider. 
To formalize the idea that providers are paid based on their performance with respect 
to contractible health outcomes, we assume that the compensation of a provider 𝑤 is 
a linear function of the amount of the contractible health outcome 𝑦𝑐 produced, which 
is in turn a function of efforts 𝑒1 and 𝑒2: 
 
𝑤 =  𝛼 +  𝛽𝑦𝑐                                                                                                          (6.3) 
 
Thus, the provider chooses his/her efforts to maximize utility less the cost of effort. 
Substituting 𝑤 in equation (6.2) by equation (6.3), we obtain the initial provider’s 
optimization program given by: 
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𝑒∗ = 𝑎𝑟𝑔 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑒 𝛼 +  𝛽𝑦
𝑐 −  𝑐(𝑒1, 𝑒2)                                                                    (6.4) 
 
Substituting 𝑦𝑐 in equation (6.4) by equation (6.1.a), we obtain the final provider’s 
optimization program given by: 
 
𝑒∗ = 𝑎𝑟𝑔 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑒 𝛼 +  𝛽[𝑓(𝑒1, 𝑒2) +  𝜀] −  𝑐(𝑒1, 𝑒2)                                              (6.5) 
 
For a given 𝑤, the first-order conditions for the maximization of equation (6.5) with 
respect to the amounts of 𝑒1 and 𝑒2 are: 
 
𝑑𝑐
𝑑𝑒1
=  𝛽
𝑑𝑓
𝑑𝑒1
 and 
𝑑𝑐
𝑑𝑒2
=  𝛽
𝑑𝑓
𝑑𝑒2
                                                                                    (6.6) 
 
The optimal level of effort is chosen by the provider to equalize the marginal cost of 
effort and the marginal increase in the amount of the contractible health outcome 𝑦𝑐 
produced as a result of this effort. We expect the amount of the contractible health 
outcome 𝑦𝑐 produced to increase as 𝛽 increases. The actual level of effort a provider 
is willing to provide depends on the contract he/she has. In this regard, it is important 
to note that it is not feasible to predict the amount of the non-contractible health 
outcome 𝑦𝑛𝑐 produced as the function 𝑔(𝑒1, 𝑒2) does not appear in the first-order 
conditions.  
During the process of designing incentive-based contracts for healthcare providers 
(agents), it is important for the purchaser of services (the principal) to seek to 
maximize its utility subject to the individual rationality and incentive compatibility 
constraints of the provider (the agent). This is a typical moral hazard situation. 
Anticipated Effect. As previously discussed, contract theory suggests that financial 
incentives by the FHF would prompt higher quality performance of healthcare 
providers. Accordingly, we expect discontinuing the incentives to deter providers 
from using their “effort” to improve the quality of health services provided. This 
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expectation becomes even more justifiable given that these providers were offered 
these incentives before. Although it is beyond the scope of this study to observe the 
efforts of providers, we attempt to observe health outcomes and assess to what extent 
changes in observed outcomes are attributable to discontinuing provider incentives. 
We expect discontinuing the incentives to have direct negative effects on the health 
services that were targeted by the PBF scheme (see Table 6.1). However, we also 
expect to observe an indirect negative effect on the quality and the utilization of PHC 
services in general in contracted facilities where incentives were discontinued. 
6.2.3 Evidence on the Effect of Discontinuing/Introducing Provider Incentives  
In this subsection, we review the available evidence on the effect of discontinuing 
provider incentives in high-income countries and introducing provider incentives in 
low- and middle-income countries. 
6.2.3.1 Discontinuing Provider Incentives 
Several databases were systematically searched on May 27, 2017 using EBSCOhost. 
These databases are: Academic Search Complete, Business Source Complete, 
CINAHL, EconLit, E-Journals, Health Policy Reference Center, MEDLINE, 
PsycINFO and SocINDEX. We used a combination of keywords to retrieve studies 
on the effect of discontinuing provider incentives: “performance based financing” or 
“performance based payment” or “pay for performance” or “provider incentive” or 
“incentives for provider” or “performance incentive”, together with “discontinu*” or 
“remov*” or “stop” or “ceas*” or “suspen*” or “terminat*”. This combination was 
used to search the abstracts of studies. This search yielded 88 studies after removing 
exact duplicates from the results. As the number of studies retrieved was initially 
small, we did not limit the results by excluding non-English studies, studies published 
before a particular year or studies conducted in high-income settings. The retrieved 
studies were screened based on title and abstract and the reference lists of the studies 
were also searched. A total of six studies were finally selected to be reviewed (see 
Table 6.2.a). All studies retrieved were conducted in high-income countries, four out 
of which in the United States, one in the United Kingdom and one in Italy.
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Table 6.2.a: Evidence on the effectiveness of discontinuing provider incentives 
Study Intervention Outcome measure Reported effect 
on outcome 
Benzer et al. (2013) -Discontinuing performance-based 
incentives for selected inpatient quality 
measures 
Quality of care measures:  
Acute Coronary Syndrome  
-Cardiology Involvement None 
-Troponin Returned None 
-Diagnostic Catheterization None 
Heart Failure  
-ACE-I or ARB None 
-Weight Monitoring None 
Pneumonia  
-Timely Antibiotic Positive 
-Pneumococcal Immunization Positive 
    
Boland et al. (2010) -Discontinuing a radiologist PBF program Quality of care measures:  
Expedited finalized radiologist report turnaround times (RTAT)  
-Examination completion (C) to final signature (F) Positive 
-C to preliminary signature (P) Positive 
-P to F Positive 
    
Fiorentini et al. (2013) -Discontinuing financial incentives in 
PHC in hospitals 
Healthcare expenditure:  
-Avoidable hospital expenditure None 
-Total hospital expenditure None 
    
Hysong et al. (2011) -Discontinuing passive monitoring versus 
active assessment of clinical performance 
Quality of care measures: 
5 clinical areas common to ambulatory care: 
-Screening 
-Immunization 
-Chronic care after acute myocardial infarction 
-Diabetes mellitus 
-Hypertension 
None or positive 
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Study Intervention Outcome measure Reported effect 
on outcome 
Kontopantelis et al. (2014) -Discontinuing financial incentives for 
aspects of care for patients with asthma, 
coronary heart disease, diabetes, stroke 
and psychosis 
Quality of care measures: 
Influenza immunization 
-Asthma 
Lithium treatment monitoring 
-Psychosis 
Blood pressure monitoring 
-Coronary heart disease 
-Diabetes 
-Stroke 
Cholesterol concentration monitoring 
-Coronary heart disease 
-Diabetes 
Blood glucose monitoring 
-Diabetes 
None 
    
Lester et al. (2010) -Discontinuing incentives for screening 
for diabetic retinopathy and for cervical 
cancer 
Quality of care measures:  
-Screening for diabetic retinopathy Negative 
-Screening for cervical cancer Negative 
ACE-I: Angiotensin-converting enzyme inhibitor. ARB: Angiotensin receptor blocker.
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Five of the six studies reviewed investigated the effect of discontinuing incentives on 
recorded quality of care measures. Benzer et al. (2013) found that performance 
improvements that occurred in Veterans Health Administration (VA) medical centers 
in the United States for three common conditions (acute coronary syndrome, heart 
failure and pneumonia) were sustained for up to three years after performance-based 
incentives were discontinued. These sustained improvements might represent 
adoption of new standards of care that were driven by PBF and, once adopted, the 
incentive was no longer necessary to maintain a high level of quality.  
Another study investigated the discontinuation of incentives within the VA. Hysong 
et al. (2011) used outpatient clinical performance measure data from VA’s External 
Peer Review Program in the United States to investigate the mean time to stability of 
performance after changing status from being actively monitored (i.e., incentivized) 
to being passively monitored (i.e., no incentive) and vice versa. The study found that 
regardless of whether a measure was incentivized, all measures remained stable or 
improved over time. Quality did not deteriorate for any of the measures in which 
incentives were removed. 
Similarly, Boland et al. (2010) found that a radiologist PBF program in the United 
States had a significant positive effect on the quality of care, measured by expediting 
final report turnaround times, which continued after its discontinuation. 
In the United Kingdom, Kontopantelis et al. (2014) investigated the effect of 
discontinuing financial incentives for aspects of care for patients with asthma, 
coronary heart disease, diabetes, stroke and psychosis on eight clinical quality 
indicators withdrawn from a national incentive scheme. The study found that the level 
of performance achieved prior to incentive discontinuation was generally maintained, 
with some difference by indicator and disease condition. 
However, Lester et al. (2010) found that discontinuing incentives was associated with 
a decrease in performance of screening for diabetic retinopathy and screening for 
cervical cancer in the United States. 
Only one paper investigated the effect on health expenditure. Fiorentini et al. (2013) 
estimated the effect of discontinuing financial incentives offered to PHC providers in 
exchange for containing hospital expenditure in an Italian region. The study estimated 
the effect on hospital expenditure and found no significant effect on avoidable hospital 
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expenditure and total hospital expenditure. The evidence provided indicated that the 
discontinued incentives did not initially affect physicians’ behavior. 
To conclude, most the reviewed studies provided evidence that quality did not 
deteriorate for any of the measures in which incentives were removed. No significant 
effect was also observed on healthcare expenditure. 
6.2.3.2 Introducing Provider Incentives 
Evidence is lacking on the effects of discontinuing provider incentives in general and 
on the effects in low- and middle-income countries in particular. The available studies 
on provider incentives focused on the effects of introducing rather than discontinuing 
incentives to healthcare providers. Moreover, all studies retrieved were conducted in 
high-income settings. We did not find any study investigating the effect of 
discontinuing provider incentives in a low- or middle-income setting. Therefore, we 
complement our review in the previous subsection by reviewing the evidence on the 
effects of introducing provider incentives in an attempt to anticipate the likely effects 
of discontinuing these incentives in low- and middle-income countries. 
Three systematic reviews of the literature are particularly relevant for the scope of this 
study: Das et al. (2016), Witter et al. (2012) and Eldridge & Palmer (2009). Das et al. 
(2016) assessed the existing evidence on the effects of PBF on the quality of maternal 
and child health care in low- and middle-income countries. The review found some 
evidence that PBF was associated with positive effects but only on the process quality 
of maternal and child health. This included adherence to standard protocols and 
guidelines for management of health conditions. The effects of PBF on delivery, 
emergency obstetric and neonatal care, postnatal care and under-five child care were 
not investigated in the studies included in this review. More importantly, Das et al. 
(2016) found weak evidence that PBF was associated with positive effects on maternal 
and neonatal health outcomes and out-of-pocket expenses. PBF was also found to 
have a few negative effects on structural quality. 
Witter et al. (2012) assessed the existing evidence on the effects of PBF on the 
provision of health care and health outcomes in low- and middle-income countries. 
The review concluded that the current evidence base is too weak to draw general 
conclusions. The evidence provided suggests that the effects of PBF depend on the 
interaction of several variables. A key variable is the design of PBF (e.g., who receives 
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payments, the magnitude of the incentives, the targets and how they are measured). 
Other key variables include but are not limited to the amount of funding PBF receives, 
the strength of technical support PBF gets as well as contextual factors, such as the 
organizational context in which PBF is implemented. 
Eldridge & Palmer (2009) assessed the existing evidence on PBF in low-income 
countries only. The review found significant weaknesses in the existing evidence base 
on the effectiveness of PBF initiatives. Eldridge & Palmer (2009) concluded that the 
lack of evidence on the effects of any type of PBF in any low-income country is mostly 
due to the absence of control groups. 
Besides the systematic reviews, a quick review of studies on the effects of introducing 
provider incentives in low- and middle-income settings also suggests that the available 
evidence is mixed and of low quality. The evidence is particularly limited when we 
investigate the effects on patient health outcomes rather than process indicators. The 
health outcomes we focused on were those of family planning, and maternal and child 
health. A summary of these studies is provided in Table 6.2.b. 
Effect on Family Planning. The effects of PBF on family planning outcomes are 
limited (see Table 6.2.b). Two of the three studies reviewed reported no effects 
(Soeters et al., 2011; Falisse et al., 2015). As per Soeters et al. (2011), PBF did not 
have significant effects on family planning output and patient knowledge indicators 
in Congo, specifically having heard about family planning and currently using a 
modern contraceptive method. Even when accompanied by removing user fees, 
Falisse et al. (2015) reported no effect of PBF in Burundi on fittings of intra-uterine 
devices (IUD) as a family planning method. However, mixed interventions in Egypt, 
including PBF, were associated with an increase in the current use of modern 
contraceptive methods (Grun & Ayala, 2006). Besides PBF, interventions in Egypt 
included quality improvement through facility accreditation and user fee introduction. 
Effect on Maternal Health. A total of eight studies reported on the effects of PBF on 
maternal health. As per the evidence, PBF had variable effects on maternal health (see 
Table 6.2.b).
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Table 6.2.b: Evidence on the effectiveness of introducing provider incentives 
Study Intervention Outcome measure Reported effect on 
outcome 
Family planning    
Soeters et al. 
(2011) 
-PBF -Heard about family planning None 
-Current use of modern contraception None 
    
Falisse et al. 
(2015) 
-Demand: Cost of care removal 
-Supply: PBF 
-Fitting of IUD as a family planning method None 
    
Grun & Ayala 
(2006) 
-Demand: User fees 
-Supply: PBF, other 
-Current use of modern contraception Positive 
    
Maternal health    
Basinga et al. 
(2011) 
PBF -Any ANC None 
-At least 4 ANC visits None 
-Institutional delivery Positive 
-Anti-tetanus vaccination during ANC visit Positive 
    
Bonfrer et al. 
(2014) 
PBF -More than 1 ANC visit None 
-First trimester ANC None 
-Blood pressure measured during pregnancy Positive 
-At least 1 anti-tetanus vaccination Positive 
-Institutional delivery None 
    
Soeters et al. 
(2011) 
PBF -Institutional delivery Positive 
-Episodes using modern health facility or pharmacy Positive 
-ANC composite score 100% for 4 indicators None 
    
Van de Poel et al. 
(2016) 
PBF -At least 2 ANC visits None 
-Institutional delivery Positive 
    
Falisse et al. 
(2015) 
-Demand: Cost of care removal 
-Supply: PBF 
-ANC visits Positive 
-Anti-tetanus vaccination of pregnant women Positive 
-Institutional delivery None 
-Postnatal visits None 
-Malaria visits None 
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Study Intervention Outcome measure Reported effect on 
outcome 
Gertler et al. 
(2014) 
-Demand: Health insurance 
-Supply: PBF 
-Number of ANC visits Positive 
- Anti-tetanus vaccination Positive 
-C-section Positive 
    
Grun & Ayala 
(2006) 
-Demand: User fees 
-Supply: PBF, other 
-At least 4 ANC visits None 
-Skilled-assisted delivery None 
    
Nguyen et al. 
(2012) 
-Demand: Vouchers, cost of care 
removal 
-Supply: PBF 
-Skilled-assisted delivery Positive 
-Institutional delivery Positive 
-C-section None 
-Any ANC check-up Positive 
-At least 3 ANC check-ups Positive 
-At least 1 ANC check-up with a qualified provider Positive 
-At least 1 postnatal check-up with a qualified provider Positive 
    
Child health    
Basinga et al. 
(2011) 
-PBF -Younger than 23 months preventive visit, previous 4 weeks Positive 
-24–59 months preventive visit, previous 4 weeks Positive 
-12–23 months fully vaccinated None 
    
Bonfrer et al. 
(2014) 
-PBF -Child fully vaccinated at 1 year Positive 
    
Peabody et al. 
(2014) 
-PBF -Acute ongoing infection measured by C-reactive protein None 
-Anemia measured by blood hemoglobin levels None 
-Wasted children (underweight for height) Positive 
-Parental assessment of improvement in children’s health using a 
general self-reported health measure 
Positive 
    
Skiles et al. (2015) -PBF -Reported illness (diarrhea, fever and/or ARI) None 
-Facility care-seeking (diarrhea, fever and/or ARI) None 
-Reported illness (diarrhea and/or fever) None 
-Facility care-seeking (diarrhea and/or fever) None 
-Treatment received diarrhea and/or fever Positive 
    
Soeters et al. 
(2011) 
-PBF -Vaccination composite score (for children under 1 year) 100% for 4 
indicators 
None 
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Study Intervention Outcome measure Reported effect on 
outcome 
Van de Poel et al. 
(2016) 
-PBF -12–24 months fully vaccinated None 
-Neonatal mortality None 
    
Falisse et al. 
(2015) 
-Demand: Cost of care removal 
-Supply: PBF 
-Perinatal deaths/deliveries None 
-Anti-polio vaccination None 
-Anti-BCG vaccination None 
-Anti-MMR vaccination None 
-Anti-DPT vaccination None 
    
Gertler et al., 2014 Demand: Health insurance 
Supply: PBF 
-Birth weight (in grams) Positive 
-Low birth weight (<2,500 grams) Positive 
-Neonatal mortality per 1,000 live births Positive 
    
Grun & Ayala 
(2006) 
-Supply: Local personnel capacities’ 
reinforcement 
-Diarrhea mortality rate None 
-Supply: Health infrastructure 
enhancement 
-Diarrhea mortality rate None 
-Demand: User fees -Diarrhea mortality rate None 
-Mixed (demand: user fees 
supply: PBF, other) 
-Vaccination coverage (measles) Positive 
-Use of medical treatment for child fever/cough cases Positive 
-Share of diarrhea cases in children receiving medical treatment None 
IUD: Intra-uterine device. C-section: Cesarean section. ARI: Acute respiratory infection.
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Out of the eight studies, seven reported on ANC measured by the number of visits. 
Three out of the seven studies reported positive effects of PBF on the number of ANC 
visits in Burundi, Argentina and Bangladesh (Falisse et al., 2015; Gertler et al., 2014; 
Nguyen et al., 2012). However, none of the three studies investigated the effect of 
PBF as a stand-alone policy. In all three studies, PBF was introduced together with 
other demand-side interventions that involved removing the cost of care. The 
remainder of the studies reporting on ANC found no effect on the number of visits in 
Rwanda, Burundi, Cambodia and Egypt (Basinga et al., 2011; Bonfrer et al., 2014; 
Van de Poel et al., 2016; Grun & Ayala, 2006). 
Despite the limited effect of PBF on the number of ANC visits, evidence on the 
positive effect of PBF on the quality of ANC is more consistent. All four studies 
reporting on the quality of ANC found a positive effect of PBF on the quality of ANC. 
In Rwanda, PBF significantly improved the quality of care measured by anti-tetanus 
vaccination during ANC and standardized total quality scores. This improvement was 
not, however, associated with increase in the use of care measured by the probability 
that women receive any ANC or that they have at least four ANC visits (Basinga et 
al., 2011). Similar effects were captured by Bonfrer et al. (2014) in Burundi, where 
the quality of care provided during ANC visits improved significantly as a result of 
PBF despite the fact that the number and timeliness of visits did not change. The 
quality of ANC was captured by both blood pressure (BP) measurement and anti-
tetanus vaccination. Falisse et al. (2015) and Gertler et al. (2014) also reported a 
significant positive effect of PBF in Burundi and Argentina, respectively, on anti-
tetanus vaccination  
With respect to delivery care, four out of the six studies reporting on institutional 
delivery found significant positive effects. Basinga et al. (2011) captured a significant 
increase in the probability of institutional delivery associated with PBF in Rwanda. 
The PBF scheme in Congo was also associated with a significant increase in 
institutional delivery (Soeters et al., 2011). Similarly, Van de Poel et al. (2016) 
captured a significant increase in Cambodia in the proportion of births occurring in 
incentivized public health facilities. However, the effects on delivery in public 
facilities were much greater if PBF was accompanied by maternity vouchers that 
cover user fees. No significant effects are observed among the poorest women though. 
Nguyen et al. (2012) provided evidence that combining cash incentives for individuals 
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(i.e., vouchers) with cash incentives for healthcare providers (i.e., PBF) could 
significantly increase institutional delivery. 
Effect on Child Health. A total of nine studies reported on the effects of PBF on 
child health. Table 6.2.b provides evidence that PBF had limited effects, in general, 
on child health outcomes. 
Only two out of the seven studies that report on the effects of vaccination captures 
significant positive effects of PBF. As per Bonfrer et al. (2014), PBF significantly 
increased the probability of a child being fully vaccinated in Burundi, with effects 
being more pronounced among the poor. In Egypt, PBF accompanied by other 
interventions significantly increased the measles vaccination rate (Grun & Ayala, 
2006). However, Basinga et al. (2011), Soeters et al. (2011), Van de Poel et al. (2016), 
Falisse et al. (2015) and Gertler et al. (2014) reported no effects of PBF on vaccination 
rates in Rwanda, Congo, Cambodia, Burundi and Argentina, respectively. 
Evidence on child mortality is limited. Only three studies reported on the effects of 
PBF on child mortality, one out of which captured significant positive effects in 
Argentina (Gertler et al., 2014). The study provided evidence that combining health 
insurance with PBF had significant positive effects on child health, where 
beneficiaries had lower chance of in-hospital neonatal mortality. Approximately half 
of this reduction resulted from preventing low birth weight and half from better 
postnatal care. In parallel, Van de Poel et al. (2016) and Falisse et al. (2015) did not 
find any effects of PBF on neonatal mortality and perinatal mortality, respectively, in 
Cambodia and Burundi. 
With respect to medical treatment, Skiles et al. (2015) reported a significant positive 
effect of PBF on treatment received by children with diarrhea or fever at health 
facilities in Rwanda. Similarly, mixed interventions in Egypt, including PBF, 
significantly improved child access to medical treatment (fever/cough). However, we 
did not observe a significant effect on the share of diarrhea cases in children receiving 
medical treatment (Grun & Ayala, 2006). 
To conclude, we find that the evidence on the effectiveness of introducing PBF in 
improving family planning, maternal health and child health outcomes is mixed. This 
is to some extent because the PBF schemes introduced in low- and middle-income 
countries are mixed as well. The most consistent evidence found on the effectiveness 
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of PBF is with respect to the quality of ANC and medical treatment among children. 
These are the areas that we expect to be affected the most if provider incentives are 
discontinued. 
6.3 ECONOMETRIC STRATEGY 
Since the publication of the seminal article Rajan & Zingales (1998), the estimation 
of models with interaction effects has been applied widely (e.g., Castro et al., 2004; 
Easterly et al., 2004; Spilimbergo, 2009). To capture the effects of discontinuing 
provider incentives, we propose a simple method for modeling interactions between 
“being contracted” and a time dummy for year 2014 in which PBF is not in operation. 
The 2005, 2008 and 2014 waves of the Egypt Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) 
are combined in a panel. GLS RE and FE (within) regressions are then used to estimate 
the effects of being contracted in 2014 versus being contracted during the period 2005-
2008, when PBF was still in operation.  
Provider incentives were only offered in contracted facilities. Our hypothesis is that 
discontinuing PBF in 2008 affects the health outcomes of these facilities. We include 
two subgroups in the analysis: facilities that are non-contracted in 2005 and continue 
to be so in 2008 and 2014 (subgroup 1) and facilities that are contracted in 2005 and 
continue to be so in 2008 and 2014 (subgroup 2). We expect only the latter subgroup 
to be affected by the discontinuation of PBF by the end of 2008 as provider incentives 
were never offered in subgroup (1) of facilities. 
To test our hypothesis, we would use either of the two main estimation methods 
of panel data models: the RE model and the FE model. The main distinction between 
both models is whether the unobserved facility effect has elements that are correlated 
with the explanatory variables in the model, not whether these effects are stochastic 
or not (Greene, 2008). When using RE, we assume that the variation across facilities 
is random and not correlated with the explanatory variables included in the model. If 
this is the case, time-invariant variables could play a role as explanatory variables. 
The RE model could be estimated using GLS as follows: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾 𝑑2014 + 𝛿 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑑2014 + 𝜁 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑖 + 𝜂 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖 +  𝛼 + 𝑢𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 (6.7) 
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The dependent variable 𝑦𝑖𝑡 denotes a health outcome of interest 𝑦 for facility 𝑖 at time 
𝑡. 𝑡 = 0, 1 and 2 for years 2005, 2008 and 2014, respectively. The variable 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 1 
if the facility is contracted in all three years and 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 0 if the facility is non-
contracted in all three years. The coefficient 𝛽 captures permanent differences 
between contracted and non-contracted facilities. The variable 𝑑2014 = 1 for year 2014 
and 𝑑2014 = 0 for years 2005 or 2008. The interaction term (𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑑2014) equals 
one for contracted facilities in 2014 and zero otherwise. In this context, the coefficient 
of the interaction term 𝛿 captures the effects of being contracted on a health outcome 
of interest in year 2014 compared to being contracted during the period 2005-2008. 
For outcomes, such as mcp and ancprov, a negative sign of the coefficient 𝛿 indicates 
that positive effects of being contracted weaken in 2014 versus 2005-2008. We could, 
therefore, interpret this sign as a negative effect of discontinuing PBF. For outcomes, 
such as childmort, a positive rather than a negative sign of 𝛿 is interpreted as a 
negative effect of discontinuing PBF. The terms 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑖 and 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖 represent facility-level 
controls and district-level controls, respectively. 𝑢𝑖 is the between-facility error (i.e., 
a group-specific random element). 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the within-facility error. 
For each health outcome, we report the results from two specifications of equation 
(6.7). Our model’s specification (1) includes facility-level controls only. Specification 
(2) includes both facility- and district-level controls. The standard errors in all 
regressions are robust.  
For some health outcomes, however, the RE model is not considered appropriate. This 
is the case if facilities are likely to have some characteristics that make them more 
likely to participate in the treatment or to benefit or not benefit from it. In this context, 
the FE model is preferred. When using FE, we assume that some characteristics within 
the facility itself could affect or bias the explanatory or dependent variables. To 
control for this, FE models remove the effects of these time-invariant characteristics 
to enable us to capture the net effects of the explanatory variables on the dependent 
variable. When using FE, we also assume that those characteristics are unique to the 
facility and are not correlated with other facility characteristics. 
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Our FE model is formulated as follows: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾 𝑑2014 + 𝛿 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑑2014 + 𝜁 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑖 + 𝜂 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡       (6.8) 
 
In equation (6.8), 𝛼𝑖 is the unknown intercept for each facility i. The FE approach 
regards 𝛼𝑖 as a group-specific constant term in the regression model. 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error 
term. The time-invariant characteristics are absorbed by the intercept. The standard 
errors in all regressions are robust. 
Considerations for Model Choice. Before any discussion of the estimated effects, a 
decision should be made on which of the two models provides efficient and consistent 
estimates of parameters. To decide on this, we employ two approaches to test for RE 
versus FE. The first approach is based on the Hausman test (Hausman, 1978). The 
second approach is based on a test of over-identifying restrictions that uses an artificial 
regression approach (Arellano, 1993; Wooldridge, 2002). Both test statistics are 
compared against a chi-squared distribution. 
The Hausman test checks whether the error term is correlated with the explanatory 
variables in our models. The null hypothesis of the test is that the error is not. On one 
hand, it is reasonable to run the FE model given our panel data structure as FE yields 
more consistent estimates. On the other hand, whenever it is statistically plausible, the 
RE model is preferred to the FE model as the former yields more efficient estimates. 
Although we cannot run the Hausman test when robust standard errors are specified, 
we could still run the generalized test by running the models without specifying robust 
errors. 
The second approach we employ is based on a test of over-identifying restrictions. 
Both FE and RE models impose additional orthogonality conditions that are basically 
over-identifying restrictions. RE models imply additional orthogonality conditions 
that the explanatory variables are not correlated with the facility-specific error (RE). 
FE models imply additional orthogonality conditions that the explanatory variables 
are not correlated with the idiosyncratic error. The extra orthogonality conditions that 
cause the RE estimates to be more efficient than the FE estimates could be considered 
as over-identifying restrictions that could be tested. 
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To run the test, we follow the artificial regression approach explained by Arellano 
(1993) and Wooldridge (2002). We re-estimate our RE models, but this time, in 
addition to our original explanatory variables, we include transformations of these 
variables into deviation-from-mean form. We subsequently test for the significance 
of these additional variables. Rejection of the null hypothesis implies that the FE 
model is preferred to the RE model. 
In this context, it is important to note that the test of over-identifying restrictions is 
better than the Hausman test as the former enables us to test RE against FE when the 
errors are heteroskedastic or have intragroup correlation. Tests of over-identifying 
restrictions extend directly to heteroskedastic- and cluster-robust versions. 
6.4 DATA 
We use three waves of the Egypt DHS (2005, 2008 and 2014) to calculate our health 
outcomes of interest at the facility level. Information obtained from Egypt’s MOH is 
used to capture interventions at the facility level and calculate facility-level controls. 
We also use data from Egypt’s Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics 
(CAPMAS) to calculate a set of district-level social and economic controls. A number 
of regional dummies is included as well. 
Dependent Variables. The dependent variables included in this chapter are similar 
to some of the family planning, maternal health and child health outcomes included 
in the analyses of chapters 3, 4 and 5. However, in this chapter, we focus on the health 
outcomes that reflect the health services targeted by the PBF scheme in Egypt as well 
as the quality of these services. A list of these outcomes together with a description of 
how they are linked to the PBF scheme is provided in Table 6.3. 
To construct these outcomes, we follow the same steps discussed in details in chapter 
3. First, we use Quantum GIS 2.8.2 to spatially link women interviewed in each of the 
Egypt DHS waves to their nearest mapped facilities. Second, we recode and compute 
health outcomes at the facility-level using Stata 12.0. We, finally, combine the 2005, 
2008 and 2014 facility-level outcomes in a panel. 
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Table 6.3: Description of dependent variables and their link to PBF scheme 
 Outcome Description* Relevant PBF scheme 
indicator 
Link to 
scheme 
Family 
planning 
mcp Proportion of women 
currently using any modern 
contraceptive method 
Number of new users of all 
types of modern 
contraceptive methods 
among married women of 
reproductive age in the 
catchment area 
Direct 
    
contsid Proportion of current users 
of selected contraceptive 
methods informed of side 
effect of the method used 
Number of new users of all 
types of modern 
contraceptive methods 
among married women of 
reproductive age in the 
catchment area 
Indirect 
(quality of 
service) 
    
contoth Proportion of current users 
of selected contraceptive 
methods informed of other 
methods of contraception 
that could be used 
Number of new users of all 
types of modern 
contraceptive methods 
among married women of 
reproductive age in the 
catchment area 
Indirect 
(quality of 
service) 
     
ANC ancprov Proportion of women 
attended for ANC by 
skilled health personnel 
Number of pregnant women 
receiving regular ANC visits 
compared to the total 
number of pregnant women 
in the catchment area 
Direct 
    
anc4 Proportion of women who 
received four or more ANC 
visits 
Number of pregnant women 
receiving regular ANC visits 
compared to the total 
number of pregnant women 
in the catchment area 
Direct 
    
anciron Proportion of women who 
received iron supplements 
as an ANC component 
Number of pregnant women 
receiving regular ANC visits 
compared to the total 
number of pregnant women 
in the catchment area 
Indirect 
(quality of 
service) 
     
Child 
health 
status 
childmort Proportion of deaths at age 
0–5 years to live-born 
children 
Number of children fully 
vaccinated in the catchment 
area 
Direct 
(proxy 
measure) 
*Definitions are obtained from the World Health Organization (WHO).
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Explanatory Variables. Our main explanatory variable is 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡, which is a dummy 
variable that switches on only when a health facility is contracted in all three years 
2005, 2008 and 2014. 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 draws on information from Egypt’s MOH on whether a 
facility is contracted. Our dataset includes facilities that are contracted in all three 
years 2005, 2008 and 2014 in addition to facilities that are non-contracted in 2005 and 
continue to be so in both years 2008 and 2014. Accordingly, any changes in the 
outcomes of non-contracted facilities cannot be attributed to discontinuing provider 
incentives. We remove facilities that witness any alteration in their contracting status 
between 2005 and 2014 from the dataset. 
In all regression models, we include facility-level characteristics, district-level social 
and economic characteristics as well as regional dummies to control for any potential 
discrepancies at facility, district and regional levels, respectively. A detailed list of all 
the control variables included in our analyses is provided in chapter 3 (see Table 3.4). 
6.5 RESULTS 
In this section, we present the descriptive statistics of the subsample used and discuss 
the estimated effects of discontinuing provider incentives on family planning and 
maternal and child health. 
6.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 6.4 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the facility-level characteristics, the 
district-level characteristics as well as the health outcomes of our subsample. We 
observe moderate variation in labor force, infrastructure (inf) and coverage (cov) 
across Egypt’s health facilities. Moreover, we observe moderate variation in the socio-
economic profiles across districts in Egypt. However, relatively large standard 
deviations are reported with respect to the health outcomes of facilities included in 
our analyses. 
Tables 6.5 and 6.6 compare facility and district characteristics, respectively, by group 
of facilities. On average, the characteristics of contracted facilities are more favorable 
at both facility- and district- levels compared to other facilities. The most significant 
differences observed at the facility level are with respect to the number of practitioners 
(pract), specialists (spec) and pharmacists (pharm) who work in facilities (Table 6.5).  
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Table 6.4: Descriptive statistics 
Variable N Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Facility characteristics 2,808 3.533 4.681 0.000 37.000 
Practitioners 2,307 0.787 2.070 0.000 22.000 
Specialists  2,739 4.090 5.628 0.000 40.000 
Pharmacists  2,856 10.875 10.869 0.000 99.000 
Nurses  2,655 1.534 1.862 0.000 16.000 
Lab technicians  2,286 0.252 0.952 0.000 14.000 
X-ray technicians  2,730 1.481 1.797 0.000 17.000 
Health observers  2,274 0.420 0.925 0.000 8.000 
Social workers  2,499 1.540 0.699 0.000 2.000 
Building condition 2,610 31.092 57.262 0.290 460.035 
Population coverage      
      
District characteristics      
Illiteracy 3,336 32.066 10.748 0.000 56.390 
Unemployment 3,336 9.714 4.813 0.000 23.550 
Income dependency 3,336 6.337 17.401 0.000 87.402 
Inaccessibility to electricity 3,336 1.848 5.728 0.000 69.092 
Inaccessibility to potable water 3,336 5.338 9.232 0.000 90.204 
Family size 3,336 4.324 0.391 2.580 6.170 
HH overcrowding 3,336 1.141 0.109 0.840 1.930 
Population size 3,336 31.185 17.152 0.005 117.380 
      
Health outcomes      
Family planning      
Modern contraceptive prevalence 1,508 50.396 17.373 0.000 100.000 
Knowledge of side effects 1,253 46.990 23.484 0.000 100.000 
Knowledge of contraceptives 1,254 55.276 22.817 0.000 100.000 
ANC      
ANC by skilled health personnel 1,267 77.741 21.881 0.000 100.000 
4+ visits 1,267 68.352 24.473 0.000 100.000 
Iron supplementation 1,267 51.488 25.502 0.000 100.000 
Child health status      
Under-5 mortality 1,367 2.683 5.042 0.000 31.250 
N denotes the number of observations. 
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Table 6.5: Two-sample t-test of facility characteristics of contracted and non-
contracted facilities 
 Non-contracted Contracted Difference 
Practitioners 3.337 5.750 -2.413*** 
   (0.555) 
Specialists  0.714 1.650 -0.936*** 
   (0.277) 
Pharmacists  3.818 7.039 -3.221*** 
   (0.662) 
Nurses  10.987 9.597 1.390 
   (1.292) 
Lab technicians  1.481 2.139 -0.658*** 
   (0.228) 
X-ray technicians  0.248 0.304 -0.056 
   (0.132) 
Health observers  1.421 2.130 -0.709*** 
   (0.213) 
Social workers  0.420 0.410 0.011 
   (0.124) 
Building condition 1.509 1.875 -0.366*** 
   (0.085) 
Population coverage 31.845 23.113 8.732 
   (6.917) 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 6.6: Two-sample t-test of district characteristics of contracted and non-
contracted facilities 
 Non-contracted Contracted Difference 
Illiteracy 32.186 30.476 1.710 
   (1.262) 
Unemployment 9.788 8.731 1.057* 
   (0.565) 
Income dependency 6.524 3.849 2.675 
   (2.043) 
Inaccessibility to electricity 1.928 0.786 1.142* 
   (0.672) 
Inaccessibility to potable water 5.462 3.701 1.761 
   (1.084) 
Family size 4.328 4.263 0.065 
   (0.046) 
HH overcrowding 1.139 1.170 -0.031** 
   (0.013) 
Population size 30.806 36.200 -5.394*** 
   (2.009) 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6.5 also shows that the building condition of contracted facilities is significantly 
better than that of non-contracted facilities. At the district level, significant differences 
are observed with respect to four out of eight socio-economic indicators. These four 
indicators are unemployment (unemp), inaccessibility to electricity (elect), HH 
overcrowding (crowd) and the population size (pop) (Table 6.6). 
Table 6.7 presents the means of health outcomes of groups of health facilities by year. 
We find that six out of seven outcomes improved between 2005 and 2008 for non-
contracted facilities. However, three out of seven outcomes improved for contracted 
facilities during the same period. Between years 2008 and 2014, we observe that six 
out of seven outcomes improved for all types of facilities. We also observe that some 
outcomes, such as mcp and contoth, are steadily improving over time for all types of 
facilities. 
As previously noted, financial incentives to contracted healthcare providers were 
discontinued only by the end of 2008. Hence, we expect the change in outcomes of 
contracted facilities between 2008 and 2014 to reflect this intervention. The last two 
columns of Table 6.7 show that only one out of seven outcomes deteriorated during 
the period 2008-2014. Although most the outcomes of contracted facilities improved 
after discontinuing PBF in 2008, it is important to note that the magnitude of this 
improvement is less than that achieved by non-contracted facilities for some 
outcomes. For example, while knowledge of other contraceptive methods (contoth) 
increased by one percentage points (ppts) between 2008 and 2014 among women with 
access to contracted facilities, contoth increased by more than five ppts among women 
with access to non-contracted facilities (Table 6.7).  
6.5.2 Estimated Effects of Discontinuing Provider Incentives 
A decision should be made on which of the RE/FE models provides efficient and 
consistent estimates of parameters before any discussion of the estimated effects. To 
decide on this, two approaches are used as discussed in section 6.3: the Hausman test 
and the test of over-identifying restrictions. We use our preferred model’s 
specification that includes all controls. Our subsample includes health facilities that 
are contracted in all three years 2005, 2008 and 2014 in addition to facilities that are 
non-contracted in 2005 and continue to be so in both 2008 and 2014. 
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Table 6.7: Health outcomes by year 
  Non-contracted  Contracted 
 2005 2008 2014  2005 2008 2014 
Modern contraceptive 
prevalence 
 52.096 52.286 54.720  54.655 58.711 61.250 
 (0.778) (0.825) (0.721)  (2.198) (3.443) (2.376) 
Knowledge of side 
effects 
 46.367 47.921 46.514  44.979 40.429 52.458 
 (1.281) (1.292) (1.231)  (5.351) (4.037) (3.697) 
Knowledge of 
contraceptives 
 53.435 54.234 57.140  53.207 58.345 59.018 
 (1.158) (1.390) (1.216)  (3.263) (4.102) (3.266) 
ANC by skilled health 
personnel 
 71.106 72.680 91.962  78.830 63.180 94.725 
 (1.186) (1.209) (0.561)  (4.140) (6.003) (1.981) 
4+ visits  59.803 63.658 84.747  63.839 55.952 87.593 
 (1.269) (1.379) (0.765)  (4.182) (5.643) (2.346) 
Iron supplementation  48.357 36.857 67.116  60.470 43.608 81.544 
 (1.202) (1.354) (1.070)  (4.128) (4.937) (3.107) 
Under-5 mortality  3.628 2.380 2.248  3.102 1.484 1.763 
 (0.287) (0.280) (0.224)  (1.265) (0.615) (0.810) 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
 
For equations (6.7) and (6.8), Table 6.8 reports the FE (within) and the RE GLS 
estimates together with the results of Hausman’s and Sargan-Hansen’s tests.1 As per 
the results of the Hausman test, we reject the null hypothesis of no endogeneity for 
three out of seven health outcomes. The FE model should be used to estimate ancprov, 
anc4 and anciron. The Sargan-Hansen Chi-square test statistics indicate that the FE 
model is preferred to the RE model for four of our outcomes: ancprov, anc4, anciron 
and childmort. This conclusion coincides with the findings of the Hausman test for all 
outcomes except childmort. Only for contoth, the results of our tests of over-
identifying restrictions indicate that the RE estimates are equivalent to the pooled 
ordinary least-squares (POLS) estimates. 
Table 6.9 presents the results of the appropriate model specification for each health 
outcome. We report the results of two specifications. The model’s specification (1) 
includes facility-level controls only; specification (2) includes both facility- and 
district-level controls and is our preferred. Our estimates capture the effects of being 
contracted in year 2014, after PBF was discontinued, versus being contracted during 
the period 2005-2008, when PBF was still in operation. 
 
                                                           
1 We perform the Sargan-Hansen test using the Stata command xtoverid developed by Schaffer and 
Stillman (2010). 
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Table 6.8: Estimated differential effects of discontinuing provider incentives 
 Outcome D_2014=1*D_CONT=1 Hausman 
Chi-sq 
Sargan-
Hansen Chi-
sq 
FE RE 
Family 
planning 
Modern contraceptive 
prevalence 
3.129 0.027 2.39 2.455 
(4.613) (4.123)   
Knowledge of side 
effects 
-3.271 0.341 0.31 0.463 
(7.976) (6.716)   
Knowledge of 
contraceptives 
-13.802** -15.145*** 0.04 - 
(5.752) (4.677)   
ANC ANC by skilled health 
personnel 
-12.043*** -6.743* 7.62** 10.091*** 
(4.406) (3.672)   
4+ visits -4.800 -4.134 6.57** 8.018** 
(6.245) (5.057)   
Iron supplementation -19.295* -6.062 8.36** 9.508*** 
(10.976) (7.261)   
Child health 
status 
Under-5 mortality 1.719*** -0.204 3.57 6.369** 
(0.654) (0.806)   
Each row represents a separate regression. Robust standard errors across clusters are reported in 
parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 6.9: Estimates of the most appropriate model specification for discontinuing 
provider incentives 
 Outcome D_2014=1*D_CONT=1 
(1) (2) 
Family planning Modern contraceptive 
prevalence 
-0.567 0.027 
4.455 (4.123) 
Knowledge of side 
effects 
-0.342 0.341 
6.781 (6.716) 
Knowledge of 
contraceptives 
-14.260*** -15.145*** 
4.834 (4.677) 
ANC ANC by skilled health 
personnel 
-12.043*** -12.043*** 
(4.406) (4.406) 
4+ visits -4.800 -4.800 
(6.245) (6.245) 
Iron supplementation -19.295* -19.295* 
(10.976) (10.976) 
Child health status Under-5 mortality 1.719*** 1.719*** 
(0.654) (0.654) 
Each row represents a separate regression. Robust standard errors across clusters are reported in 
parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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We find that discontinuing provider incentives is associated with multiple negative 
effects on the outcomes of contracted facilities (Table 6.9). With respect to family 
planning, a significant negative effect is captured with respect to knowledge of other 
contraceptive methods that could be used (contoth). Table 6.9 indicates that the 
proportion of women with access to contracted facilities, who are informed of other 
contraceptives (contoth), decreased in 2014 by more than 15 ppts compared to the 
period 2005-2008. 
In parallel, we find that discontinuing provider incentives is associated with a 
significant negative effect on the likelihood of receiving ANC by skilled health 
personnel (ancprov) (Table 6.9). We realize that ancprov is an outcome that is directly 
and strongly related to provider incentives. The choice of a woman to use the skilled 
care of a healthcare provider is expected to be influenced by the quality of care that 
the provider offers. In this sense, if discontinuing financial incentives demotivates 
providers from offering the same quality of care, women could become less 
encouraged to be attended for ANC by skilled health personnel. 
We also find that discontinuing provider incentives is associated with a significant 
negative effect on the likelihood of receiving iron supplements during pregnancy 
(anciron). Table 6.9 shows that the proportion of women with access to contracted 
facilities, who receive iron supplements (anciron), decreased by about one fifth in 
2014 compared to the period 2005-2008. This finding suggests that discontinuing 
provider incentives worsens the quality of ANC provided in contracted facilities. 
More importantly, Table 6.9 provides evidence that discontinuing provider incentives 
has a significant negative effect on child mortality. We observe that discontinuing 
provider incentives is associated with a significant increase by 2 ppts in under-five 
mortality (childmort) among children with access to contracted facilities. This 
negative effect suggests that discontinuing provider incentives is associated with 
lower quality of child health services provided, which deter women from its use. 
As previously noted, one of the indicators based upon which a contracted facility 
qualifies for financial incentives is the protection provided by family planning 
services denoted by the years of protection. We observe that discontinuing provider 
incentives has an insignificant effect on modern contraceptive prevalence (mcp) 
among women with access to contracted facilities in 2014 (Table 6.9). Another 
138 
indicator is ANC visits per pregnant woman. We observe that discontinuing the 
incentives has a negative effect on ANC coverage (at least four visits) (anc4). 
However, the effect observed is not significant (Table 6.9). 
6.6 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS  
As noted earlier, the RE and FE models are used to estimate the effects of 
discontinuing provider incentives. We perform a number of checks to test for facility 
FE and RE. These models are tested against the POLS model.  
Facility-FE Model. First, we test the FE model against the POLS model. To do so, 
we use the F-test that jointly tests that all facility effects are zero for each of the health 
outcomes. We do not report correct cluster-robust Huber/White standard errors. The 
second column of Table 6.10 reports the F-test statistics for FE. We reject the null 
hypothesis that facility effects equal zero for most of our outcomes. Thus, the FE 
model is preferred to the POLS model as significant facility FE are observed. If we 
choose to use the POLS model, unobserved facility heterogeneity will cause our 
estimates to be biased and inconsistent. 
 
Table 6.10: Summary of results of diagnostic tests 
 Facility FE: 
F statistic 
RE: Chi-sq 
statistic 
RE vs. FE: 
Hausman’s 
Chi-sq 
statistic 
RE vs. FE: 
Sargan-
Hansen Chi-
sq statistic 
Preferred 
model 
Modern contraceptive 
prevalence 
1.98*** 7.15*** 
2.39 
2.455 RE 
Knowledge of side 
effects 
1.10 0.38 
0.31 
0.463 RE 
Knowledge of 
contraceptives 
1.02 0.00 
0.04 
- POLS/RE 
ANC by skilled 
health personnel 
2.29*** 1.22 
7.62** 
10.091*** FE 
4+ visits 
 
2.18*** 1.00 
6.57** 
8.018** FE 
Iron supplementation 
 
1.22* 5.84*** 
8.36** 
9.508*** FE 
Under-5 mortality 
 
1.27** 1.51* 
3.57 
6.369** FE 
 
RE Model. Second, we test the RE model against the POLS model. To do so, we use 
the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier (LM) test. The LM test statistic is 
compared against a chi-squared distribution. Correct cluster-robust Huber/White 
139 
standard errors are reported. The third column of Table 6.10 reports the chi-sq test 
statistics for RE. We reject the null hypothesis that the variance of the unobserved FE 
is zero for mcp, anciron and childmort. Significant RE are observed in the panel data 
used to estimate some outcomes. For these outcomes, the RE model is preferred to the 
POLS model. 
RE versus FE Model. As previously discussed, the Hausman test and a test of over-
identifying restrictions are used to test for RE versus FE. For contoth, the POLS model 
is preferred to the RE or the FE model. However, we prefer to use a panel data model 
to exploit the panel structure of our data. So, we would rather use the RE or the FE 
model. We could still report the results that the POLS model yields, whenever it is 
preferred, to support the robustness of our results yielded by the panel data model we 
choose (RE or FE). 
The Hausman and the Sargan-Hansen Chi-square tests’ statistics are reported in the 
fourth and the fifth columns, respectively, of Table 6.10. These results support the 
findings of our tests for facility-FE and RE reported in the second and third columns, 
respectively, of Table 6.10. The preferred model for each of our health outcomes of 
interest is indicated in the last column of Table 6.10. 
6.7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter introduces evidence for the first time on the effect of discontinuing 
provider incentives in low- and middle-income countries, and highlights the effects of 
such discontinuation on the health services initially targeted by the PBF scheme. Data 
from three waves of the Egypt DHS (2005, 2008 and 2014) are collapsed at the facility 
level and RE/FE models are used in this context.  
With respect to family planning, we find that discontinuing provider incentives had a 
significant negative effect on knowledge of other contraceptive methods that could be 
used. As for ANC, discontinuing the incentives had a significant negative effect on 
the likelihood of receiving ANC by skilled health personnel and receiving iron 
supplements during pregnancy. More importantly, we find that discontinuing the 
incentives was associated with higher under-five child mortality. 
The findings of this chapter suggest that PBF schemes need to be applied carefully in 
low- and middle-income countries as negative effects are observed when provider 
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incentives are discontinued. The sustainability of funding remains a key challenge for 
continuing the incentives in most of these countries. Thus, adequate revenue streams 
should be generated to finance PBF schemes in order to avoid any potential negative 
effects of discontinuation. In addition, consideration of alternative health sector 
interventions is initially required before introducing any incentives in low-resource 
settings, especially in light of the weak evidence on the maintenance of performance 
levels after incentive discontinuation. 
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7. CONCLUSION 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This thesis investigates the effects of different interventions under Egypt’s Health 
Sector Reform Program (HSRP) on a complete set of family planning, maternal 
health and child health outcomes during the period 2000-2014. To provide reliable 
evidence, a number of methods are used complementarily: difference-in-differences 
(DD), DD propensity score matching (PSM), fixed effects (FE), random effects (RE) 
and pooled ordinary least-squares (POLS). Four waves of the Egypt’s Demographic 
and Health Survey (DHS) are collapsed at the facility level to calculate our health 
outcomes of interest. These outcomes are combined with information on different 
interventions at the facility level, facility-level characteristics, and district-level 
social and economic characteristics. 
This chapter concludes the thesis. In section 7.2, we summarize the results obtained 
from the preceding empirical chapters. We derive some policy implications based on 
our empirical results in section 7.3. Section 7.4 outlines the limitations of the thesis. 
Finally, we propose some directions for future research in section 7.5. 
7.2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
In this section, we summarize the results on the effects on family planning and 
maternal and child health obtained from the empirical chapters 3 to 6. The main 
contributions of the thesis are highlighted in accordance. 
Chapter 3 that estimates the effect of improving the quality of health care through a 
facility accreditation program provides evidence that quality improvements can have 
multiple significant positive effects, especially on delivery care and child morbidity 
prevalence. However, for these effects to be sustained, a high level of commitment 
from the central government is indispensable. The chapter also provides evidence 
that facility accreditation as a stand-alone policy is ineffective in improving the 
utilization as well as the quality of ANC services. 
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In chapter 4, we found that introducing user fees drove demand for health services in 
two opposite directions. With respect to ANC, the positive effect of increased 
willingness to pay for an improved quality of service outweighed the negative effect 
of the price elasticity of demand. Introducing user fees was associated with a higher 
likelihood of receiving ANC by skilled health personnel, a higher likelihood of 
receiving at least four ANC visits and a higher likelihood of receiving iron 
supplements during pregnancy. However, the two effects offset each other with 
respect to the outcomes that reflect the utilization of family planning and delivery 
care services, women’s access to health care, and child health status. No net effect at 
all was observed on these outcomes. 
Again, we observe positive effects on both the utilization and the quality of ANC 
services when user fees are accompanied by two quality improvement interventions 
(facility accreditation and PBF of providers) (chapter 5). More notably, a positive 
effect on access to care was observed during our first study period (2000-2005). 
However, these effects were reversed during the second study period (2005-2008). 
In this context, it is important to note that user fees were introduced in 2004 and, 
therefore, the second study period is more likely to reflect the effects of user fees 
while the first period is more likely to reflect the effects of quality improvements. 
The positive effects of introducing user fees captured in chapter 4 could be partially 
driven by higher level of public awareness of the pro-poor exemption policy during 
the study period of this chapter (2008-2014) compared to the study period of chapter 
5 (2005-2008). 
It is also important to note that the positive effects reported in both chapters 4 and 5 
were mainly with respect to ANC outcomes. No effects were reported with respect 
to the outcomes that reflect the utilization of family planning and delivery care 
services, and child health status. The findings of both chapters suggest that, even 
when accompanied by quality improvements, introducing user fees in low- and 
middle-income settings can have negative effects on access to and utilization of 
health care, especially in light of unpublicized exemptions and unsustainable quality 
improvements. 
In chapter 6, we provide the first evidence on the effect of discontinuing provider 
incentives in low- and middle-income countries. We benefit from the fact that PBF 
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was replaced by “fee-for-service” in Egypt in 2008 to separately estimate the effect 
of incentive discontinuation on health outcomes that reflect the health services 
targeted by the PBF scheme as well as the quality of these services during the period 
2008-2014. We found that discontinuing the incentives had a significant negative 
effect on four out of the seven considered health outcomes: knowledge of 
contraceptive methods, receiving ANC by skilled health personnel, receiving iron 
supplements during pregnancy and, more importantly, under-five child mortality. 
These multiple negative effects suggest that PBF schemes need to be applied 
carefully in low- and middle-income countries. 
7.3 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This thesis has important policy implications for improving family planning, 
maternal health and child health in low- and middle-income countries. First, 
improving the quality of care through facility accreditation can be particularly 
effective in improving delivery care and child health. If needed, accreditation can be 
accompanied by some interventions in order to meet equipment quality standards 
and strengthen staff’s competence in addressing maternal and child health needs. 
Second, the sustainability of the positive effects of quality improvements partially 
depends on the level of commitment from the central government. 
Third, user fees are ineffective, in general, as a stand-alone policy. Introducing user 
fees should be part of a broader package of interventions that include addressing the 
quality of care in order to offset reduction in care utilization. Fourth, introducing 
user fees on the demand side will not necessarily have negative effects on access to 
and utilization of family planning, maternal health and child health services. 
Introducing user fees can even be associated with some positive effects on the 
utilization and the quality of ANC services. Fifth, any potential negative effects of 
introducing user fees in low- and middle-income settings on the utilization of 
healthcare services can be mitigated by officially exempting the poor from any fees 
at the point of service. More importantly, this exemption should be necessarily 
known to the population. Sixth, combining quality improvement interventions with 
user fees will not necessarily add to the few positive effects obtained when user fees 
are introduced as a stand-alone policy. 
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Seventh, provider incentives should be introduced carefully in low- and middle-
income countries as negative effects are observed when these incentives are 
discontinued. To avoid these negative effects, adequate revenue streams should be 
generated to support the financial sustainability of the PBF schemes. In addition, 
consideration of alternative health sector interventions is initially required before 
introducing any provider incentives in low-resource settings, especially in light of 
the weak evidence on the maintenance of performance levels after PBF schemes are 
discontinued. 
Finally, the lack of effects of different types and combinations of health sector 
interventions under Egypt’s HSRP on modern contraceptive prevalence necessitates 
the investigation of the effectiveness of outreach activities in this regard. 
7.4 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
We realize that the study of this thesis has some limitations. These limitations are 
mainly related to the data used. First, the lack of random assignment to treatment 
and the lack of randomization from accreditation to contracting could affect the 
validity of our inferences. The best option to control for the HSRP targeting is to 
include the socio-economic indicators initially used for the targeting whenever 
applicable. In addition, a set of facility-level characteristics are included as controls 
whenever applicable to account for possible differences between treated and control 
facilities prior to being accredited, being contracted or shifting from accreditation to 
contracting. 
Second, the Egypt DHS does not allow us to track the same women and children 
over time. Therefore, we collapse data from each DHS wave at the facility level and 
investigate the effects of interventions under the HSRP at the facility rather than the 
individual level. 
Third, a limitation of spatially linking women to their nearest mapped health 
facilities is that we do not account for the fact that some women could seek health 
care from alternative sources apart from their nearest facilities. However, the 
phenomenon of bypassing is unlikely in our context as for a woman to use a public 
PHC facility in Egypt, she is obliged by the Ministry of Health (MOH) to use only 
the facility in catchment. 
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Fourth, we limit our analyses on child health to the prevalence instead of treatment 
of common early childhood illnesses. The number of observations that the Egypt 
DHS avails on treatment is statistically insufficient to construct indicators of 
treatment at the facility level. Thus, indicators of prevalence of these illnesses are 
constructed instead. Whenever applicable, we also construct a comprehensive 
indicator of early childhood mortality: the under-five mortality rate. 
7.5 DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The results of this thesis encourage an enquiry into several directions. First, future 
research is needed to understand the contextual factors associated with the 
differential effects of health sector interventions on family planning and maternal 
and child health. Our results can be complemented by in-depth process evaluations 
to identify mechanisms via which an intervention can or cannot be effective. 
Second, the lack of effects of different interventions under Egypt’s HSRP on 
modern contraceptive prevalence suggests investigation into the effectiveness of 
outreach activities, especially on family planning outcomes. 
Third, the results of this thesis can be further strengthened by investigating the 
spillover effects of different interventions under the HSRP at the district level. This 
investigation would enable us to acquire a more comprehensive understanding of the 
effects of these interventions. 
Fourth, it is also important for future research to investigate the differential effects 
of interventions on population subgroups, most importantly, targeted subgroups such 
as high-risk populations. 
Fifth, future research should also attempt to investigate the effects of different health 
sector interventions on inequalities in access to and utilization of healthcare services 
and health outcomes. 
Sixth, an extension of the work in this thesis can involve investigating the cost-
effectiveness of health sector interventions in low- and middle-income countries in 
general and in Egypt in particular. Local governments, donor agencies and funding 
organizations seek evidence on the cost-effectiveness of different interventions. The 
financial sustainability of different intervention schemes, especially those that are 
externally funded, should be investigated as well. 
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